CONFIDENTIAL

ARCHIVES

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART 27.

JULY—DEC. 1930.

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXVII

JULY TO DECEMBER 1930

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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

Part XXVII.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 3448/1306/91] No. 1.

High Commissioner of Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, June 27.)

(No. 295.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Bagdad, June 24, 1930.*

REFERENCE telegram No. 78 from Jedda to Foreign Office. In oral discussions with me, King and Prime Minister expressed strongest disapproval of linking Extradition Treaty with "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. I, however, find that in letter to Fuad Hamza the Prime Minister—provided political offenders are exempted and term "political offence" is defined in advance—welcome idea of negotiating Extradition Treaty. This is polite way of turning down extradition altogether.

A second letter was being written, Feisal informed me, asking that signature of "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement should not be delayed by negotiations for extradition.

As Ryan suggests, I am writing personal letter to Ibn Saud.

[E 3552/3090/91] No. 2.

Sir S. Barton to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Addis Ababa, June 9, 1930.*

WITH reference to Mr. Troutbeck's despatch No. 65 of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to report that my German colleague has shown me the text of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce which he hopes to sign on behalf of the Reich with the Kingdom of the Yemen.

2. The treaty is modelled on that made with the Kingdom of the Hejaz and consists of four articles providing for perpetual friendship, exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives, and most-favoured-nation treatment for German citizens and goods. The German and Arabic texts are to be of equal force.

3. During the negotiations which have been carried on in Cairo during the past year, the Yemen representative sought to obtain the insertion of articles recognising the independence and the boundaries of his State, such as are found in the treaty with the Soviet Union, and also of articles recognising the right of jurisdiction, such as are found in the treaty with Persia, but the German Government, so Dr. Prüfer informs me, are not prepared to agree to such insertion.

4. Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and to the political resident at Aden.

I have, &c.
S. BARTON.

[E 3563/1/91] No. 3.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, July 3, 1930.*

MY telegram No. 90.

On the receipt of Bagdad telegram No. 321 to Colonial Office, I thought it advisable to make telephone communication to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs about Ibn Mashhur this morning without awaiting further instructions.

I said that Iraqi Government, influenced by High Commissioner, were doing everything to promote return of Ibn Mashhur to this country. I understood that King Feisal had written to Ibn Saud on 14th June suggesting despatch to Ibn Mashur of letter conveying pardon promised on board "Lupin."

Ibn Mashhur had tried to get commission to go to Syria. This had been refused, but, in view of his desire to go there, despatch of pardon at an early date would be advantageous.

Pending instructions as to degree of pressure to be used in connexion with question of £10,000, I reminded Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs some days ago that I was awaiting fulfilment of promise which I had understood the King to give me on 11th June. He said to-day that the King had given an order for payment. He hoped it would be made within a week or at the furthest fortnight.

I made no reference to King Feisal's offer to accept £30,000 in full settlement. I think it best to leave this between the two Kings at present.

I now expect to see Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on 7th July. If you approve action so far, I will continue on the same lines.

(Repeated to Bagdad and Bushire, No. 140.)

[E 3564/1308/91] No. 4.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, July 3, 1930.*

MY immediately preceding telegram, last paragraph.

I propose also, if you see no objection, to pursue question of "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement on 7th July. In view of Bagdad telegram No. 295 to Colonial Office, I would say I understand that Iraq Government do not object in principle to Extradition Treaty, subject to agreement about political offenders, but that earlier conclusion of "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement is most desirable.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 141.)

[E 3580/2/91] No. 5.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Jedda, July 4, 1930.*

MY telegram No. 92.

Reply from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated 30th June, expresses the King's thanks for the various facilities described in my note. Assurances are given regarding accommodation, subsistence and return journey of pilot to be borrowed from Royal Air Force; approximate date on which his assistance will be required will be notified to me in due course. The King agrees to his aeroplane being fitted with improvements at Hinaidi as proposed.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs states, with reference to portion of my letter dealing with pearling flights, the King has given orders to the authorities concerned "with a view to studying the subject and searching in islands opposite His Majesty's coast for a suitable place for this purpose, but owing to far distance definite reply on the subject is not possible before lapse of necessary time."

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Jerusalem.)

[E 3563/1/91] No. 6.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 5, 1930.*

YOUR telegram No. 99 of 3rd July: Return of Ibn Mashhur to Nejd and proposed payments by Hejazi Government in settlement of Iraqi raid claims.

I approve your action and proposal to continue on same lines. Please note that the payment of £10,000 is to be on account of Iraq and Koweit claims, and not, as stated in Bagdad telegram No. 304 to Colonial Office, on account of Iraq claims only.

Your telegram No. 100 of 3rd July.
No objection.
(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 3584/223/91] No. 7.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Jedda, July 5, 1930.*

MY despatch No. 131.

When preparing record I unfortunately overlooked one communication from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, written on 10th June, in explanation of oral references made during conversations with MacDonnell to special position as regards raids by Ibn Mashhur.

Note stated that Hejaz Government could not accept responsibility for claims in respect of raids on Transjordanian tribes by Ibn Mashhur, Eddiheina and Errafdi, because immediately after raids in question they had pursued the culprits, recovered part of the loot and returned it to the victims. During the pursuit the culprits joined with Nejd rebels, and, when latter were defeated, crossed into Iraq, where they still are with their property and remainder of the loot. During the negotiations in January British Government undertook to hand over to Ibn Saud all Nejd criminals and deserters, and Hejaz Government could naturally not accept responsibility in connexion with previous action of such persons pending fulfilment of that undertaking.

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 3598/223/91] No. 8.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 131.)
Sir, *Jedda, June 12, 1930.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 73 and 74 of the 11th June, I have the honour to state that King Ibn Saud received Mr. MacDonnell in formal audience on the morning of the 7th June and for business in the afternoon. In addition to Sheikh Fuad Hamza, Sheikhs Yussef Yasin and Hafiz Wahba were present at the business audience and the subsequent discussions. It was noticeable that, after the King, Yussef Yasin played the leading part.

2. In order to facilitate discussion and minimise any danger of the King's professing to be taken unawares, Mr. MacDonnell had prepared a memorandum, dated the 6th June, which I forwarded with a formal covering note, so as to reach Fuad Hamza early on the 7th June, when the King came down from Mecca. I enclose a copy of this memorandum.

3. At the business audience, the King first embarked on general considerations connected with the Transjordan frontier situation. I reminded him that this was a subject on which I was instructed to make a separate communication, and that I had only been prevented by His Majesty's illness from making it in advance of Mr. MacDonnell's visit to him. When he had been gently steered back to the business in hand, he began by declaring the whole of Mr. MacDonnell's plan to be unpracticable. He proposed instead that Mr. MacDonnell should study all the Hejaz Government files in Jedda before he did anything else. Presently, he changed his front and agreed to attach a representative to Mr. MacDonnell, though he insisted that any idea of getting into touch with scattered tribesmen through such

a representative was chimerical. His most definite pronouncement was when he plumped for alternative (*b*) in paragraph 5 of Mr. MacDonnell's memorandum. The upshot of the discussion was a sort of agreement on several points, but so nebulous that I suggested our meeting the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs next day to tabulate the results.

4. This led to a series of three meetings on the 8th and 9th June between the three sheikhs, Mr. MacDonnell and myself. At the outset they produced a counter-memorandum, a translation of which I enclose. Taking the two memoranda as a basis, we engaged in most terribly wearisome debates, which turned principally on four points, namely:—

(*a*) The appointment and functions of the Hejaz Government official to be attached to the mission.
(*b*) The question of how best to get such evidence as might be required, other than that already recorded on paper.
(*c*) The question of what was to be considered notification within a reasonable time for the purpose of claims being admitted to investigation.
(*d*) The question of access to and facilities in Hejaz-Nejd territory.

5. Points (*a*) and (*b*) gave rise to comparatively little difficulty. It was agreed that one and the same official should act as representative attached to the mission for purposes of liaison, issuing summonses and the submission of cases. The official in view was produced at one of the meetings. He proved to be one Sheikh Abdul Aziz an assistant to the Governor of Jedda. He is not held of great account locally, but, it is [illegible] he would [illegible] a walking encyclopædia of information relative to raids. As for point (*b*), there was obvious force in the King's suggestion that it would be difficult to muster promiscuous tribesmen at short notice from all quarters, and it was important to avoid, if possible, a situation in which, the attempt to do so having failed, Ibn Saud could say "Told you so!" Mr. MacDonnell therefore agreed, without committing himself, to consider benevolently the suggestion that the tribes near the frontier should be represented by a certain number of spokesmen.

6. The three sheikhs were incredibly tiresome over point (*c*), and hours were wasted. The King had broached the matter at the audience and seemed satisfied with an explanation to the effect that the formula "within a reasonable time" was intended to be interpreted in the most favourable sense. In the subsequent [illegible] it was not [illegible] His Majesty was [illegible] admission of all claims or the recognition of all which had not been notified without delay. In the end the three [illegible] Mr. MacDonnell [illegible] his [illegible] from His Majesty's [illegible] I regret [illegible] views [illegible] Mr. MacDonnell [illegible] His Majesty's Government [illegible] expressly [illegible]

7. The King and the three sheikhs [illegible] to express no views as to where Mr. MacDonnell should hold his enquiry. [illegible] assisted however the [illegible] be no necessity for entering Hejaz-Nejd territory [illegible] that the state of the country (due, it was [illegible]) [illegible] such as to make any visit to Hejaz-Nejd territory most inadvisable. All the eloquence of Mr. MacDonnell [illegible] this point.

8. On the afternoon of the 8th June I prepared, in consultation with Mr. MacDonnell, a draft record [illegible] which I sent to Fuad Hamza late that evening. The King countered next morning [illegible] letter to Mr. MacDonnell [illegible] which I [illegible]. The Monday passed in two desperate discussions. Towards the end I suggested that, if nothing could be agreed on as regards points [illegible] the record I should deal with them in a covering letter to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. While I was drafting a possible letter for this purpose, Sheikhs Yusef Yasin and Hafiz

Wahba went out to pray on the verandah of the Legation, where we were sitting. I [illegible] the King. I enclose copies of the record as finally drawn up and the covering letter, with which I [illegible] morning of the 10th June to make sure that the texts were, in fact, agreed.

9. The results of all this labour were meagre, but they are of some value, especially the promises regarding the Hejaz Government agent. The affability of both sides survived the great strain put upon it. On the night of the 8th June the King entertained Mr. MacDonnell, myself, with the principal members of my staff and the commander and two officers of H.M.S. "Clematis," at a great dinner. He was in a very merry monarch mood, told us much about the stars, and cracked jokes with the Keeper of the Key of the Kaaba. He received Mr. MacDonnell in farewell audience before he left on the afternoon of the 10th June, and was again most forthcoming though more serious. He excused himself for having seemed stiff and ungracious during the negotiations, saying that he had been seeking in a spirit of truth to enter only into such commitments as he could fulfil. I took it on me to reply to this part of His Majesty's remarks. I assured him that there had been no [illegible] I myself, I said, believed in plain though polite speaking as the best method of [illegible] used to get at the kernel. I hoped that, before he was finished, Mr. MacDonnell would produce a whole basketful of nicely shelled walnuts. In this exchange, which [illegible] him, I had in mind the necessity I should be under of expressing myself very categorically in later discussions with the King on the general [illegible] subjects.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and to Mr. MacDonnell.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

Memorandum by Mr. M. S. MacDonnell for submission to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.

THE instructions of His Britannic Majesty's Government are that I should examine all claims arising out of raids, committed between the conclusion of the [illegible] the Government of Hejaz-Nejd [illegible] that such [illegible] that [illegible] sufficient [illegible] evidence [illegible]

2. [illegible] the Hejaz Government [illegible] assistance which [illegible] that [illegible] for [illegible] Government has [illegible] to [illegible] a responsible with [illegible] authority to [illegible] and [illegible] wherever required by me to [illegible] such [illegible] for the purposes [illegible] that His Majesty [illegible] to [illegible] powers to my mission and to inform [illegible] of the tenor of the orders given to this official.

3. It has been left to my discretion, in accordance with the freedom of action allowed me under the arrangements already made with the two Governments concerned, to select any place or places for examining the claims. I am not yet in a position to state definitely what place may eventually be found most suitable. The main factors in fixing the headquarters of the mission will be facilities of communication, accessibility to the interested parties and adequate accommodation. It will consequently be of assistance to me to hear any suggestions that His Majesty the King may wish to make on this point and to receive any information as to the

localities in which the members of the Hejaz-Nejd tribes concerned will be found during the present summer season.

4. The Transjordan Government has undertaken to supply me with the transport escorts, guides and accommodation necessary while I am in its territories. I am instructed to request that His Majesty the King may be pleased to order the same facilities to be accorded to me within His Majesty's territories. It may in practice be more convenient that I should make use alternatively of any means of transport placed at my disposal by the British authorities in Transjordan. As it is the desire of all parties to facilitate the rapid accomplishment of my task, I trust I may assume that His Majesty the King will have no objection to my continuing to use for the prosecution of necessary enquiries in His Majesty's territory any transport already placed at my disposal by other authorities.

5. The procedure to be adopted to arrive at a clear understanding of the claims put forward has also been left to my discretion. I have been considering the comparative advantages of two methods, viz. (a) A Bedouin tribunal with myself as president, to hear each case, and (b) the submission of the cases by a competent person authorised by each Government to sustain claims of its nationals falling within the scope of my instructions as defined in paragraph 1 above. The first procedure has certain [illegible] advantages but may involve considerable delays. The second is not open to this objection, but may give rise to others from the point of view of the two Governments. I should consequently be glad to receive an expression of the opinion of His Majesty on this point, in the course of the intended audience.

6. His Britannic Majesty's Government attach importance to a speedy termination of the mission. It is my intention, after receiving an expression from His Majesty the King, when I have the honour of being received by him, to proceed to Transjordan to consult similarly with His Highness the Emir and the Government of that territory.

Jedda, June 6, 1930.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

Sheikh Fuad Hamza to Sir A. Ryan.

(Translation.) 12.1.1349 (*June* 8, 1930)

Your Excellency,

WITH reference to your Excellency's memorandum of 2.1.1349 (the 6th June, 1930), I have the honour to send you a memorandum in reply containing the answers and observations which the Government of His Majesty give concerning Mr. MacDonnell's memorandum of the same date.

As Mr. MacDonnell exhibited to His Majesty in the audience that took place on the 4th June the commission given to him by His Majesty King George V, and as His Majesty has seen it, I have the honour to return it to your Excellency herewith so that you may be good enough to deliver it to Mr. MacDonnell.

The Hejaz Government, who attach great importance to the settlement with Transjordan of the question of looted property (raids ?), are prepared to offer all possible assistance to facilitate Mr. MacDonnell's mission.

With highest respects,

FUAD HAMZA.

Sub Enclosure to Enclosure 2.

Memorandum in reply to Mr. MacDonnell's Memorandum.

(Translation.) 12.1.1349 (*June* 8, 1930)

Although His Majesty has confidence in the British Government and the representative selected by them to conduct the investigation, he draws attention to the necessity of explaining the basis upon which the arbitrator will accept claims for raids in respect of which a long delay has occurred before official notification was made, [illegible] which will make the notification acceptable.

His Majesty agrees to attach to the mission a competent official entrusted to summon Hejaz Nejd nationals or witnesses whose evidence the arbitrator may find

it necessary to take. But His Majesty thinks that there is much less hope of success if this system is employed than if the arbitrator were now to appoint, after discussion with His Majesty's Government (the Hejaz Government), a number of persons, chosen from every tribe, whether raiders or raided, to represent the interests of the tribes concerned and to give information on their behalf. His Majesty, therefore, expects that Mr. MacDonnell will agree to choose those people instead of [illegible] individuals whose evidence the arbitrator wishes to hear. His Majesty believes that choosing representatives from the tribes will tend to accelerate the work and will [illegible]

[illegible] Mr. MacDonnell insists in his opinion that persons should not be appointed [illegible] left [illegible] to assist the [illegible] but [illegible] procedure is [illegible]

His Majesty has not yet been able to give a decision with regard to the place [illegible]

Neither is His Majesty able to give a reply to paragraph 4 of Mr. MacDonnell's memorandum, as it is not possible to answer this point before fixing the place in [illegible] will be able to give a decision on the subject.

In the opinion of His Majesty, the procedure which should be followed in the investigation is that a representative should be appointed by the Government of His Majesty (Hejaz Government) to defend the point of view of the Hejaz-Nejd tribes and to produce the documents of which the arbitrator has need; moreover, His Majesty thinks that this person should be identical with the individual whom it is suggested to attach to the mission.

His Majesty thinks it essential that the evidence of the tribesmen [illegible] own Government or their fellow tribesmen. This rule should be applied to the tribes of both sides.

His Majesty considers it an essential condition that the raided party [illegible] except those persons who shall be selected by the arbitrator for the purpose of defend their action and support their claim.

[Enclosure 3 not printed.]

Enclosure 4 in No. 8.

Ibn Saud to Mr. MacDonnell.

(Translation.) *June* 9, 1930

WE regret to learn from our representatives that you thought that we had [illegible] which we gave to the Government of British [illegible] expressing our opinion to them [illegible] the question of [illegible] between us and the Government of Transjordan, and that because we insisted upon the inadmissibility of claims which have not been [illegible]

If the British Government, when they authorised you (to act for them) and appointed you as their agent, instructed you to settle the [illegible] in accordance with the authorisation we gave them for that purpose, we accept and we have no objections. If, however, the British Government instructed you to submit your memorandum to us for an expression of our opinion thereon, then our opinion is that which was explained to you by our representatives, and is confirmed by us at the beginning of the memorandum presented to you through our representatives on the 8th June.

With respects,

(Seal) IBN SAUD

Enclosure 5 in No. 8

Sir A. Ryan to Fuad Hamza

My dear Minister, *Jedda, June* 10, 1930

WITH reference to the discussions which have taken place between His Majesty the King and his advisers, Mr MacDonnell and myself during the last three days, I enclose the record as finally drawn up of the points agreed upon.

We discussed at some length the question raised by His Majesty on the use of the words "such notification was made within a reasonable delay" &c. in the first paragraph of Mr MacDonnell's memorandum of the 6th June. As Mr MacDonnell pointed out, this matter is not one which he is really entitled [illegible] bound by certain instructions from His Britannic Majesty's Government. I myself as representative of the British Government, willingly note the views of His Majesty the King as expressed in your Excellency's memorandum of the 8th June and His Majesty's letter to Mr MacDonnell of the 9th June, and I will not fail to bring those views to the notice of my Government.

In deference to the wishes of His Majesty, the record as finally drawn up contains no reference to the question of transport and accommodation for Mr MacDonnell on the occasion of any journeys which he might wish to undertake into His Majesty's territory. His Majesty has expressed the view that no such journeys can be necessary or would be advisable. As His Britannic Majesty's Government, to whom His Majesty has given full power to arbitrate, have hitherto believed that their investigator would have a free hand to conduct his enquiries in whatever manner seemed best, I should be grateful if I could have, for submission to them, a statement of the reasons on which His Majesty founds his view.

Yours sincerely,
ANDREW RYAN

Sub Enclosure to Enclosure 5

[illegible] *His Majesty the King [illegible] Advisers and Mr MacDonnell on June 7, 8 and 9, with His Britannic Majesty's Minister present and assisting.*

The Hejaz Government will attach to Mr MacDonnell's mission an official, herein called "the agent," who will

(a) Serve as a channel of communication with the Hejaz Government for matters not requiring the intervention of His Britannic Majesty's Minister;

(b) Serve as intermediary for such summonses as Mr. MacDonnell may have occasion to address to Hejaz-Nejd subjects with a view to elucidating claims;

(c) Serve generally as the agent of the Hejaz Nejd Government for the submission of claims put forward by persons subject to the authority of that Government and for the production of all necessary documents or other evidence in support of such claims.

2. As regards [illegible] Mr MacDonnell [illegible] difficulty of securing the personal attendance of large numbers of Hejaz Nejd subjects, consider the proposal that His Majesty should nominate representatives of the various tribes in the neighbourhood of the frontier to be at the disposal of Mr MacDonnell, whenever notified through the agent, as spokesmen of the tribe concerned. Mr. MacDonnell will inform His Majesty through His Britannic Majesty's Minister of his conclusions on this point as soon as he has conferred with the authorities in Transjordan, in order that His Majesty may be able to issue instructions to the tribes without delay.

3. The question of the place or places at which Mr MacDonnell should conduct his investigation is one which His Majesty prefers to leave to Mr MacDonnell's discretion. Mr MacDonnell will inform the Hejaz Government through His Britannic Majesty's Minister of his conclusions on this subject as soon as he has conferred with the authorities in Transjordan.

4. Mr. MacDonnell will consider the point raised in paragraph 6 of the Hejaz Government's memorandum of the 8th June [illegible] His Majesty's interest indicates, are equally concerned. It appears to him, however, that all questions of the admissibility and value of particular kinds of evidence are such as can only be definitely settled by the investigator himself in the actual course of his enquiries.

5. Mr MacDonnell takes note of the proposal in paragraph 7 of the Hejaz Government's memorandum of the 8th June. He will [illegible] He understands that the point [illegible] practice [illegible]

Jedda, June 10, 1930

E 3605/92/91] No. 9.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 147)

Sir, *Jedda, June* 21, 1930

WITH reference to Mr Bond's despatch No. 103 of the 3rd May, I have the honour to forward the Jedda report for the month of May 1930. [illegible] Mr. MacDonnell's visit and the King's presence in Jedda. [illegible]

2. Copies of the report have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Jerusalem for transmission to the [illegible] Sudan, Lagos, the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea sloops and His Majesty's consul at Basra.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure in No. 9.

Jedda Report for Period May 1 to 31, 1930

Internal Affairs and Frontier Questions.

ALTHOUGH, as stated elsewhere, there have been vague rumours of "trouble in Nejd" no definite information [illegible] to the [illegible]

2. [illegible] Mr MacDonnell [illegible] His Majesty [illegible] Ryan [illegible] that, by the [illegible] date the [illegible] done on the Transjordan side in the way of development [illegible] Tribal Control Board, providing the Frontier Force with mechanical transport and [illegible] the [illegible] Nejd [illegible] large [illegible] and Ibn Nesmat, in February. He was to be urged to take serious steps to control his tribes and to be urged to give immediate

effect to article 3 of the Hadda Agreement, which provides for the maintenance of direct contact between the authorities on both sides of the frontier, but which has never come into operation owing to Ibn Saud's attitude. Owing to the King's absence at Mecca no opportunity occurred during May of carrying out these instructions, but Sir Andrew Ryan prepared the ground in conversation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3. Reports continued to be current regarding an alleged intention on the part of Ibn Saud to attack the Yemen. They were of such a nature as to deserve some attention, but, at the same time, to necessitate great reserve in accepting them. One of the more precise rumours in May was [illegible] Nejdi garrison at Abu Arish, inland from Jizan. It is possible that the King may have a troublesome situation in Asir itself. It is also possible that he may hope at a favourable opportunity to extend southward along the [illegible] boundary between Asir and Yemen remains undefined. But it seems improbable that he would try conclusions with the Imam of Sana in recognised Yemen territory.

4. The question of general negotiations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud [illegible] in abeyance during the month.

5. Much the most important event of the month in connexion with frontier relations was the despatch of letters from King to King Faisal and Fuad Hamza to the Iraq Minister for Foreign Affairs intimating in studiously polite but definite language that Ibn Saud was not prepared to confirm the Treaty of Friendship and *Bon Voisinage*, agreed to in principle at the "Lupin" Conference and initialled by his Ministers at Bagdad on the 9th March, until such time as an extradition treaty should have been also negotiated. Fuad Hamza sent copies of these letters to Sir Andrew Ryan under cover of a personal letter of the 25th May and requested [illegible] to know in advance the contents of the letters to Bagdad, they should be told by Sir F. Humphrys. On the 28th May, Sir Andrew Ryan had a long conversation with Fuad Hamza. He told him that he was conveying the information to His Majesty's Government and Sir Francis Humphrys [illegible] by the former. He [illegible] express any [illegible] view that His Majesty's Government would be deeply disappointed at the setback to a rapprochement which they had done so much to promote and which had attracted more attention in Great Britain than any Arabian event of recent years. He recognised that the question of an extradition treaty had been associated with that of *Bon Voisinage* at an earlier stage, but pointed out that it had not been raised on board the "Lupin." He stressed the difficulty of negotiating treaties at a early stage [illegible] formal relations and the desirability of proceed[illegible] towards that [illegible] and on the [illegible] which His Majesty's Government were [illegible] independent country towards which they were well disposed. On the 31st May Sir Andrew Ryan was authorised to make an official communication on the lines of what he had said as from himself, subject to any observations that might be made by Sir Francis Humphrys. The latter endorsed Sir Andrew Ryan's views with the additions that [illegible] Iraq Government also sent a reminder that the rejected agreement [illegible] King [illegible] His Majesty's [illegible] to which the former had only agreed under strong pressure by Sir Francis. [illegible] appear to have much to do with his attitude in this matter.

International Relations

6. His Majesty's Minister arrived in Jedda in H.M.S. "Dahlia" on the 6th May. The Hejaz authorities showed the courtesies usual here. An officer was sent on board with a [illegible] The Governor of Jedda came down to the landing stage. In the ensuing twenty-four hours the King had further [illegible] telegrams from Mecca expressing regret that he could not receive Sir Andrew Ryan [illegible] with the pilgrimage. On the 7th May His Majesty [illegible] from Mecca to Jedda to receive Sir Andrew Ryan's credentials. The protocol [illegible] Hejaz Government [illegible] precedents was chosen to avoid [illegible] of the old Turkish protocol for the reception of the Ambassadors. The speeches exchanged were conventional but cordial, and in the less formal part of the audience which followed the

King displayed great affability. Photographs were taken by a press photographer from Egypt. The King [illegible] group. Sheikh Fuad Hamza entertained Sir Andrew Ryan and his staff at dinner in the evening. Many of the guests [illegible] dined early with the King before he proceeded to Mecca. Ibn Saud did not revisit Jedda up to the end of May.

7. The King received [illegible] Mr. Edward Raczynski [illegible] Poland, accompanied also by Dr. Sinkiewicz, the head of the Moslem community in Poland. The objects of the visit were [illegible] Ibn Saud [illegible] by Poland to establish [illegible] the King's [illegible] the Moslems of Poland [illegible] Statesman's Year Book [illegible] 1873 [illegible] as "the most pious King [illegible] drawn on both sides [illegible] the lower [illegible] Mecca.

8. The Netherlands representative, M. Van de Meulen, informed his colleagues on the 26th May [illegible] Minister M. [illegible] British Legation, the Turkish Legation ("Diplomatic Representative" of status otherwise [illegible] as such to the King), the Persian Legation (diplomatic representative and [illegible] d'Affaires [illegible] the newly made Dutch Legation. The Italian and Egyptian missions remain consulates.

Air Questions

9. On the 4th May the Emir Feisal, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed a strong protest to the [illegible] British aeroplane had visited Turaif, in the Hail, Aqir and [illegible] Neutral Territory, flying and going without permission. The [illegible] part [illegible] statement that the incident had [illegible] public opinion, and had been reported with exaggeration in the [illegible] press. On inquiry it was found that the visit complained of was [illegible] a Royal Air Force flying boat, which called at Darin at considerable [illegible] on a return voyage from India, to provide the Hejaz Nejd Air Force with spare parts and [illegible] its wireless installation. Sir Andrew Ryan explained matters to Fuad Hamza orally, and suggested to His Majesty's Government that any formal reply in writing should be explanatory rather than detailed [illegible].

10. The incident shows how ready the Hejaz Government are to take offence and [illegible] 25th May Sir Andrew Ryan made a general statement to Sheikh Fuad Hamza, which, he [illegible] to convey more briefly to the King [illegible] His Majesty's Government's attitude towards matters in this country. The terms of the statement were (*a*) that any appearance of intervention by His Majesty's Government in the affairs of the Hejaz-Nejd Air Force should be avoided in its first flight, as being solely due to their desire to promote the success of a force, which was undoubtedly Ibn Saud's own concern, which they had helped him to create, and (*b*) that, while scrupulously respecting Ibn Saud's [illegible] rights His Majesty's Government were anxious to see him come into the [illegible] Powers in the direction of facilitating the development of international aerial communication by a liberal policy in regard to flying over [illegible]. Sir Andrew Ryan [illegible] the Hejaz Government to reconsider their decision [illegible] time [illegible] to come to an agreement with [illegible] Iraq on Bahrein [illegible] routes on a greater scale [illegible] attempts at encroachment, but as leading up to the [illegible] had [illegible].

11. One of the things which provided the opportunity for this statement was the action of His Majesty's Government in advising the King to dismiss one of the

pilots of the Hejaz-Nejd Air Force, whose drunken misconduct on one occasion and [illegible] was threatening the [illegible] of the force [illegible] explanation [illegible] at the instance of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the man was duly discharged as from the [illegible] May [illegible] successor for the time being.

Pilgrimage and Connected Matter.

12. The Qurban Bairam festival, which is the culminating point of the pilgrimage, began on the 9th May in [illegible] years of special blessing [illegible] to draw [illegible] except the [illegible] showed a falling off as compared with last year. The Mecca [illegible] Qurban [illegible] pilgrims who arrived by sea in 1930 :—

Nationality—	Total
Javanese († including Malays)	35,871
Egyptian	17,136
Indians	11,457
Others	20,357
	84,821

13. [illegible] most of May, was [illegible] There were no [illegible] The use of motor [illegible] for the first time [illegible] into operation [illegible] departure of the pilgrims from [illegible] good results. The dispersal of [illegible] up to the [illegible] the latter [illegible] satisfactory [illegible] paragraphs [illegible]

14. The Hejaz authorities had, on the 12th May, officially declared the pilgrimage clean and the claim appeared to be justified. On the 22nd May, however, [illegible] on the apparently true assertion that no cholera [illegible] [illegible] Hejaz itself [illegible] properly [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] "Asia" of the French Fabre line, caught fire at anchor in the outer [illegible] from the Yemen, but including about 300 from French Somaliland. About [illegible] persons [illegible] The British pilgrim ships in port rendered all [illegible] on shore. The disaster gave rise to the most [illegible] origin of the fire and the action of the French captain and officers, both as regard- [illegible] of the points at issue [illegible] enquiry, but showed little capacity for conducting [illegible] confidence in any conclusions. The "Asia" [illegible] was [illegible] [illegible] Some days [illegible] [illegible]

16. [illegible] Hussein, [illegible] held in Mecca and were [illegible] for the night at Bir Abbas Hussein, on the [illegible] 23rd May. A [illegible] there was a [illegible] [illegible] twenty-two deputy collectors from India and eight others were seriously injured [illegible]

The initial use made this year of cars on the narrow Mecca to Arafat and Muna road created considerable panic amongst the staid and traditional camel caravans.

17. [illegible] supplements recorded in paragraphs 14 and 15 above, a regatta for the pilgrim ships was held on the 10th May, an old custom which was revived in 1929 after many years of abeyance. The presence in port of H.M.S. "Dahlia" which remained for a week after bringing Sir Andrew Ryan from Port Sudan, contributed much to the success of this year's regatta and special praise is due to Commander Jackson, R.N., and his officers for the manner in which they helped things forward without imposing themselves on the commanders of the pilgrim ships. The latter themselves worked harmoniously, with the result that the regatta, if it left a good deal to be desired as regards the actual racing organisation, was extremely successful as a *festa*. The local authorities showed sympathetic interest and the Governor of Jedda, who is also a leading shipping agent, contributed £15 to the funds. Subscriptions exceeded expenditure by £50, which sum has been divided between local charities, [illegible] Port Sudan Seamen's Institute, [illegible] Seamen's charities.

Miscellaneous.

18. Sheikh Fuad Hamza returned to Jedda *en route* for Mecca on the 8th May and was confirmed in his former duties of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs some days later. He had not been back in this country since he left to attend the "Lupin" Conference. He had devoted his holiday to getting married and brought back a bride, a lady of the Lebanon. She found Mecca very trying, and her husband told Sir Andrew Ryan on the 28th May that he hoped to install her at Taif, a circumstance of possible importance, as it might incline the sheikh to advocate the more strongly the idea of making the place accessible to Europeans, a project of which he spoke hopefully to Sir Andrew Ryan in the same conversation.

19. Ibn Saud's heir apparent, the Emir Saud, arrived in Jedda on the 25th May, his first visit since 1926. He received the foreign representatives with Royal ceremony next day, and most of them attended a dinner given in his honour by the local authorities the same evening. The prince had intended to make a stay of some days but countermanded all [illegible] on the 27th May. It was [illegible] from Riyadh, and it was suggested that the Emir would be sent to show his father's sword in Nejd, but he was still at Mecca at the end of the month.

20. Ibn Saud now uses for residential and official purposes in Jedda a house between Eve's Tomb and the town walls which has been named the Green Palace. It was built by the Director of Customs, [illegible] who [illegible] and seems to [illegible] It is a passable house, built on rather an odd plan and makes but a moderate Palace. Various extensions are, however, being carried out.

21. Ibn Saud's return to the Hejaz has been accompanied by a certain tendency towards the stricter enforcement of restrictions imposed in accordance with the principles or prejudices of Wahabiism. [illegible] taken during May [illegible] were [illegible] Mecca were deserted from the [illegible] Eve's Tomb [illegible] [illegible] Jedda [illegible] [illegible] Hejaz which he [illegible] His Majesty's Minister at Jedda [illegible] 17th May, expressed that they were [illegible] [illegible] Sir Andrew Ryan [illegible]

22. It is [illegible] Mr. [illegible] [illegible] Mecca [illegible] Mr. [illegible] [illegible] why a Wahabi is not already a Saint is not stated. The King himself delivered a

[illegible] Mr [illegible]'s speech at a banquet in Jedda during the pilgrimage season. He [illegible] with Europeans but acrimoniously among themselves.

(E 3763/223/91) No. 10

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Jedda, July 12, 1930.*

I HAVE now received copy of letter which the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs says that he sent on 12th June in reply to [illegible] [illegible] consideration of undesirability or doubtful personality to [sic] [illegible] important of which are as follows:—

1. Hejaz Government had no previous knowledge of intention to make such [illegible]
2. [illegible] for comfort and accommodation in frontier districts.
3. [illegible] particularly, no sufficient guarantee for MacDonnell's safety [illegible] raids and operations carried out by Transjordanian [illegible]
4. [illegible] interior which make it undesirable [illegible] whatsoever his capacity, to penetrate [illegible] very watchful.

This statement seems to call for reply [illegible] seems to indicate that the King's main anxiety still is to reduce the number of Transjordanian claims admitted to [illegible] Other [illegible] appended to MacDonnell's instructions.

I feel strongly that position taken up in regard to second point is wholly [illegible] I see little prospect of [illegible] here from [illegible] asked MacDonnell to [illegible] up to [illegible] expression of [illegible] importance of obtaining facilities. I will inform you of his reply. If [illegible] consider the matter important in itself, formal reservation may suffice.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 152.)

(E 3902/1308/91) No. 11

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 21.)

(No. [illegible])
(Telegraphic.) R *Jedda, July 20, 1930.*

[illegible] received here 11th July and left on the [illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs received here 11th July and left on the 15th. We discussed position as regards "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement very closely [illegible]

[illegible] handed Minister Sir F. Humphrys' personal letter for delivery to King and [illegible] translation. We speedily [illegible] point at which he [illegible] the King's desire to meet wishes of His Majesty's Government but intimated that His Majesty had been expecting a further lead. I explained why I had stopped where I did on 11th June. My definite advice now (and it was also

presumably recommendation of His Majesty's Government) was that "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement should be completed without reference to course of extradition negotiations, on which, however, I understood that Iraq Government had in a recent direct letter expressed willingness to embark. This being the position, I expressed the opinion, but only as from myself, that advantage might be taken of any meeting of delegates for signature of "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement to initiate extradition negotiations.

Minister's attitude was favourable, and we discussed details, viz.:—

1. Place of meeting. I said I would put forward any proposal, but if Jedda were suggested I would support it only on the clearest understanding that if extradition negotiations were initiated at the same time "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement would be not only signed but ratified independently.
2. Fuad understood this, but pointed out that ratification by Iraq would require sanction of Parliament. I admitted that ratification might have to be simultaneous, and that this might entail delay, but said it did not affect the [illegible] extradition treaty, but adhered to the view that all tribal criminal activities should be considered non-political, else disaffected tribesmen would always think they could hope for impunity by crossing the frontier. He asked me definitely [illegible] Government had shown disposition to do so at the time of the Clayton negotiations. I maintained amiable but non-committal attitude on this point throughout the conversations.
4 [sic]. Fuad wished to know whether absence of King Feisal and Iraq Minister for Foreign Affairs would entail delay. I suggested it need not, as Iraq Government had regular regency arrangements, &c.

Fuad asked me not to report until he had taken the King's further instructions. When we resumed on 17th July he was [illegible] that the King [illegible] His Majesty [illegible] understood [illegible] would be embodied in some instrument (special article of protocol or letters) forming part of or accompanying "Bon Voisinage" Agreement. This might [illegible] alternatives as follows:—

1. Distinction, already suggested, between real political offenders of town type and tribesmen.
2. Agreed list of tribes on both sides, members of which would be given up on demand if accused of any sort of crime in country of origin.
3. Amendment of article 3 of Bahra Agreement providing that tribesmen should not cross the frontier [illegible] under penalty of expulsion by the Government on the other side.

I said that difficulty of agreement even in principle over political offenders was the crux of the whole matter, and that the King's attitude took us back for practical purposes to position before I saw His Majesty on 11th June. Fuad tried to deny this, but it alarmed him. In the evening he communicated result of further consultation with the King. The latter, he said, sincerely wanted to follow the advice of His Majesty's Government. If Iraq Government would send a representative to Jedda to sign "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement and to negotiate extradition treaty, he would act on our recommendation to complete the former, but he still attached the greatest importance to the support of His Majesty's Government [illegible] indicated.

I gathered that the reply to Iraq Minister for Foreign Affairs stating Dr. Sanda's views on political offenders would be despatched as soon as possible without awaiting any outcome of my conversations.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

E 3905/1/91] No. 12

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received July 21.)

No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, July 20, 1930*

YOUR telegram No. 100, first paragraph

I again explained position regarding Ibn Mashhur to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on 12th June. In that and subsequent conversations he promised definitely that necessary letters, including one to Ibn Mashhur, would be sent without delay. He said, however, that the King wished for definite arrangements for delivery [? of] Ibn Mashhur, if only because he could not be certain that his assurance of safety would be respected if person in question merely crossed the frontier. Fuad at first suggested alternatives of delivery by Iraq authorities in southern desert to representative of Ibn Saud or despatch of Ibn Mashhur by aeroplane to Jedda when Air Force came here. I suggested second course would not be very practical but in final conversation on 17th July Fuad said that His Majesty would greatly prefer it, as he wished to see person in question before he returned to his own area. Other arrangements could be made for the return of his companions and property.

[illegible] repeated to Colonial Office, No. 338. I feel that unless Iraq Government can contrive means to give substantial satisfaction over Ibn Mashhur that question will continue to envenom the whole situation of both His Majesty's Government and Iraq *vis-à-vis* Ibn Saud.

I reminded Fuad [illegible] the latest. He said definitely that Ministry of Finance had been instructed to arrange payment, but I have not received it. He referred spontaneously to Faisal's offer to accept £30,000. He said Ibn Saud had agreed at the time of "Lupin" conference to leave the whole matter in Faisal's hands, and was willing to accept offer, but that the Nejd counter claims would have to be subject to separate assessment [illegible] in full settlement of all claims [illegible]

(Repeated to Baghdad and Bushire, No. 162.)

E 3916/1308 91] No. 13

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting High Commissioner of Iraq (Baghdad).—(Received in Foreign Office, July 22.)

(No. 271.)
(Telegraphic.) P *Colonial Office, July 18, 1930*

Your Residency's No. 2[illegible] of the 24th June. Proposed Extradition Treaty with Hejaz Nejd.

Foreign Office have asked that attention may be drawn to correspondence mentioned below as showing that, in 1928, Iraq Government had agreed to meet wishes of Ibn Saud with regard to question of extradition of political offenders:—

(1) [illegible] No. 315 of the 12th June, 1928.
(2) [illegible] of your telegram No. 360 of the 15th July, 1928.
(3) [illegible] of the 18th July, 1928.

No action seems to be necessary pending receipt of reply from Fuad Hamza to Iraq Prime Minister's letter mentioned [illegible] the event of Fuad Hamza urging in reply that any extradition treaty between the two Governments should permit extradition of tribesmen accused of political offences Iraq Government will no doubt keep in mind attitude which they adopted in 1928.

Since, however, the [illegible] of 1928 no longer obtain, I should not regard Iraq Government as being bound to adopt in any current negotiation of an extradition treaty the attitude which they took up two years ago, when attempting to [illegible] Ibn Saud. It might, however, become necessary to reconsider the matter if Ibn Saud were to persist to the point of making the political offences concession a prior condition to the final signature of the "Bon Voisinage" Agreement.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 103.)

E 4049 334/91] No. 14.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 158. Confidential.)
Sir, *Jedda, July 1, 1930.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 94 and 95 of the 30th June, I have the [illegible] that he expected to stay about a fortnight in Egypt and would go on to London viâ Marseilles.

2. The record of Sheikh Hafiz Wahba is so well known to you that [illegible] following impressions derived from reports which have reached me:—

(a) He would be glad to see much closer relations between Great Britain and this country [illegible]

(b) He is hostile to the "Syrian party," the protagonists in which are Sheikh Fuad Hamza [illegible] position *vis-à-vis* of the King is probably that the latter values his [illegible] King difficult. He told one of my informants, nevertheless, that a special code had been arranged which would enable him to communicate with Ibn Saud independently of the Syrians.

(c) He does not think that the King is [illegible] for reasons connected with ultimate aspirations [illegible] to Syria. It is suggested even that Ibn Saud hopes one day to secure the throne of that country for one of his sons.

3. I may mention in this connexion that reports have been rife for some time to the effect that [illegible] Foreign Affairs, retaining the services of Fuad [illegible]

4. Hafiz Wahba told the informant already mentioned that the Hejaz [illegible] treaty [illegible]

5. I am not circulating this despatch to any other post.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

E 4059 92 91] No. 15.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received July 29.)

No. 170.
Sir, *Jedda, July 8, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz [illegible] 1930.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Cairo, Ba[illegible] Secretary to the Government of the Sudan, [illegible] Lagos (2), the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, and His Majesty's consul at Asmara.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 15

Jedda Report for June 1 to 30, 1930

Internal Affairs and Frontier Questions.

NEWS regarding the situation in the interior continues to be meagre, though rumours of trouble continued to be circulated throughout June. These rumours related largely to trouble near the Transjordan frontier and the region of Medina and Hail. It looked as though there might be something in them when the Emir Saud suddenly went off to Medina on the 16th June, but he returned a few days later and has not gone back. Reports from Amman do not point to anything unusual on the Hejaz-Nejd side of the frontier. In these circumstances the rumours as a whole may be dismissed as being greatly exaggerated. It was reported in June that the King had postponed *sine die* the attack on the Yemen which he was previously said to be contemplating and had decided to leave the Asir situation alone. If he has in fact made any backward movement in his attitude towards Yemen and Asir questions, it is probably at least as much due to financial stringency as to trouble further north.

2. Mr M. S. MacDonnell, the investigator appointed by His Majesty's Govern- [illegible] the Hejaz-Nejd [illegible] His Majesty's sloop "Clematis" on the 3rd June. The King had promised to receive him on the 6th June, but did not do so until next day owing to an indisposition of His Majesty, apparently genuine. The object of the visit was to establish personal [illegible] Before seeing the King, Mr MacDonnell prepared a list of points for discussion. The King at first tried to ride him off at every point. He modified his attitude in the course of the business audiences and an agreement was reached on certain points, but [illegible] the situation more clearly in discussion with the King's advisers. This led to a series of most wearisome meetings on the 8th and 9th June between Mr MacDonnell, assisted by His Majesty's Minister, and Sheikhs Fuad Hamza, Hafiz Wahba and Yousef Yasin. It was noticeable that the first-named had been relegated to a [illegible] himself followed the proceedings very closely in the background.

3. The three sheikhs were inconceivably tiresome on every point except one, which had been more or less definitely agreed with the King. This related to the appointment [illegible] Mr MacDonnell [illegible] necessary persons and also to present the cases of the Hejaz-Nejd subjects. The sheikhs took violent exception to a definition in Mr MacDonnell's instructions from home of the range of cases he was to investigate in detail. They were, if possible, even stickier over a question arising out of Mr MacDonnell's request for facilities for transport, &c., in Hejaz-Nejd. [illegible] from the King, that it would be undesirable and unnecessary for Mr MacDonnell to enter Hejaz-Nejd territory at any stage of his investigation. The King had [illegible] Mr MacDonnell [illegible] proposal that the King should nominate a certain number of spokesmen drawn from the frontier tribes involved.

4. These were the principal points discussed. It was agreed to make an informal but written record of the results arrived at. This document in its final form dealt with the following points:—

(1) The appointment [illegible] representative [illegible]
(2) Mr MacDonnell's undertaking [illegible] proposal that the frontier tribes should be repr[illegible]
(3) The King's desire that Mr MacDonnell [illegible] the place or places where he should h[illegible]
(4) [illegible] the procedure to be followed, proposals which Mr MacDonnell did not consider it in the province of the Hejaz Government to make, but which he promised to consider.

5. Sir Andrew Ryan handed the record to Sheikh Fuad Ha[illegible] the [illegible] observations in regard to matters which had had to be omitted from the record:—

(*a*) He referred to the views expressed by the King in the stipulation in Mr MacDonnell's instructions that, before embarking on the detailed examination of any claim, he should satisfy himself that it had been notified within a reasonable time or that there had been good and sufficient reasons for any delay. Sir Andrew Ryan confirmed Mr MacDonnell's reply that he was not entitled to discuss the point, and he was bound by his instructions, but undertook himself as representative of His Majesty's Government to draw their attention to the point raised [illegible]

(*b*) He referred to the omission from the records, in deference to the King's wishes, of any mention of provision for transport and accommodation in the Hejaz-Nejd territory. He pointed out that His Majesty's Government had expected that their investigator would be free to conduct his [illegible] of the reasons for the King's view that any visits to his territory would be unnecessary or undesirable.

6. These two documents amounted to little—ridiculous mice produced by [illegible] enmesh him. He left on the 10th June after a farewell audience in which the [illegible] Mr MacDonnell was to proceed to [illegible]

7. No answer to Sir Andrew Ryan's letter of the 10th June had reached [illegible]

8. [illegible] postponed until after Mr M[illegible] audience, on the 11th June, [illegible] belittled the efforts made on [illegible] He stated that he had issued stringent [illegible] side and the return of loot. He said [illegible] public, action in regard to Ibn Musaad, the [illegible] regretted, [illegible] sense. He admitted that [illegible] Hadda Agreement [illegible] with those on the Transjordan [illegible] He had [illegible] confidence, but he now hoped to make [illegible] arrangements for direct contact at an early date.

9. Meanwhile, protests regarding raids continue to be made. On the 2nd and 6th June Fuad Hamza weighed in with two lists of no less than twenty-seven raids [illegible]

10. [illegible] parties of Druses, now in Nejd, whose leaders [illegible] These people [illegible] Nejd [illegible] Syria [illegible] last year that [illegible] Nejd, [illegible] Iraq [illegible] the Hejaz-Nejd [illegible] report that Sultan Pasha El Atrash [illegible] present habitat

The "Oriente Moderno" goes on to describe various alleged efforts by Syrians, Palestinians and Egyptians to [illegible]

11. On the 9th June the Hejaz Government addressed to Sir Andrew Ryan a memorandum protesting strongly against the proceedings of a Transjordan officer, Abdulla Kerihan, who was said to have presented himself at Qariat on the 5th May [illegible] Taif by pretending his journey was authorised by Ibn Saud. A telegram from Jerusalem dated the 24th June shows that the officer in question has more than once been employed for [illegible] ted communication with the authorities in Nejd [illegible] pending the receipt of further information from [illegible]

12. [illegible] the King, on the 11th June, His Majesty's Minister [illegible] May report, [illegible] ph 5) to confirm officially what [illegible] King Ibn Saud's refusal to sign the *Bon Voisinage* [illegible] a negotiation [illegible] additions suggested by Sir Francis Humphrys [illegible] form fall under three heads, viz

(1) The great disappointment experienced by His Majesty's Government in common with the Iraq Government and Sir Francis Humphrys.

(2) The utility of the agreement, independently of any other merits, as an instrument embodying that recognition of Ibn Saud by King Feisal to which the latter had consented under pressure from Sir Francis Humphrys

(3) The difficulty, amounting at present to impossibility, of agreeing on an extradition treaty the negotiation of which might be expected to break down over disputes regarding "political offenders" apart from any other points

13. Ibn Saud again insisted that [illegible] and would sign the [illegible] Agreement [illegible] Sir Andrew Ryan did not [illegible] ered to press the King no further without [illegible] It was quite clear that the Ibn Mashh[illegible] g's gizzard Sir Andrew Ryan held out a certain hope [illegible] the near future [illegible] points to a real [illegible] be kept. King [illegible] 14. [illegible] Minister [illegible] gested that [illegible]

14. There had been no further development [illegible] the month in connexion with the *Bon-Voisinage* Agreement.

15. At the same audience on the 11th [illegible] His Majesty Minister put [illegible] strong pressure on Ibn Saud [illegible] negotiated by the Political Resident [illegible] to His Majesty's agency at Jed[illegible] Mar[illegible] Saud had with [illegible] of a final settlement of Iraq and K[illegible] that the [illegible] held this payment, [illegible] wish to discuss [illegible] pointed out that [illegible] the 27th [illegible] upheld, but for whose actions they [illegible] Sir Andrew Ryan countered [illegible] the King's [illegible] dealer to [illegible] Fuad Hamza. At the end of the month he reminded the latter that he understood

the King to have promised to pay the £10,000. The prospect then was that it would be paid, but the situation may be affected by a letter from King Feisal to Ibn Saud, written early in June, offering to accept £30,000 in full settlement of all Iraq claims

International Relations

16. The Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires, M Van de Meulen, presented letters of credence to King Ibn Saud on the 9th June. He left for Holland on the 26th June The Persian representative has also gone on long leave, fervently hoping never to return

17. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, the Hejaz-Nejd Minister designate in London, [illegible] in Jedda on the 29th June with the intention of leaving for his post on the 1st July. This came rather as a surprise, as his departure had already been so long delayed and the King had of late kept him in such close attendance It is possible though this is mere surmise, that the Minister is being sent to explore the possibilities of raising money to relieve what is reported on all hands to have become a most difficult financial situation The surmise derives some added plausibility from the fact that Abdurrahman Qusaibi of Bahrein, who came early in June to visit the King before going to do his pearl business in Paris, prolonged his stay a good deal beyond what was expected and finally arranged to leave with Hafiz Wahba

18. The Mecca paper "Um-el-Qura" published on the 13th June the text of a treaty of friendship between Hejaz-Nejd and Persia, which was signed at Tehran on the 24th August, 1929 Accompanying texts show that ratifications were exchanged in Jedda on the 16th June, 1930. This treaty is in five articles Article 1 makes the usual provision for permanent and increasing friendship Article 2 provides for the exchange of Ministers and consuls, who will be treated in their respective territories in accordance with the principles of international law Article 3 assures most favoured nation treatment to the subjects of the respective countries in the territories of the other, and provides that Persian pilgrims to the H[illegible] in their way and that measures shall be taken for their security Article 4 foreshadows further agreements at a suitable time on political, economic, commercial and other matters. Article 5 provides for signature in Arabic and Persian texts of equal validity

Air Matters

19. On the 10th June, Sheikh Fuad Hamza informed Sir Andrew Ryan that King Ibn Saud had decided to transfer the Hejaz Air Force from Darin Island to Jedda He asked that permission should be obtained for the flight of the aeroplanes over Koweit, Iraq and Transjordan, the direct route across the desert being still [illegible] petrol, &c., and for the loan of an officer of the Royal Air Force to pilot the fourth aeroplane in place of the Hejaz Air Force pilot dismissed for misconduct in May (see May report, paragraph 11)

20. The various facilities asked for were duly arranged. A question arose as to whether the opportunity might not be taken of obtaining a *quid pro quo* in the shape of Ibn Saud's assent to the pearling flights between Bahrein and Ba[illegible] the Air Ministry are anxious to organise (see May report, paragraph 10)

21. Sir Andrew R[illegible] Air F[illegible] regard to pearling flights. Before the question had been raised in this form at home and in Bagdad, he had spoken to the King on the 12th June on lines similar to those followed in his conversation with Sheikh Fuad Hamza on the 28th May (see May report, paragraph 10) In due course, he sent the King, on the 25th June, under cover of a note to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, a letter in which he [illegible] to facilitate the transfer of the Air Force to Jedda in the various ways requested, and went on as follows —

"Your Majesty will doubtless appreciate the strong spirit of goodwill [illegible] by my Government in this [illegible] other matters affecting the Hejaz Nejd Air Force. They are confident that in considering the question of flights over the coast of El Hasa of which I had the honour to [illegible] your Majesty on the 12th June, your Majesty will show an equal goodwill. The organisation of experimental pearling flights this year, if it were possible, would confer

[illegible] benefits on all concerned in an important industry which would be the [illegible] Majesty should authorise a certain number of pilgrims by Roy[illegible] [illegible] would land. The necessary marking out might be effected by your Majesty's [illegible] Majesty preferred to enlist the assistance of the British authorities.

[illegible] the desire for [illegible] spirit although you naturally desired to study [illegible] conclusions on the subject in the near future.

22. [illegible] of several reasons for not connecting the two questions more directly [illegible] decision, the British authorities concerned exerted themselves to stave off a crisis. [illegible] Fortunately, the [illegible] orders to proceed to Jedda [illegible] Majesty's Government.

[illegible]

24. Although the [illegible] been of [illegible] were [illegible] repeated [illegible] May report, [illegible] paragraph 14 [illegible] 1929 [illegible] This meant that pilgrims [illegible] "Jehangir" [illegible] of the month [illegible]

24. [illegible] the causes of the disastrous fire in [illegible] 1st May (see May report, paragraph 15). [illegible] removing in order to realise [illegible] Ratsey of H.M.S. "Clematis" [illegible] local authorities. His conclu[illegible] [illegible] May report [illegible]

paragraph 14). The Hejaz Government were extremely [illegible] cast on the cleanliness of the pilgrimage. They publish[illegible] the 13th June a communiq[illegible] to exist in the Hejaz itself and practi[illegible] authorities of faking the cases at Tor a[illegible] International Health Bureau at Paris [illegible] pt on the ground that there w[illegible] [illegible] so plague was real enough, was [illegible]

[illegible] Jedda [illegible] were perhaps [illegible] and other [illegible]

Miscellaneous.

27. King George's birthday was duly celebrated in Jedda on the 3rd June. [illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs were still in residence. The official reception held by His Majesty's Minister in the forenoon was well attended by foreign representatives and local officials. The Soviet representative, as doyen of the mixed diplomatic and consular body, made a cordial speech on conventionally old world lines. The arrival of H.M.S. [illegible] Mr M[illegible] [illegible] of twenty two persons, all of whom, except the Indian vice-consul and the Malay pilgrimage officer, were West European Britons and one lady. Jedda moves *quand même*.

28. Mr. C. G. Hope-Gill arrived in Jedda on the 3rd June on appointment as His Majesty's vice-consul and [illegible] charged with the duties of head of chancery in the Legation. Mr. W. L. Bond, who had been agent and consul and later chargé d'affaires for just a year, left on the 10th June. It will not be out of place in a report intended for general circulation, and written by a senior officer, to place on record a tribute to the great ability displayed by Mr. Bond as His Majesty's representative at Jedda during an unusually strenuous period and to the admirable manner in which he prepared the way for the incoming Minister and started him in the work of the Legation. It has been decided [illegible] of Minister in the person of Sir Andrew Ryan.

29. A note from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs dated the 13th June announced the ratification by Ibn Saud of the seven agreements negotiated at the International Postal Congress held in London and signed there on the 28th June, 1929.

30. King Ibn Saud is pursuing his scheme for creating a wireless system to link up his dominions. Negotiations with the Marconi Company were understood to have reached [illegible] several weeks ago, the idea being [illegible] stations at Mecca and Riyadh and ten subsidiary stations elsewhere in Hejaz and Nejd at a cost of something under £25,000. It is not certain that the King has abandoned the alternative of placing the contract with Siemens. The latter do not seem to be very keen on it. Anyhow, the King is said to be now considering a more grandiose scheme with a view to being more certain of the efficiency of the future system and to enlarging the number of stations. It is requested that [illegible] may be treated as strictly confidential as it has been obtained from [illegible] private sources.

31. The June "simoons" brought to Jedda large numbers of locusts. They are reported, although there has been a conflict of information on the point, to have done a good deal of damage in cultivated districts in the interior like Wadi Fatma and Taif. There is little for a locust to destroy in or about Jedda, but the little creatures displayed great vivacity in spite of an apparent lack of food and, among other places, visited His Majesty's Legation, where the windows are but scantily [illegible] considerable force. They passed like other locusts to the inexperienced

ove. According to an expert, however, they were all in the "imaginal" as distinct from the hopper state [illegible] breed, different from the African. The International Bureau at Damascus have expressed a wish to send a mission to study him in his homeland. This proposal is to be submitted to Ibn Saud, [illegible] He probably prefers locusts to foreign missioners, even those of science. His subjects would regard the former, much more than the latter, as Kismet.

32. No slaves were repatriated during the month of June.

[E 3993 223/91] No. 16

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Foreign Office, August 1, 1930.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 105 and 111 of the 12th and 18th July. Conditions of investigation into Transjordan-Hejaz Nejd raid claims.

Unless you see objection, you should reply to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs' letter on following lines:

[illegible] *Time Limit.*—His Majesty's Government fully considered question over a [illegible] 21st March, 1929, and, as [illegible] Hejazi Government as a result of Foreign Office telegrams No. 40 of 26th April and No. 61 of 14th June, 1929, formed opinion that limitation of time limit desired by Ibn Saud would fetter unduly discretion of arbitrator and debar him from considering certain categories of claims which should clearly fall within scope of inquiry. His Majesty's Government understand that view of Ibn Saud is that [illegible] possible after date of raids to which they refer. While they agree generally with this view, persuasion of Hejaz Ne[illegible] of claims vary greatly, and that establishment of rigid time limit would exclude so [illegible] claims on both [illegible] to reduce value of proposed [illegible] and involve risk of no comprehensive settlement being reached. It will [illegible] Government, to whom Ibn Saud has given complete discretion to conduct arbitration in whatever way they thought best, are convinced that the proper and natural person to examine circumstances and take decision on this point is the investigator. Mr. MacDonnell's instructions were drawn up accordingly, and His Majesty's Government are unable to agree to their modification. They are confident that the discretion allowed to investigator will not be abused.

[illegible]

E 4134 33 91] No. 17

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 2, 1930.*

IN SIR R. [illegible] despatch No. [illegible] June [illegible] Colonial Office of which copy has been sent to your [illegible]

His Majesty's Government attach [illegible] importance to [illegible] settlement between Nejd and Koweit, with particular reference to customs questions.

Favourable opportunity is afforded by fact that Sheikh of Koweit has now put forward definite proposals [illegible] Bahrein Agreement. These proposals have not yet been considered in detail and may need revision, but [illegible] 7th January to Colonel Biscoe in Bushire despatch No. 3 of 31st January to Colonial Office.)

In view of [illegible] His Majesty's Government still think it desirable that negotiations should if possible be conducted by Political Resident in Persian Gulf. From your telegram No. 59 of 20th May it appears that Ibn Saud's objection to negotiations with Colonel Biscoe arises from the [illegible] His Majesty's Government [illegible] may be overcome by Colonel Biscoe's explanation given in his telegram No. 678 of 4th July enclosed in my despatch No. 247 of 21st July, on receipt of which you should approach Ibn Saud on following lines. His Majesty's Government are now in a position to discuss proposed agreement between Nejd and Koweit and are anxious to take the opportunity also to discuss Koweit customs embargo, [illegible] trust that for this purpose he will be prepared to agree to a meeting with the Political Resident in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf.

If Ibn Saud replies that he is unable to receive Colonel Biscoe for personal reasons [illegible] offer explanation now submitted by Resident. If King's objection is of a different character and it proves impossible to remove it with the information at your disposal, you should state that you must refer home for instructions.

I appreciate that it may be impossible to dissociate this negotiation from consideration of Ibn Saud's desiderata in the Persian Gulf. His Majesty's Government are anxious to avoid linking them if possible, but in last resort if satisfaction for Koweit can be secured in no other way, risk is one which will have to be faced. You should not, however, commit yourself regarding this at the present stage.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 110. Repeated to Bushire.)

E 4172 89 91] No. 18

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan.—(Received in Foreign Office, August 4.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) P *Colonial Office, August 2, 1930.*

REFERENCE Jedda telegrams Nos. 120, 121 and 122, repeated to you as Nos. 176, 177 and 178. [illegible] Transjordan to Nejd.

[illegible] telegrams under reference, our more immediate endeavour should be to reassure him both about the attitude of the Transjordanian Government in this matter and about the measures that are being adopted to put an end, if his complaints prove to be well founded, to the recent series of raids from Transjordan. Please deal fully in your reply with these two points, in regard to the second of which you will doubtless consult the Air Officer Commanding.

You will realise, and you should, if necessary, impress upon the Transjordanian Government [illegible]

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 109.)

E 4146/223/91] No. 19

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, August 3, 1930*

MY telegram No. 103 and despatches Nos. 167 and 169.

MacDonnell considers he should ascertain facts of raids involving Ibn Mashhur, as Transjordanian Government state that two out of three of them occurred when there were no rebels.

I reached the same conclusion on the ground that the present object is merely to investigate facts, and that Hejaz Government having reserved the question of their liability should leave it to be dealt with later after MacDonnell has examined cases.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs stated in recent note (copy now in bag) that Hejaz Government agent was not authorised to discuss case of Ibn Mashhur. On my [illegible] would not object to MacDonnell examining cases, but would not defend Ibn Mashhur. They maintain disclaimer of liability. Position would be altered by his return with his property.

I do not think I can advance the matter further here. I consider the only course as for MacDonnell [illegible] recommendations by default. Matter is, however, so delicate in all its aspects that I submit it to you.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 160, for MacDonnell.)

E 4218/1/91] No. 20

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Jedda, August 5, 1930*

MY telegram No. 114.

I have received £10,000 in the shape of cheque by Dutch bank here on National Provincial, London. To whom shall I send it? Covering letter from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs refers to Iraq subjects only. I have pointed out that under the King's letter of 27th January it falls to be divided, and have stressed importance of point in its bearing on the two separate final settlements with Iraq and Koweit.

It may be well to get this quite clear. Position appears to be that Hejaz [illegible] of allocation proposed by Colonel Biscoe in January.

(Repeated to Bagdad and Bushire, No. 187.)

E 4247/33/91] No. 21

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, August 6, 1930*

YOUR telegram No. 110.

I received your despatch No. 247 [illegible]

Following facts may seem to you to necessitate modification of proposed procedure:—

1. Chance mention by me of political resident's name in another connexion [illegible] Biscoe [illegible] He added [illegible] to have communicated direct with Biscoe about visit and received no answer; but his account showed that His Majesty's resentment was far greater and more deep-seated than I had realised. Fuad returned to the subject on 3rd August in order to withdraw statement regarding unanswered communication, which, he said, was his personal mistake. On both occasions I scouted the possibility of discourtesy, using every argument I could deduce from correspondence up to date. I stressed the

importance from every point of view of good relations between Biscoe and the King. Fuad finally agreed, but admitted frankly that, owing to the Royal attitude he could only inform me personally of the position and must leave it to me to consider the possibility of promoting reconciliation by some independent action.

2. The King is overtired and is by way of deputing much of his authority. I doubt whether he will ever really do this, but his present intention is to stay in He [illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs with, it is said, extensive delegated powers. Fuad told me this privately on 3rd August, and said reorganisation would shortly be announced.

3. I entirely agree that Biscoe is the best person to negotiate, but Hejaz Government [illegible] accredited Minister here all diplomatic business should normally be dealt with through Legation. They could not, of course, refuse special mission, but they are in principle averse to discussing questions direct with neighbouring British authorities as such. The fact that those authorities are not directly under the Foreign Office increases this tendency.

4. I think it certain that any attempt to obtain formal settlement of Koweit customs question will entail reopening by other side of other Persian Gulf questions, especially as last action by us was that described in your telegram No. 42.

In view of above, I feel procedure laid down in your telegram will not advance matters either as regards settlement of Koweit question or liquidate personal incident, which, owing to the King's extreme and unreasoning susceptibility, is graver than we knew. If Biscoe is to deal usefully with the former, latter must first be disposed of. No good will be done unless His Majesty can be induced really to change his heart and not merely accept explanation out of politeness while continuing to regard Biscoe as *persona non grata*.

I did not initiate my conversations with [illegible] your despatch No. 247. I could go on to [illegible] importance of reconciliation [illegible] general grounds and because His Majesty's Government consider political resident [illegible] the best person to discuss agreement proposed by Sheikh of Koweit and customs question of meeting could be arranged.

Such a letter would draw the King on all points. If you approve within the next few days I could write it before I leave on 15th August and could call at the Foreign Office on 3rd September to review the situation.

(Repeated to Bushire, No. 180.)

E 4247/33/91] No. 22

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 9, 1930.*

YOUR telegram No. 129 [illegible] Koweit negotiations.

I approve alternative procedure proposed by you.

E 4309/4309/91] No. 23.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 184.)
Sir, *Jedda, July 22, 1930*

YOU are aware of the difficulties under which the more purely diplomatic work of the post is carried on. They [illegible] a person who is trying to build up a stronger British representation here than has been possible in the past. They result from the facts that the Legation is confined to Jedda, that the King, personally inaccessible except on rare occasions when he comes here, is both in theory and in practice the sole controller for Foreign Affairs, that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, such as it is, is in Mecca, and that the Acting Minister, who can

at least discuss questions though he can take practically no decision, has to divide [illegible] between fairly constant personal attendance on the King now that the latter is at Taif, the management of his office at Mecca and occasional visits to Jedda, made at short [illegible] intervals. Fuad Bey Hamza—he prefers the "bey" to the "sheikh," I understand—has been in Jedda for the following periods only, since I arrived here on the 6th May:—

[illegible] May when he returned from leave and proceeded direct to Mecca.

[illegible] 17th May [illegible] King, meeting my credentials until the afternoon of the 18th May, when he went to Mecca to rejoin the King.

The 27th May to I think the 29th or 30th May, a short visit without the King.

[illegible] 21st June [illegible] King [illegible]

The 11th only to the 18th July, without the King [illegible]

intercourse with Fuad Hamza has been confined to conversations by telephone, and the telephonic service is only moderately efficient.

2. The difficulties of doing business are somewhat increased by imperfections [illegible] diplomatic work proper. Opportunities of discussing really [illegible] far as he is concerned even Mecca and Taif are the blue, [illegible] with his Minister, except for an occasional enq[illegible] Bey does visit Jedda, outstanding business [illegible] date in a frantic rush. There is no time at [illegible] staff [illegible]

3. [illegible] Fuad Bey [illegible] On other [illegible] receptions [illegible] he himself [illegible] plans. We had [illegible] might impel His Majesty's Government [illegible] going on leave. The ground was thus well prepared.

4. I was careful to say and to repeat at least once that I had no reason to [illegible] personally. The King had shown me the [illegible] When [illegible] myself [illegible] Minister of [illegible] Fuad Bey that the King [illegible] was to be a [illegible] the [illegible] Other [illegible] I said [illegible] I said [illegible] I said [illegible] I spoken to me [illegible] perhaps after running up to Suez [illegible] the time but [illegible] direction of our foreign affairs [illegible] Foreign Office [illegible] Oxford that it were considered essential, in deference to the ancient Christian traditions of that [illegible] it Moslems, Brahmins and the disciples of Confucius, and that Iraq Wahda were [illegible] Government then think that they were justified in the expense of maintaining a Legation in Great Britain!

5. In the course of my statement I referred again to the possibility of my being instructed to ask for an audience of the King. I said that if this happened my only

proper and polite course would be to ask to be received at Taif, as Ibn Saud was in residence there and I had no official knowledge that it was closed to foreign representatives. In conclusion, I told Fuad Bey that my statement was of a purely personal nature, intended primarily for his own consumption. The matter might not be ripe for submission to the King, but I begged him to remember what I had said if one of these days I did ask for an audience at Taif or if, at some future date, His Majesty's Government conceived doubts as to the utility of maintaining a Minister here.

6. Fuad Bey is supporting a great burden, and in most ways impresses me more favourably than I [illegible] frank connected statement. At the end, he said that my criticism was justified. He was himself conscious of the defects of his machinery. He had not wished to trouble the King prematurely at a time of great preoccupation, but he had now prepared a scheme for the consideration of His Majesty. He added spontaneously that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs ought to be in Jedda.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

[E 4310/1409/91] No. 24.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 160.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 23, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to state that in conversation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs I have more than once touched on the question of the possibility of Hejaz-Nejd entering the League of Nations.

2. I threw out a first reference to the subject in one of my earlier conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza about the *non-ressortissant* agreement with Iraq. This is recorded in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 122 of the 29th May on that subject.

3. In a conversation on the 12th July regarding the position of this country [illegible] (see my despatch No. 156 of the 23rd July) Fuad Bey mentioned that he had received certain information bearing on the matter from the League. I said lightly that I was glad to learn that he was in communication with that body, upon which he said that he received but did not send communications. He intimated that he would be glad to have a talk with me on the subject.

4. On this and other occasions during Fuad Bey's stay here, I adverted to the [illegible] to the League. We had a more connected, though inconclusive, conversation at our final meeting at my house on the 17th July. I again dwelt on the advantages of the League as an international organ, as a solvent of many questions of universal interest, and as an institution which had already proved its value in the direction of deterring nations from war, though it might not prevent all recurrence of war in the world. I said I knew that some Eastern countries adopted an attitude of reserve, either because they looked upon the League as a European club or because they shared the idea that it might be engineered into an instrument of the hegemony of a single Power, an idea which I said was discounted by the fact that that fear had been expressed with reference to different Great Powers like Great Britain and France.

5. The only upshot of our conversation was that Fuad Bey said he did not know the King's attitude but continued to manifest interest and did not seem to exclude [illegible] member. I said that if he were really interested and would care to have further information, I thought the best thing would be for me to discuss the matter during my approaching visit to London.

6. At a certain point in the conversation Fuad Bey said banteringly: "You know we are already members of the League." I said I knew that the Hejaz in a previous [illegible] signatory of the Covenant, but that King Hussein had for certain reasons conceived a rather violent distaste for the League. I remarked that Ibn Saud had not shown any alacrity in adopting European ideas about the responsibilities of succession States, but hinted that in this matter he might show himself to better advantage than King Hussein. When Fuad Bey left [illegible] a series of strenuous discussions, I harked back to the theme of "the more the merrier."

7. I thought it advisable at a suitable moment in the final conversation to [illegible] paid great attention. As, however, I have occasion to address you separately on certain matters connected with slavery, I am recording this portion of the conversation in my despatch No. 187 of the 23rd July.

I have &c.
ANDREW RYAN

E 4311/1054/91] No. 25.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 187. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 23, 1930.

IN my despatch No. 186 of the 23rd July, relative to Ibn Saud's attitude towards the League of Nations, I have mentioned a conversation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 17th July, in which I thought it well to advert to the subject of slavery. For the purposes of that conversation I stressed the [illegible] Government and British public opinion. I referred to Ibn Saud's obligation under article 7 of the Treaty of Jedda.

2. The Acting Minister said that the King had really done a good deal. He [illegible] Even if I had been better prepared for the conversation, I might have hesitated to pursue this more closely, having regard to the status of Asir as a whole and the [illegible] M. [illegible] paragraph 35 of the memorandum enclosed in his despatch No. 60 of the 6th March, describes as an important, if not the chief port concerned in the distribution of slaves. I may refer to my despatch No. 100 of the 2nd July, in which I had occasion to raise the question of the political position of Medi[illegible]

3. Fuad Bey admitted the possibility of smuggling, but said that smuggling [illegible] If any substantial number were, in fact, imported into this country, it was by the overland route from the Yemen. The King had taken certain measures in this direction also, and there was a regulation whereby any person bringing in slaves over the land frontier was bound to supply a certificate with photograph attached that the slave had grown up in slavery. I did not pursue the Yemen aspect of the [illegible]

4. [illegible] fluttered this [illegible] I enclose a [illegible] Mr. [illegible] I [illegible] the Acting Minister [illegible] it almost impossible for the [illegible] I [illegible] I will ask [illegible] which [illegible]

5. He [illegible] on the next morning. W[illegible] long and interesting conversation, which I will summarise as briefly as possible.

6. I expressed regret that M. Sollazzo had been involved [illegible] as regards the sailing of his [illegible] disclosure of the existence of [illegible] had invoked. I confined [illegible] European ideas, and that [illegible] necessary for larger political [illegible] in which the King had a personal interest.

7. M. Sollazzo said he wished to make a quite definite statement. He would have been prepared the previous day to disembark the four men on a formal request from me. If, however, a similar case arose in the future he would not return to

land any person embarked in an Italian ship, and more particularly any person in [illegible] I was reporting the incident of the previous day for your [illegible] would be formal. I should, in fact, be delighted.

8. M. Sollazzo had previously told me that he was staying [illegible] advocate of early recognition of Ibn Saud by Italy. In our conversation on the 21st July he said that he was having difficulty over the inclusion of an article similar [illegible] of the Treaty of Jedda. He had been met with an intimation that Great Britain herself was ready to delete that article. He asked me whether this was true.

[illegible] revision of [illegible] to Ibn Saud, I had referred [illegible] so regarded it. If the question [illegible] expect to see article 7 abandoned [illegible] namely, if Ibn Saud had come into [illegible] reunion of the slave trade to such an extent [illegible] ry. I told M. Sollazzo of the [illegible] day four days earlier, and which [illegible] No. 186 of the 23rd July relative to [illegible]

10. M. [illegible] such negotiations to be proceeding, and [illegible] me position as himself regarding the slave [illegible]

[illegible] May, 1927 [illegible] In this connexion I may mention that [illegible] ards manumission was weaker than that [illegible] refuge in his consulate his only course [illegible]

I considered it incumbent on me to speak as explici[illegible] M. [illegible] I [illegible] If I [illegible] I should be grateful for telegraphic instructions, [illegible] may reach me before I go on leave about the 15th to 20th August.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

P.S.—When drafting this despatch I overlooked one point [illegible] interest [illegible] Pending [illegible]

A. R.

Enclosure in No. 25.

Memorandum by Mr Hope-Gill.

ROYAL SLAVES AN INCIDENT

AT about 8 30 on Sunday morning, the 20th July, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs rang up to say that the four slaves whom we had manumitted and had that same morning put on board the Italian boat, just due to sail for Massowa, were royal slaves and had recently [illegible] at once, under the agreement on this subject and added that the ship would not be allowed to sail until the slaves were taken off her.

2 I expressed surprise and incredulity, but said that I would at once investigate and ring him up again shortly As I rang off, M Sollazzo came in (followed [illegible]) and said that [illegible] boat could not sail until four slaves put on board by us were debarked He had replied that the slaves, having been handed over by us, could only be returned to us and at our request. He asked me to let him know in writing if we wanted them so returned, and also asked what he should do if the authorities tried by force to detain the ship, which was due to sail shortly. I said that I had just that moment [illegible] the case I thanked [illegible] him for his loyalty to us. He then left.

3 [illegible] circulars of the four slaves in question Two [illegible] refuge here seven weeks before (2nd June), one over a fortnight (4th July), and the [illegible] satisfactory evidence as to the identity of their former masters None [illegible] get them away earlier owing to lack of shipping facilities to Massowa.

4 I therefore rang up Fuad Bey to give him these results, stressing the different and considerable lengths of time these slaves had been here, and giving the reasons why. He asked for the names of their supposed masters, which I gave him [illegible] ago, but added he would ring up again shortly

5 [illegible] to Fuad Bey about them and that there had evidently been a mistake Fuad Bey just then rang up again to say that three of the slaves were clearly not Royal slaves, [illegible] was really the King's property [illegible] owner, and had been placed by the King in his Finance Minister's hands. Fuad Bey did not *demand* his return, but asked His Majesty's Minister to consider the position and return the slave if he thought right.

6. I asked Fuad Bey to tell the Acting Governor, who was still in my office, that the matter was settled as far as the local authorities were concerned. He did so, and in my presence Sheikh Abdul Aziz rang up the Officer Commanding, Jedda, and told him that the ship was free to leave.

7. After due consideration Sir Andrew Ryan rang up Fuad Bey and told him that, in view of the facts that (*a*) there had been no secret about this slave having taken refuge here, (*b*) he had been here seven weeks, (*c*) the local authorities themselves had a fortnight [illegible] Massowa, (*d*) it was now almost too late to entertain any objection—the eleventh hour, in fact, and (*e*) removal of the slave from an Italian ship on which he was already embarked could [illegible] these considerations Sir Andrew could only have the slave debarked if he were himself [illegible] certificate declaring [illegible] the King's property [illegible] Sir Andrew [illegible] character While declaring his willingness to take these steps out of consideration for the King, Sir Andrew urged that in His Majesty's own interests he should not

be forced to take them, concluding with references to his recent conversation with Fuad Bey on the subject of slavery, the widespread comment that might well be caused, the feeling in Europe, *e.g.*, Rome and Geneva, British public [illegible] possible and very unfortunate odium which the King might incur, &c.

8. Fuad Bey asked for time to consider the matter and consult the King, and said he would ring up later. He did so in half an hour, to say that, in view of all the circumstances, the King agreed that the best course would be to let the slave proceed. On ringing up M Sollazzo, I found that Fuad Bey had already told him that the matter was closed

H G

July 22, 1930

[E 4300/89/91] No 26

Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, August 11.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) P *August* 7, 1930

REFERENCE your telegram No. 48. The original list handed to MacDonald at Jedda of raids alleged to have been carried out by Transjordan against Hejaz tribes comprised 171 The complaint in many cases was laid several months subsequent to the alleged date of the raid

2 A further list of forty-nine raids was forwarded by Ryan on the 30th June, [illegible] of the raids mentioned had figured in previous lists communicated by him, but Cox is unable to reconcile these with any of those previously made. In this latter list, moreover, complaint is made of raids in no cases less than four months after alleged occurrence thereof, whilst in a large number of cases an interval of one or two years has been allowed to elapse.

3 With regard to the last eight, it is incredible that information of those given in Jedda telegrams dated the 7th, 28th and 31st July should, if gen[illegible] month of January eighteen raids took place as follows In February 8, April 3, May 3, June 3, July 4, with a toll of 5,000 camels 820 sheep and 42 men killed [illegible] following raids only have set out since the 1st January, 1930 January [illegible] ary 1, March 1, April 9, May 3, June 2, July 2, with an approximate [illegible] camels, 40 sheep and one man killed Two of these were dispersed before the frontier was crossed, and the majority of the returning raiders in two other raids were captured by Imperial forces There have been seized from the raiders some 150 camels, and twenty sentences of imprisonment in excess of six months have [illegible] referred to in telegram No. 174, there has not been time for a detailed enquiry

5. On the other hand, there have been nine raids since the 1st January from Hejaz into Transjordan, which took a toll of 4,348 camels, 2 300 sheep, 314 tents, [illegible] any punishment inflicted

6 The Amir has declared closed an area in Southern Transjordan which lies between the railway and the frontier, and that any Bedu found in that area will be punished and will be liable to be fired on at sight. The Amir has issued recently a further strict order against raiding, and has granted the powers of arrest to Imperial detachments patrolling and those now stationed at only existing water points in the desert in Southern Transjordan

7 [illegible] in the High Commissioner's secret despatch dated the 26th June. The Air Officer [illegible] far as the control of Transjordan tribes is concerned, and that it should improve still further now that a mechanised company is in being

8. I do not consider that the complaints of Ibn Saud are well founded. He should be informed of the effective efforts which are being made by Imperial forces

and Transjordan Government, and his failure to keep his own people under control should be brought to his notice.

9. I invite reference to the High Commissioner's secret despatch of the 8th February in this connexion.

E 4305/89/91] No. 27

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, August* 10, 1930

TRANSJORDANIA telegram No. 51 to Colonial Office.

I myself am suspicious of Ibn Saud's possible motives and of his allegations, although I think it would be [illegible] to get [illegible] within two or three days of raids in Jauf area, and Hejaz Government have certainly made great effort to speed up machinery in order to make the best show possible during MacDonnell's investigations.

Nevertheless, if situation is not really serious, I think it would be better tactically to await correspondence exchanged here and record of my conversations with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (all of which go by bag 11th August) before replying officially. The interval might be utilised to develop more fully the part of our case which rests on measures taken up to date by Transjordania. The arguments based on examination of allegations of raiders are also valuable, but reciprocal denials at this stage serve little useful purpose and promote renewal of mere recriminations, which we wish to avoid. It must also be remembered that many of this year's raids come within scope of MacDonnell's enquiry and that it might be impolitic to anticipate unduly his decisions.

I do not wish to deny official reply indefinitely, but [illegible] attacked the King's position and said that your enquiries will require time, I feel that delay of three weeks would do more good than harm. His Majesty is either genuinely convinced that situation is bad and that we are to blame or he is playing for position. In either case I have said enough to put him in the wrong if he contemplates any immediate folly. If he is bent on that anyhow nothing will stop him, but I believe he will hold his hand after his recent demonstration and my personal reply reinforced by what I said to Fuad.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 195.)

E 4338/1/91] No. 28

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, August* 11, 1930

COLONIAL Office telegram No. 238 [I No. 283] to Bagdad.

Ibn Saud sent promised letter regarding Ibn Mashhur to King Feisal by mail leaving here 1st August. Letter of pardon addressed by Ibn Saud to Mashhur was enclosed.

At our last interview Fuad sounded as though the King was still keen on having Mashhur brought to Jedda by air. He asked whether it would not be possible to hire an additional aeroplane from Royal Air Force or elsewhere. I discouraged this idea, and again told him that His Majesty's Government considered transport by Hejaz aircraft impracticable, and favoured, I thought, some arrangement for delivery in southern desert.

If letters are otherwise satisfactory and Ibn Saud has not meanwhile expressed fresh views, I think it would be useful to be able to give him some agreed view of the Iraqi and British Governments as to what they consider practical means of delivery.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 198.)

E 4338/1/91] No. 29

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 13, 1930

[illegible] telegram No. 135 [illegible] Mashhur [illegible] ment would prefer that satisfactory arrangements for his delivery should, if [illegible]

[illegible] arrange[illegible], No. 303, [illegible] objection, communi[illegible]

[illegible] Bagdad No. 304.

E 4305/89/91] No. 30

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 13, 1930

[illegible] telegram No. 133 [illegible] August [illegible]

His Majesty's Government agree that official reply to Hejazi Government should [illegible] you refer. They are, however, anxious that everything possible should be done to [illegible] Ibn Saud [illegible] therefore, unless you see strong objection, address Ibn Saud further personal letter [illegible] His Majesty's Government [illegible] 25th July and reports from Transjordan before making full official reply, desire [illegible] to you, No. 53), as evidence that, so far from approving recent raids, Transjordan [illegible] all that is possible to prevent them, although they are [illegible] left in ignorance of measures taken by Ibn Saud on his side.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 213.)

E 4408/1/91] No. 31

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting High Commissioner for Iraq (repeated to Foreign Office, August 14.)

(No. 403.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Colonial Office, August* 13, 1930

[illegible] telegram No. 135 of the 11th August repeated to you as No. 198.

Since question of disposal of Ibn Mashhur is brought up at every opportunity by Hejaz Government, even when Transjordan questions are being discussed, His Majesty's Government consider it important that when once letter of pardon has [illegible] disposal. You should therefore press [illegible] pardon has not yet been received [illegible] as soon as [illegible] are in a position to do so should communicate their proposals in this respect to Jedda [illegible] Ibn Saud.

Since this question has throughout been regarded as one for settlement between the Iraqi and the Hejaz Governments, His Majesty's Government would like to be consulted as to proposed method of Ibn Mashhur's delivery if matters should so develop that you think it desirable to seek their advice. They would be glad, however, if they could be kept informed of developments.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

E 4420/111/91] No. 32

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, August* 14, 1930.

I HAVE received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs copies of following letters, which he says left Jedda in mail of 1st August —

Two from Ibn Saud to Feisal (1) confirming promise to guarantee Ibn Mashhur's life and enclosing letter of pardon, and (2) acknowledging receipt of Feisal's judgment in matter of loot.

Three from Fuad to Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs (*a*) agreeing to signature forthwith of "Bon Voisinage" and arbitration protocol subject to [illegible] when plenipotentiary for both purposes can be sent, (*b*) outlining Hejaz Nejd point of view on "tribal" crime as distinct from "political", and (*c*) pursuance of "Nearchus" agreement between the two Foreign Ministers transmitting details of Nejd counter-claims against Iraq amounting to £20,500, including over £4,000 worth of damage by aeroplanes.

As regards (*b*), Fuad renews, in his covering note, request for "adequate [illegible] out that his Government cannot differentiate between reparation due [illegible] between themselves [illegible] have already forwarded to [illegible] above five letters. India [illegible]

(Repeated to Baghdad, No. 201.)

[E 4364/1/91] No. 33

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 14, 1930.

YOUR telegram No. 128 of 5th August. Receipt of £10,000 from Hejaz [illegible] deposit in Legation's bank account subject to early withdrawal. [illegible] done so, that sum is for division between Iraq and Koweit.

E 4516/89/91] No. 34

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 142.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, August* 19, 1930.

YOUR telegram No. 123.

Sir A. Ryan was [illegible] departure to add [illegible] further personal letter to Ibn Saud. Latter has now made spirited reply to his letter of 1st August. It was heralded by perturbed private letter from Fuad describing King as deeply moved [illegible] Sir A. Ryan to use.

Ibn Saud's letter bears unmistakable signs of collaboration by Yusuf Yasin and very possibly by Mr. Philby, who has recently embraced Islam and was in Taif at [illegible] Gist is as follows:

"1. We feel sure you wrote with best intentions, but your reliance on [illegible] situation and vitiates your judgment.

"2. Having referred claims to arbitration and seen arrival of investigator, we look only to present and future. Our letter of 23rd July was written not in light of the past arguments, but in order to elucidate British Government's present and future steps to prevent recurrence of former state of affairs.

"3. Our judgment on Transjordanian measures was based on result. We most regretfully state results do not say much for the measures. They neither satisfy us as to their adequacy nor with confidence in those responsible for their carrying out. As you see, since we issued our own strict orders after Musaad and Neshmi affairs our subjects have committed nothing compared with misdeeds of Transjordanians, and this in spite of precautions taken there and supposed lack of any steps by us.

"4. We notice you continually refer to Musaad and Neshmi incidents. We will explain their nature, but first must say that, disapproving of part of their action, we have shown our displeasure at it.

"5. Those two were responsible for law and order in troubled regions, and at time when it was necessary to apply martial law. Series of Transjordanian attacks demand exceptional precautions of which Mr. Bond was informed in November–December 1929. Both officials were faced with critical situation of revolt in North-Eastern Nejd and attempted revolt near Transjordanian frontier. They had taken immediate punitive action without reference to Government for instructions.

"6. Their acts were therefore neither raids nor aggressions against Transjordania nor disobedience of their Government. They punished the rebels [illegible] has never been proved that they crossed frontier. Even if they did they were right, for they acted within meaning of reservations made by my Government in 1929 (see Jedda despatch No. 185, 16th July).

"7. You refer to non-application of article 3 of Hadda Agreement. It would be desirable to give that article effect, but from what we see of Transjordanian Government's behaviour towards us, especially intentions of some of its people, and particularly when we look with eyes of reflection on small district like Transjordania, where effective measures to prevent raiding have been taken and are useless, we prefer to wait and see until the situation is explained."

I have [illegible] reply to private letter to Fuad, saying that I have forwarded King's and his letters to Sir A. Ryan, London. Translations go by bag 20th August. Possible palliative afforded by communication to Ibn Saud of information contained in paragraph 6 of Jerusalem telegram No. 51 seems inadequate at this stage. It might well act as irritant, and I prefer, subject to your concurrence, not to administer it. Alternative submitted in Sir A. Ryan's telegram No. 133 seems indicated by all circumstances.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 206.)

E 4523/89/91] No. 35

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Jedda, August* 19, 1930.

MY telegram No. 142. Raiding on Hejaz-Nejd-Transjordan frontier.

[illegible] The following summary of the position and a proposal as regards action to be taken are submitted for the consideration of His Majesty's Government:—

(*a*) Since the incident of the 7th February (Musaad) it is alleged that 22 raids have been made from Transjordan compared with 5 from Nejd, 36 persons killed [illegible] 2,500 camels taken compared with 413 [illegible] part of 1929 [illegible] raids from Transjordan compared with [illegible]

(*b*) [illegible] there has [illegible] increase [illegible] relative, [illegible] may be [illegible]

(*c*) As regards the raids from Transjordan [illegible] decrease [illegible] compared with the outburst in January [illegible] though there may well be exaggeration as regards number of casualties and the amount of the loot. Ibn Saud [illegible] strong position, even if only half these alleged raids have, in fact, taken place.

(c) It is open to us either to attack his position by imputing full responsibility to [illegible] Hadda Agreement and/or by showing [illegible] raids taking place [illegible] being there [illegible] made to [illegible] or, alternatively, we can prepare to [illegible] position.

His own case, formerly merely specious, but now more practical and significant as already known to us. In the circumstances, attack would only bring counter-[illegible] creating difficulties. The first appears improbable, the second would be explained only by some tactical necessity of playing for position. If he is looking for a [illegible] of Transjordan he must have forgotten the warning we gave him about Iraq (Foreign Office telegrams Nos. 133 and 134 of last year). This is likewise very improbable.

(f) Foregoing summary can only point towards (a) careful watching of measures [illegible] raids, (b) [illegible] the raids [illegible] provisional reports, differentiating between the real and the imaginary.

(E 4523/89/91) No. 36.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope-Gill (Jedda)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 22, 1930*

[illegible] Your Reports Nos. 142 and 144 of 19th August. [illegible] protests regarding raiding situation in Transjordan frontier.

[illegible] Government made in official Hejazi note of 28th July, it would [illegible] informing them, under instructions of His Majesty's Government, of measures described in paragraph 6 of Jerusalem telegram No. 51 of 7th August to Colonial [illegible] that detailed reply to Hejazi note will be made after receipt of text and full reports from Transjordan.

This seems less likely to increase King's irritation than further personal letter to him; but if you think latter course preferable you may adopt it, adding, if you wish, explanation that Sir A. Ryan was unable owing to indisposition to carry out before he left instructions to give Ibn Saud this information.

(E 4632/89/91) No. 37.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 211.)
Sir, *Jedda, August 7, 1930.*

WITH reference to recent telegraphic correspondence regarding the general situation on the frontier between this country and Transjordan, ending with the telegram to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan repeated to your telegram No. 109 to me, I have the honour to forward herewith the following papers:—

Translation of King Ibn Saud's letter to me of the 23rd July, forwarded by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs with a formal covering [illegible]
Copy of my interim reply to Fuad Bey Hamza of the 28th July.
Translation of Fuad Bey's official note of the 28th July.
Copy of my reply to the King of the 1st August.
Copy of my letter to Fuad Bey of the same date transmitting my reply

2. As stated in my telegram No. 122 of the 1st August, I considered it important to take such early action as I could on the King's letter. My personal re-examination of all the recent papers showed me that a good case could be made out [illegible] appeared from [illegible] the King was far too ready to put all the blame on Transjordan. I enclose an analysis of raids this year which I made from the files.

3. I was dealing at the same time with the protest against the actions of the [illegible] (see my despatch No. 212 of to-day's date), which I felt could be turned to good account. You will find a side reference to it in my letter to the King.

4. Fuad Bey came to Jedda on the 1st August. In order to push my counter attack to the utmost, I spoke to him at length on the following day. He had opened my letter to the King under a general authority. I need not weary you with all that I said, as I followed in the main, though with greater freedom, the lines of that letter and my official reply to the ar-Rihani protest. I showed him my analysis. I think it impressed him, but he suggested that a situation might be worse than appeared from a [illegible] to grasp a general situation and to tackle it was for the authorities on both sides to weigh it up, compare notes and collaborate—hence the stress I persistently laid on article 3 of the Hadda Agreement. I begged him to consider the Rihani case. Colonel Peake had heard of a recrudescence of raiding in April and had tried to [illegible] developed [illegible] protest. From May [illegible] raids [illegible] equally balanced, but that was a fact for which I could conjecture various possible reasons, *e.g.*, the lure of the Wadi Sirhan and similar causes, or even the better police arrangements in Transjordan for keeping out raiders from the other side. [illegible] from the other, and that you could not have security unless measures were taken on both sides of the frontier.

5. I passed to the three points (see my telegram No. 120 of the 1st August) in which Fuad Bey had gone further than the King. I demurred to [illegible] the idea was to [illegible] the foundation of [illegible] I stressed the great [illegible] the recent occasion. It could have served [illegible] Did it mean that the King thought the situation beyond control? [illegible] that the King, thinking his tribes outrageously [illegible] them from raiding? Did it mean that, if there were a repetition of the Ibn Musaad and Amir Neshmi enterprises, the King would condone them instead of disapproving of them as he had done in February? Did it mean that they might be repeated with some countenance from the King?

6. Fuad Bey promised to give me his personal views with equal frankness another day. When he reverted to the subject on the 5th August, however, he said he would prefer to limit himself to a few points. He tried once more to convince me that the Ibn Musaad and Amir Neshmi affairs, even if those gentlemen had entered Transjordan (a point on which I had the King and he always make reservations), were not raids but punitive expeditions of a sort undertaken in circumstances of great provocation and urgency. I said I had no reason to doubt that the leaders had entered Transjordan. I quite realised that their enterprises had a special character, but I preferred to call them raids rather than call them invasions. Fuad Bey went into a long explanation of how our Air Force on the Iraq frontier had [illegible] Nejd. He admitted that his Government had hotly denied it, but said they had finally expressed willingness to [illegible] I pointed out that unless such an agreement had been reached, he was defending the possibility of a right of pursuit into Transjordan which by his own account his Government had denied in regard to penetration from Iraq into Nejd. As for the Rihani affair, Fuad reminded me that he had merely given me an aide-mémoire and that Rihani had in fact been trying to do something for which no provision had yet been made in pursuance of article 3 of the Hadda Agreement. I repeated that his protest, whatever the form

was violent and rested largely on an obviously cock-and-bull story. On my side, I had given him the facts and had drawn the morals. I had not complained of the refusal of the local authorities to allow Riban to proceed to Jauf. It might have been better if Colonel Peake had set the diplomatic machinery in motion and moved this Legation to get permission for the journey; but that would have meant at least a fortnight's delay to get the Hejaz Government's assent, and the assent would [illegible]

7. These conversations, strenuous as they sound, were perfectly amicable. They helped, I hope, to clear the air. Having received in the interval between them your telegram No. 109, I was able to tell Fuad Bey that His Majesty's Government were giving the matter their most serious attention.

8. I have [illegible] received from His Majesty's High Commissioner in Transjordan the detailed account of the work of the Tribal Control Board, which I hoped to have in May. I realise the great preoccupation of the High Commissioner, and I have meanwhile had the advantage of reading in the Mecca newspaper "Umm-el-Qura" of the 25th July an account of two cases in which, according to the Transjordan press, severe action has been taken by the board. The following is the gist of the "Umm-el-Qura" article:—

(a) The "Umm-el-Qura" quotes the Amman newspaper the "Ardan" (issue No. 348) as publishing a report, under the heading "The Bedouin Tribes," to the effect that the Tribal Control Board has sentenced twenty tribesmen of the Beni Atiya and Howaitat to seven months' imprisonment for having participated in raids against Nejd tribes; that one of the shoikhs of the Sharaerat had been sentenced to one year's imprisonment; and that the paper learned with regret of such severity, and begged the Transjordan Government and the Amir to reconsider the sentences with a view to transmuting them into fines.

(b) [illegible] that [illegible] Ardan did not give the names of the guilty tribesmen, so that it might be known whether the news was true or was merely circulated to create the impression that the Transjordan authorities *are* taking action to prevent and punish raids. Doubt is expressed as to anything having been done, for raids continue, and are being reported daily from the frontier by telegraph.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 37

Ibn Saud to Sir A. Ryan.

In the Name of God the Most Merciful the Compassionate!

(Translation.) 27.2.1349 (*July* 23, 1930).

WE wish to inform your Excellency that our Government has submitted to us the information recently received by them concerning the Transjordan frontiers, details of which were lately communicated to your Excellency.

We would like to explain to you with complete frankness our feelings in regard [illegible] that you may be good enough to take the measures that are necessary to combat this bad state of affairs on the frontier.

[illegible] approached near to our territory to the effect that they and certain others had received through Shereef Shakir messages urging them insistently to raid the tribes [illegible] tools by the Shereef Shakir, could not put up with such a state of affairs and came to us.

[illegible] Nevertheless, we think it essential to inform the British Government of these rumours which are being spread among the tribes, and the result of which—as we see—is the chain of successive Transjordan raids on our subjects.

Anxiety and complaints among our subjects have reached such a pitch that it [illegible] the frontiers and to strike with a hand of iron on the hands of those who disturb the peace and desire to make raids.

Unfortunately, we have seen that the measures, of which you were good enough [illegible] produce the desired fruits and do not stop the raids against us; on the contrary, we see that recently they have increased to such an extent as to exceed the limit of mere raids of robbing and plundering and take on the form of organised expeditions, [illegible]

We are certain that your Excellency's Government does not approve [illegible] allowed to continue in such a manner. We, therefore, would be glad if you will inform the British Government, and will kindly let us know what solution, in their opinion, is calculated to put an end to it, for the state of affairs has become very critical.

With best compliments,
(Seal) IBN SAUD

Enclosure 2 in No. 37

Sir A. Ryan to Fuad Bey Hamza.

My dear Minister, *Jedda, July* 28, 1930.

[illegible] of the 23rd July, which reached this Legation on the 25th July, enclosing a letter [illegible] letter will necessitate in London. Will your Excellency be good enough to inform His Majesty accordingly.

Yours sincerely,
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure 3 in No. 37

Fuad Bey Hamza to Sir A. Ryan.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, 3.3.1349 (*July* 28, 1930).

I HAVE the honour to [illegible] the Transjordan frontiers has lately become so critical that its danger is very much great. The Hejaz Government, in the circumstances, feel obliged to point out these dangers and the perils that may result if the matter is allowed to continue in such a dreadful state, so that they may avoid responsibility for the results of this situation.

2. Your Excellency will realise, from seeing the list of raids carried out by the tribes of Transjordan [illegible] the list of raids carried out by the Transjordan Bedouin against Nejd since the date of Mr. MacDonnell's departure from Jedda till now, that such raids are outside the category of [illegible] but are a series of [illegible] attacks conducted on a large scale with a view to aggressing against Nejd and its tribes.

3. Your Excellency was good enough, during your conversation with His Majesty on the 12th June last, to mention the measures taken by the authorities concerned in Transjordan with a view to remedying that evil state of affairs and [illegible] the Transjordan tribes. Your Excellency will doubtless remember that His Majesty told your Excellency that he thanked those authorities for their care in

taking such measures, but the scale by which the arrangements can be measured is [illegible] of these raids shows in the clearest way that such measures have never been sufficient nor adequate to put an end to the carrying out of such actions by the [illegible]

4. The Hejaz Government [illegible] ment of the question of raids between the two countries. They, therefore, greatly welcomed Mr MacDonnell's mission and hoped that his coming will bring forth the best consequences. [illegible] makes them doubt the possibility either of calming the situation or of bringing the necessary pressure to bear on their tribes in order to prevent them retaliating. Over and above this they feel convinced, from what they have noticed, that in this matter the Transjordan Government can only be in one of the following situations :—

(1) Either they are actually unable to restrain their tribes, or
(2) They are unwilling to do so.

In [illegible] the Hejaz Government are compelled to approach the British [illegible] which they should take up. [illegible] out that they cannot consider themselves responsible for what may happen henceforth as a result of the disturbing incidents on the frontiers if the situation continues as it is at present.

5. I enclose herewith a detailed list of raids that took place since Mr MacDonnell's departure until now, so that you may be convinced of the truth of what I have mentioned above, and so that you will realise the importance of such hostile attacks of which the latest are the three recent raids ending with the raid of the Howeitat only two days ago.

6. The Hejaz Government most certainly request

(1) That the guilty tribes should be severely punished and prevented from raiding.
(2) That all criminal tribes who lately participated in the attacks and raids should be severely punished and restrained.
(3) That the looted property should be restituted, blood money of the people killed paid and compensation made immediately.

With highest respects,
FUAD HAMZA

Enclosure 4 in No 37

Sir A. Ryan to Ibn Saud

Jedda, August 1, 1930

Your Majesty,

(AFTER respectful compliments.)

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the letter which your Majesty was gracious enough to send [illegible] Transjordan frontier. I am naturally [illegible] attention. As however the necessity [illegible] as I have not had the opportunity [illegible] necessary pressure. In doing so I will use that freedom which your Majesty and which you have graciously permitted me to use [illegible]

2. Your Majesty refers to [illegible] Government. Since receipt of your letter I have had the personal study of those communications [illegible] Transjordan. I do not express my opinion on the merits of the respective claims as I could not do so without prejudice to Mr MacDonnell's [illegible] the statements made on both sides as an indication of the situation as seen by the authorities who have to deal with it.

3. I find that your Government have notified to my Legation twenty-six raids as having been committed by Transjordan subjects in the months January and February of this year, none in March, three in April; and eleven in the months May [illegible]. It is worth noting that none of the January, February and April raids were specifically notified to the Legation before the 2nd June, and could not, therefore, be brought to the notice of the Transjordan authorities until long after the event, and that several of them are stated to have occurred after the unauthorised and provocative attacks on Transjordan by Ibn Musaad and Amir Neshmi.

4. Taking the same recent period, I find that four raids by Hejaz Nejd subjects into Transjordan [illegible] and Amir Neshmi) as having been committed in January and February, none in March and April, and five in the months May to July.

5. I informed your Majesty on the 11th June that His Majesty's Government [illegible] of the measures which had been or were being taken by the authorities in Transjordan. I now deduce two conclusions from my study of the notifications analysed above, namely :

(1) If there has been a renewal of raiding during the months May to July, after a lull in March and April, the situation during the last three months, as described in the detailed notifications of the two Governments, is less serious than that in January and February both as regards the number of raids and the total damage, except for the number of human casualties said to have been suffered by your subjects in two raids in May. It is, therefore, in my opinion, much too soon to assume that the measures taken by the authorities in Transjordan have been without effect.
(2) It nevertheless remains true that raiding from either side of the frontier is always accompanied by raiding from the other. The situation cannot therefore be controlled from one side only. Parallel and continuous action on both sides, especially of a preventive kind, can alone produce that permanent improvement which your Majesty and my Government equally desire.

6. As I have said, I [illegible] taken on the Transjordan side both to punish and to prevent raids. We shared the hope, and I trust we still share the hope, that the outcome of Mr MacDonnell's [illegible] created by the past. Under instructions from my Government I begged your Majesty to take measures for the future corresponding to those that had been taken in Transjordan. I once more pointed out the deplorable effects of the raids of Ibn Musaad and Amir Neshmi, of the failure of the Hejaz Government to punish them, and of the fact that no loot had recently been returned. I also drew your attention to the importance of giving effect to article 3 of the Hudda Agreement, a point to which I attached very special importance.

7. Your Majesty was pleased to inform me that you had issued fresh instructions for the punishment of raiders and the return of loot, that you had signified your displeasure with Ibn Musaad in a non-public manner and would punish him publicly if offenders on the Transjordan side were punished, and that you were making arrangements for the co-operation between the authorities on both sides contemplated in article 3 of the Hudda Agreement.

8. Now that seven weeks have elapsed, I would make the following observations on these three points. I am still without particulars of the measures taken [illegible] to prevent raids. I [illegible] that I know of [illegible] support to those of Ibn Musaad and Amir Neshmi [illegible] tendering to the Hudda Agreement for operation. On the other hand your Government [illegible] which I [illegible] without [illegible] to the Nejd authorities was sent to Qaryat [illegible] May [illegible] to obtain it from those authorities [illegible] supervision [illegible]

9. I [illegible] your Majesty to forgive the candour of this letter. It is not written in a spirit of recrimination. One of the objects of my Government in charging me to deal with the subject personally with your Majesty was to get away from such a

spirit and to make a new start towards a better future I desire nothing more than [illegible] before I leave for England of your views and conclusions on the three points mentioned in the previous paragraph of this letter

With highest respects,
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure 5 in No. 37.

Sir A. Ryan to Fuad Bey Hamza.

(Personal.)
My dear Minister, *Jedda, August 1, 1930.*

I ENCLOSE my reply to the King's letter to me of the 23rd July regarding [illegible] will forward it to His Majesty.

I [illegible] also your note of the 28th July on the same subject. As I have [illegible] th the matter in my letter to His Majesty the King I will not reply [illegible] the receipt of instructions from my Government to which [illegible] the whole correspondence. I should like, however, [illegible] a view to elucidating the meaning of the Hejaz Government's disc[illegible] responsibility for further developments.

With highest respects,
ANDREW RYAN

E 4428 223 91] No. 38

Mr A. Henderson to Mr Hope-Gill (Jedda).

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 28, 1930.*

[illegible] No. 167 of the 5th July, and your telegram No. 123 of the [illegible] Ibn Mashhur was involved.

2. Please address reply to Hejazi Government's note of 10th June in following [illegible]

[illegible] Hejazi Government [illegible] Ibn M[illegible] involved. His Majesty [illegible] return of Ibn M[illegible] of responsibility w[illegible] Government must, h[illegible] refuge.

5. Furthermore, in the case of Ibn Mashhur, at any rate, examination of circumstances shows that a[illegible]ment of Hejazi Government could not apply to the [illegible] raids in which he was involved (see Transjordan telegram to [illegible] Ibn M[illegible] Government against these tribesmen is clearly not affected by Hejazi [illegible] ing Ibn Mashhur.

6. [illegible] second paragraph of Hejazi note you should reaffirm contenti[illegible] maintained by Sir A. Ryan [illegible] and point out that it is borne out by terms of point 4 in Ibn Saud's letter of 27th January

enclosed in Bushire despatch to Colonial Office No. 3 of 31st January. Undertaking of His Majesty's Government did not apply to Ibn Mashhur, whose case, moreover, was left over from meeting with Political Resident for discussion at meeting of two Kings.

(Repeated to Acting High Commissioner, Transjordan, No. 61.)

E 4657 4309 91] No. 39.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 218.)
Sir, *Jedda, August 11, 1930.*

IN my despatch No. 184 of the 28th June I recorded a personal conversation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the conditions governing diplomatic work in this country. One of my various reasons for choosing the moment of that conversation for a strong expression of views was that since the King went to Taif he was known to have been giving much of his time to questions of reorganisation of the administration of the Hejaz as well as to the revision of legislation. Comparatively little information had, however, been made public regarding his new administrative plans except as regards changes in the personnel of various departments, like Customs, municipalities, law courts, and certain committees, matters of considerable local interest, but not important enough to record in a despatch.

2. [illegible] August he [illegible] returned to the subject of arrangements for foreign affairs. He told me on the 3rd August, by way of a personal though not very confidential statement, that the long talked-of [illegible] taken. He, Fuad, would remain as second in-command. The Ministry would be really organised in four sections as soon as men could be found to act as their heads. [illegible] foreign missions would be either resident or constantly accessible in Jedda, it was [illegible] arranged. The reorganisation would soon be publicly announced.

3. I welcomed this statement provided it did not mean that I should be thrown back on heads of sections for the handling of important affairs. Fuad Bey reassured [illegible] have preferred not to have had another intermediary besides himself between me and the King.

4. On this Fuad Bey made the most interesting part of his statement. The King, he said, was over tired. He was at last listening to his doctors and trying to ease off, with a view to being able to reign rather than to rule. It was therefore [illegible] of the Hejaz, and who will now take over much of the King's work in respect of foreign affairs.

5. It is hardly credible that Ibn Saud, masterful and restless as he is, should abdicate so much of his real power as the foregoing suggests, but it will be interesting to see what balance is achieved under the new arrangements.

6. It had already been announced in the "Umm-al Qura" of the 18th July that one of the decisions taken during the recent conferences was to constitute in the Diwan a political department under Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. I asked Fuad Bey whether this new department would also be concerned with foreign affairs. He replied that it was being created to provide a single channel in the King's Palace system, through which matters dealt with in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs would pass. This is as it may be, but it is obvious that Yusuf Yasin will be in a strong position to ventilate his views, especially as Ibn Saud probabl[illegible] in him than in Fuad Hamza, to whom he probably clings more because of his utility and undoubted ability than because he has complete confidence in him. I consider it an exaggeration to regard Yusuf Yasin and Fuad as so closely united in what has been called the "Syrian group" as to see eye to eye on all matters, and Ibn Saud might well use the former as a check on the latter.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

[E 4776 223/91] No. 40

Mr Hope-Gill to Mr. A Henderson.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 155.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Jedda, September 3, 1930*

MR. MACDONNELL'S telegram No. 42 T. (enclosure 6 in Sir A Ryan's despatch No. 1[illegible]) fixed 1st August as time limit for [illegible] of such raids as were made prior to that date. What is the position as regards subsequent raids?

2. I am receiving from Acting High Commissioner further particulars [illegible] classes of raids both ways, and have replied by despatch that, as the former class are *sub judice*, no further action by me seems desirable. Do you agree?

3. I am not, however, clear whether investigation will cover raids made between [illegible] Government (see Jedda telegram No. [illegible] No. 203 to you). Do you wish me similarly to communicate subsequent details received from either side about recent raids (*a*) against, and (*b*) by their tribes.

4. I [illegible] may properly be communicated by this Legation in support of [illegible] but that later details as to (*b*), *e.g.*, punishment inflicted, is primarily a domestic concern, and should only be communicated on special occasions (as in reply to Hejaz note of 28th July).

5. I am also requested by Acting High Commissioner to ask the Hejaz Government for similar particulars of [illegible] raid into Nejd. I realise that these are required for administration and police purposes, but am anxious not to allow diplomatic action to [illegible] Paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 132 speaks of *local* enquiries.

I request instructions.

(Repeated to Jerusalem No. 220.)

[E 4907/1/91] No. 41

Mr Hope-Gill to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received September 10.)

No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, September 10, 1930*

H. M. has written a personal letter stating: "The intention has always been to regard this sum (the £10,000 [illegible] in personal [illegible] 3rd August) as the one which His Majesty's the King promised in January last during negotiations with Colonel Biscoe."

He has also undertaken verbally and very unwillingly to write to Iraq Minister for Foreign Affairs to the same effect.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 220, and Bushire, No. 153.)

[E 4974/1/91] No. 42

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 13.)

(No. 422.)
(Telegraphic.) P *Bagdad, September 12, 1930*

REFERENCE your telegram No. 339.

Following sent to Jedda, No. 39:—

"On the 10th September Nuri Pasha telegraphed to Fuad Hamza, stating that Ibn Mashhur had been guaranteed absolute pardon in respect of his life, property and personal freedom and that he will travel to Hejaz via Damascus. He requested telegraphic confirmation.

"The telegram was sent without my being consulted as to the wording, but I hope that [illegible] there with the following additional information will reassure him. The conveyance of Ibn Mashhur by

air was impossible, as you know. The possibility of sending him from Basrah [illegible]

"I trust that Fuad Hamza will telegraph satisfactory reply within least possible delay. [illegible] and is becoming uneasy at the postponement of his departure. If further [illegible] settling this business to the satisfaction of all parties would then be lost. I should be grateful for any assistance that you may be able to give in this matter."

E 4953/1/91] No. 43

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, September 14, 1930.*

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad, No. 233.—

Your telegram No. 39 S.

"I had a long interview with Fuad yesterday. On [illegible] of Nuri Pasha's telegram he tried to consult me by telephone from Taif, but [illegible] true), so sent a telegraphic reply and came to Jedda to talk matters over.

"His reply apparently stated (1) that it was both [illegible] for him to [illegible] Ibn Saud promise [illegible] Mashhur should return to Nejd.

"He explained to me, as regards (1), that Ibn Saud's intention was neither to [illegible] to be able to [illegible] the state. He [illegible] answer [illegible] be recoverable from [illegible] As to (2) Fuad [illegible] that [illegible] Ibn Mashhur [illegible] by the French to [illegible] He stressed the disastrous [illegible] occurring at this stage.

"In regard to point (1), I fear that it is quite impossible [illegible] further and more explicit [illegible] from Ibn Saud [illegible] endangering the [illegible] reached and embittering relations. With reference to (2) [illegible] His Majesty's [illegible] Moreover [illegible] His Majesty's Government have [illegible] Ibn Mashhur's return [illegible] Government [illegible] telegram to Bagdad No. [illegible] of his past history and [illegible] with Syria [illegible]

"[illegible] Ibn Mashhur [illegible] Although His Majesty's representatives have not [illegible] to discussion. His Majesty's Government's [illegible] the matter we are deeply interested in avoiding disastrous ending. We [illegible] delivering Ibn Mashhur by air to the Hejaz authorities at Wejh or failing that, to [illegible] Ibn Mashhur [illegible] Arabia. In the latter case [illegible] Amir Nasir would be required as guarantee and it is just possible that I might be able to arrange with him to be kept there by agreed to answer claims prior to his passing over into Nejd."

[E 4991/95/91] No. 44

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 16.)

No. 237 *Jedda, August 27, 1930*

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 242 of the 17th [illegible] the request of the Saud and the Yam[illegible] I [illegible] Amara of [illegible] that Ibn Saud would [illegible] guarded [illegible]

2. [illegible] the form [illegible] that [illegible] whether this news was true, it was learned that it is false and [illegible] of the official character of the "Umm-al-Qura," this *dementi* [illegible]

3. [illegible] It [illegible] more than passing interest to [illegible] as Ibn Saud's financial position [illegible] possibility of such extensive and expensive purchases.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 5121/1/91] No. 45

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 19.)

(No. 439.)
(Telegraphic.) P *Baghdad, September 19, 1930.*

[illegible] is acceptable to King Feisal and King Ali but they think it essential to their own honour that Ibn Mashhur should [illegible] freedom. This, of course, I refused to do.

In these circumstances it is not possible to settle route by which Ibn Mashhur shall travel without his own concurrence. He is an untutored Bedouin youth, and [illegible] will travel through Nejd since he believes that he [illegible] at once involve His Majesty's Government in [illegible] Mashhur's delivery to Ibn Saud, but also for his [illegible] have not put forward this suggestion.

As King Ali [illegible] has decided to do nothing further till King Feisal [illegible]

(Repeated to Jedda.)

[E 5140/223/91] No. 46

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting High Commissioner for Transjordania.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 20.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) P *Colonial Office, September 19, 1930.*

I SHOULD be glad to have your observations on Jedda telegram No. 155 to Foreign Office repeated to you as No. 220.

As [illegible] Transjordania and Hejaz Governments to [illegible] Mashhur [illegible] countries should be

regarded as covering all raids up to the 1st August, and that no claims shall hereafter be submitted by either Government in respect of such raids. Please inform me whether you see any objection to this proposal, and, if not, communicate it forthwith to Transjordanian Government.

Raids said to have occurred on and after the 1st August could probably be dealt with as you have already suggested by local inquiry and investigation carried out by respective Government, unless it proved possible to establish tribunal provided for by article 6 of Hadda Agreement.

As regards remainder of Jedda telegram, I refer to His Majesty's Government propose that, as general [illegible] His Majesty's representative at that post should continue to transmit all communications between two Governments about raids, as at present, making it clear that, when the communication relates to a raid which occurred prior to the 1st August, he does so without prejudice to MacDonnell's investigations. He may, however, refrain from transmitting to Hejaz Government communication from you in particular case if he sees special reason for doing so. In such cases he should communicate his reasons to Foreign Office and to you. Please telegraph, repeating to Jedda, whether you agree to this procedure.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

[E 5154/223/91] No. 47

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Jedda, September 23, 1930.*

YOUR telegram No. 134.

Copy of my reply to Hejaz Government's note of 10th June went to you by bag on 10th September.

I have received the following answer:—

1. His Majesty's Government appear to have overlooked article 5 of Hadda Agreement, which states that chief of tribe is to be held responsible. [illegible] such leaders as remain with their property in territory to which His Majesty's Government promised to forbid them entry.
2. Hejaz Government further maintain that if a criminal commits a crime against a certain country, returns home, escapes to that country from his own Government's punishment and is there not punished but pardoned, his own Government cannot be held responsible.
3. As regards circumstances of Ibn Mashhur's raids. Whilst Hejaz Government were making strenuous efforts to punish him and others they escaped into Iraq.
4. With regard to "the only undertaking given by His Majesty's Government being to hand over such persons as were held by *British* authorities," His Majesty's Government also undertook several months before January, in their own [illegible] that of Iraq Government, to deny refuge in Iraq or Koweit to [illegible] repeated on several occasions. Ibn Mashhur, who, according to Iraq Government, had indulged in criminal activities against Iraq subjects, was given refuge in Iraq.
5. Although it was agreed in January to postpone discussion of Ibn Mashhur's case that did not mean that Ibn Saud [illegible] to its exclusion from the pact.
6. Hejaz agent's instructions not to discuss the case of Ibn Mashhur until he and his property are returned cannot, therefore, at present be changed.

Translation of note goes by bag 30th September.
(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 241.)

E 5187/223/91] No. 48

Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 25.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) *September 24, 1930*

FOLLOWING from Mr. MacDonnell:—

(No. 7. A 239.)

Hejaz agent made me an official communication Monday night [illegible] Hejaz [illegible] representatives [illegible] I [illegible] custom, I should require his representative [illegible] presiding over a Bedouin tribunal, which of course comported the use of tribal [illegible] [illegible] discretion left to me by you to conduct my [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] large [illegible] [illegible] caused me [illegible] I should cond[illegible] [illegible] agreed and understood [illegible]

(Repeated to Jedda.)

E 5184/223/91] No. 49

Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 26.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *September 25, 1930*

FOLLOWING from MacDonnell:—

"(No. 8. A 250 B.)

"A violent altercation, ending in high words and a good deal of mutual abuse, arose 24th September before my arrival for morning session between Hejaz agent and one of the principal Transjordan chiefs. As far as I can gather, honours in vituperation were about divided, but as Hejaz agent [illegible] continue any further sittings with other side present, so I adjourned [illegible] Saud takes it up further."

Have requested MacDonnell to furnish full report as to cause of rupture so that it may be determined upon whom the blame primarily attaches. Meanwhile every effort is being made to conciliate parties.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

E 5189/223/91] No. 50

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Jedda, September 26, 1930*

MACDONNELL'S telegrams Nos. 6 A 239 and 240.

I have received note from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] categorically that:—

1. [illegible] Government [illegible] latter verified them and approached British Government. They thus became responsible for seeing that they are dealt with. Claims were shown in the lists which, have been [illegible] Hejaz Government, their agent and tribal representatives have nothing to add to them. Duty of both latter at Amman is to elucidate and prove facts, and not to enter into legal procedure or reconciliation.

2. Hejaz Government cannot agree to oath "because it entails loss of established rights" of their subjects.

I have tried to elucidate last statement by telephone, but failed to get Fuad. I expect him here to-morrow.

(Repeated to Jerusalem No. 243.)

E 5189/223/91] No. 51

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Hope Gill (Jedda).

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 27, 1930*

Your R. telegram No. 170 [illegible] arbitration.

Attitude of Hejaz Government as revealed in their note and in Mr. MacDonnell's recent telegrams is calculated to imperil whole arbitration. It is essential, therefore, that position should be cleared up without delay.

My immediately following telegram contains text of message from His Majesty's Government to Ibn Saud on whole question. It would be preferable, if possible, to reach settlement without direct appeal to Ibn Saud. If, therefore, Fuad Hamza is available in Jedda [illegible] satisfactory settlement without [illegible] you are instructed to communicate to the King forthwith special message from His Majesty's Government. You should explain that this message is couched in strong terms, and that His Majesty's Government hesitate to forward it without first representing gravity of situation to Fuad Hamza, as His Majesty may consider message reflection on his good faith. Unless this procedure produces satisfactory result within forty-eight hours of your interview, you should forward message to the King. If Fuad Hamza is not expected [illegible]

Repeated to [illegible]

[E 5189 223/91] No. 52

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Mr Hope-Gill (Jedda)

(No. 155.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Foreign Office, September 27, 1930*

FOLLOWING is message for King Ibn Saud referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.—

"His Majesty's Government view with deep concern the unfavourable turn which Mr MacDonnell's investigation is taking as a result of attitude of Hejazi Government as revealed in their recent note. Hejazi Government apparently contend that the results of the enquiries held by them should be accepted by the British investigator as sufficient to establish claims of Hejaz-Nejd subjects. His Majesty's Government learn from Mr MacDonnell that in [illegible] this view Hejazi agent has already refused to allow spokesmen of Hejaz-Nejd tribes to give evidence on oath or to be examined in any way upon Transjordan claims.

"Your Majesty will remember that when Mr MacDonnell visited Jedda it was more than once suggested that he should base his investigation on a study of the results already obtained by the Hejaz-Nejd authorities. Both Sir A. Ryan and Mr MacDonnell rightly objected to this on the ground that it would destroy the essential character of an impartial investigation such as could alone form the basis of an arbitral award by His Majesty's Government. Such an investigation can only give results of any value if it be conducted independently and his opportunity [illegible] whatever way he thinks best and if necessary on oath. It was understood that your Majesty finally accepted this view, and His Majesty's Government now learn with the utmost surprise that Hejaz-Nejd Government have apparently reverted to their original attitude.

"The situation now created is such as to endanger a settlement which His Majesty's Government hoped would materially improve the relations between Governments concerned. Your Majesty will remember that in inviting His Majesty's Government to act as arbitrators you gave them complete discretion to conduct any necessary enquiries and issue their arbitral award in whatever manner they thought best. They are therefore at a loss to understand the motives of the Hejazi Government in now attempting so seriously to fetter that discretion.

"If the Hejazi Government persist in this attitude, His Majesty's Government will not be able to assume the onus of giving an arbitral decision on disputed facts [illegible] the normal method of verification and assessment which had already been agreed on and thus from making impartial or adequate recommendations. The responsibility for the consequent failure of the investigation and inability of His Majesty's Government to give their award and for any deterioration in Transjordan-Nejd Hejaz relations which may follow will be a serious one and will rest with the Hejazi Government alone."

(Repeated to Acting High Commissioner, Transjordan, No. 69.)

E 5257 223/91 No. 53

Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda, to Mr. A. Henderson (Received October 1.)

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Jedda, September 30, 1930*

YOUR telegram No. 154.

I have had two long interviews with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. He quickly realised the importance of the matter and urgency of decision, but stated that he could not possibly give definite answer without consulting the King, who is holding court at Taif. Fuad said he expected message that evening and learned from Emir Feisal that it would be delivered at midday to-day. Fuad is himself cutting short his visit here to leave early to-morrow morning for Taif, where he will receive His Majesty's reply.

If favourable, he will at once inform me by telephone (forty-eight hours expire to-morrow evening). If unfavourable, he will [illegible] without delay. [illegible] temporarily out of [illegible] possibly to delay passing the matter [illegible] answer. I [illegible] Foreign Office has so far produced this satisfactory result.

I have made it clear, however, that if I receive unsatisfactory or no answer before the Mecca mail leaves Jedda on the morning of 3rd October [illegible] to King Ibn Saud.

He [illegible] was spurred to this activity not by the [illegible] of this message but by his desire to settle the matter as soon as possible.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 249.)

[E 5290/26/91] No. 54

Mr Hope-Gill to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 178.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Jedda, October 1, 1930*

FOLLOWING for Sir A. Ryan.—

"As bag was closing yesterday Fuad gave me King's reply to your letter of 23rd August. I could only enclose hasty translation. Better translation will be sent by post.

"It opens very friendly, states that Arabs bear no rancour [illegible]

"It being his habit to pardon, you may rest assured that everything [illegible] away.

"He has no objection to meeting him for settlement of Persian Gulf question, but his visit to Nejd will be too short. If His Majesty's Government [illegible] they send Biscoe or anyone else to Jedda, he is prepared to negotiate here.

"So far as he knows, no matters of importance relate to Koweit. Most important relate to commercial communications of Nejd, *i.e.*, Bahrein. He has written to Sheikh Hamed on the subject.

"He looks to your early and healthful return."

E 5256/89/91] No. 55

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope-Gill (Jedda)

(No. 360.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 2, 1930.*

WITH reference to Sir A. Ryan's despatch No. 211 of the 7th August and to [illegible] Nos. 229 and 233 of the 19th and 24th August respectively relative to the Transjordan-Nejd Hejaz frontier situation, I have to inform you that His Majesty's Government have now considered in detail the Hejazi Government's note of the 24th July, together with those portions of King Ibn Saud's letters of the 23rd July and the 13th August to Sir A. Ryan, not yet dealt with by Sir A. Ryan direct.

2. I transmit to you the accompanying memorandum for eventual textual [illegible] to the Hejazi Government, embodying the views of His Majesty's Government [illegible] protests and [illegible] contained in the above mentioned communications. As it has not yet been possible to give final sanction for the initiation of the new measures in Transjordan referred to in this memorandum, you should not communicate it to the Hejazi Government pending the receipt of further instructions from me which will, if possible, be sent to you by telegram.

I am, &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON

Enclosure in No. 55

Memorandum

HIS Majesty's Government have given their careful attention to the note of [illegible] addressed to Sir [illegible] by the Acting Hejazi Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the situation in respect of raiding across the frontiers between the Hejaz Nejd and Transjordan. The Hejazi Government in that note expressed the opinion that the position had become exceedingly critical, and that the measures taken by the authorities of Transjordan to control their tribes were inadequate; they contended, further, that the Transjordan Government had failed to fulfil their obligations.

2. [illegible] Mr. M. Dowell [illegible] the [illegible] more especially referred to by the Hejazi Government, [illegible] prefer not to express an opinion regarding the facts al[illegible] or them, beyond noting t[illegible] entered by the two Governments up to the end of [illegible] Government's protests in respect of the eight ra[illegible] shows, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, [illegible] analysis serves as the principal basis of [illegible] 1st August last, and the text of it was shown by Sir A. Ryan to Fuad Bey Hamza [illegible] Majesty's Government and the Transjordan Government have had [illegible] under continuous [illegible] for many months past. Sir Andrew Ryan, on the first opportunity [illegible]

[illegible] been captured and brought to trial, much loot has been recovered, and raiding parties have been turned back.

(*e*) On the 14th July the Emir Abdullah reiterated the orders referred to under (*c*) above, and issued a warning in the following terms:—

> We shall not be held responsible before God for any punishment which [illegible] information about raiding. Whoever is found in the closed area shall be fired upon, and previous orders issued by the Bedouin Control Board must be respected.

[illegible] desert of Southern Transjordan.

5. His Majesty's Government are informed by the British authorities in Transjordan that considerable results have already been achieved by these measures, [illegible] contrary to the allegations made in the Hejazi Government's note of the 28th July, has of late sensibly diminished.

6. It is evident that an important factor in the control of raiding is the early receipt of intelligence of impending raids. As a result of the further consideration which has been given of late to the whole problem by the Transjordan Government in consultation with His Majesty's Government, the following additional measures are now being taken to improve the intelligence system at the disposal of the Transjordan authorities:—

(*a*) The appointment of a British intelligence officer on the establishment of the Arab Legion; the sphere of this officer's work will be more particularly the southern desert region of Transjordan, and he will have powers so extended as to ensure respect for the decisions of the Bedouin Control Board, of which he will be a member.

(*b*) The establishment of two advance intelligence posts at Azrak and Imshash (Bir Nam). These posts will be equipped with wireless telegraphy apparatus and will be manned by small parties, whose duty it will be to [illegible] thus enabling the Transjordan authorities to take immediate action to prevent raids or to turn back raiders. It is also proposed to station a similar intelligence detachment in the old Turkish fort near Mudawara and to provide this post with wireless apparatus.

7. The Hejazi Government will observe from the foregoing that the Transjordan Government, far from [illegible] their obligations in respect of the control of their tribes in the matter of raiding, have devoted earnest attention to the [illegible] stringent and costly measures to this end.

8. His Majesty's Government desire now to turn to another aspect of the obligations which rest upon both Governments in connexion with the raiding problem, namely, the punishment of offenders and the return of loot. His Majesty's Government are [illegible] and tribesmen of the Hejaz and Nejd who have been guilty of raids against Transjordan. During the period from the 20th July, 1928, to the 29th June, 1930, the Transjordan Government have inflicted fines and imprisonment on raiders on twenty-one occasions, as set forth in the first list attached to this note.* His Majesty's Government have learnt of only one case in which loot carried off by Hejazi or Nejdi tribes has been returned by the Hejaz-Nejd authorities, namely, the case of the property looted by Nejdi Shararat from a Beni Atta caravan on the 1st July last, and returned to its owners by the Governor of El Ula. On the other hand, during the period from February 1926 to the 12th August, 1930, the Transjordan Government have [illegible] to the Hejaz-Nejd [illegible] restitutions are given in the second list attached to this note.* Other restitutions have been made direct by Transjordan tribesmen to the tribes of the Hejaz-Nejd concerned. In this connexion, His Majesty's Government would draw attention to the circumstance that the task of the Transjordan authorities in controlling their tribes has been made most difficult owing to the latter's resentment at the fact that

* Not printed.

loot as [illegible] from them and returned to the Hejaz Nejd authorities, who, on their side, take no steps to return to Transjordan property looted [illegible] raiding parties.

9. The Hejazi Government, in the second paragraph of their note of the 28th July [illegible] are a series of hostile attacks conducted on a large scale with a view to aggression [illegible] authorities in [illegible] inception, character and [illegible] whole decreased of late as a result of the activity [illegible]

10. One further and most important point [illegible] ment requires attention. They [illegible] responsibility for the future [illegible] situation continues. His Majesty's Government are not clear as to the [illegible] the Hejazi Government intended to give to this statement. They desire, however, to [illegible] with the situation on the frontier between two [illegible] tute a denial of obligations clearly [illegible] His [illegible] Government [illegible] operation.

11. His Majesty's Government would once more draw attention to the importance [illegible] 3 of the Hadda Agreement, whereby King Ibn Saud agreed that constant communication should be maintained between the local authorities on the two sides of the frontier. The authorities of Transjordan have from the date of that a[illegible] and anxious to carry out their part of it, but, so far as His Majesty's Government a[illegible] steps have been taken by King Ibn Saud to fulfil the obligations accepted in that article. An [illegible] of the unfortunate results of this failure on the part of the Hejazi Govern- [illegible] Transjordan authorities was seriously [illegible] Abdullah-er Ribani would have been accomplished normally within a few days, and the Transjordan authorities would have been in a better position to check the [illegible] Hejazi Government now deplore.

[illegible] as to [illegible] between [illegible] from [illegible] Nejdi witnesses. Instances of cases in which the Transjordan Bedouin control Board have been compelled to [illegible] raiding for lack of evidence are given in the third [illegible]*

* Not printed.

13. In King Ibn Saud's letter of the 23rd July to Sir Andrew Ryan reference is made to certain [illegible] His Majesty's Government are gratified to find that King Ibn Saud himself was loath to give credence to those allegations, though His Majesty felt bound to draw attention to them. Careful investigation by the Transjordan authorities proves the allegations to be devoid of foundation. There is, indeed, reason to believe that they were deliberately put into circulation by interested persons, whose evidence could have no value, namely, men of the Beni Atia tribe, who came originally from Nejd into Transjordan and raided then[illegible]

14. His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to share the views expressed in the King's letter of the 13th August to Sir Andrew Ryan regarding the character of the raid conducted by Ibn Musaad and the Emir Nesran, or [illegible] accept the reasons which His Majesty adduces in partial justification of those raids. The information in the possession of the British authorities admits of no doubt that the operations of the two officers extended into Transjordan, where they created a resentment all the greater because it was felt that, while the Transjordan Government were taking severe measures against raiders into Nejd, officers of the Hejaz-Nejd Government went apparently unpunished. While noting the assurance given by the King to Sir A. Ryan on the 11th June that he had visited his displeasure on Ibn Musaad in a private manner, His Majesty's Government can only again express [illegible] His Majesty [illegible] officer and the Emir Nesran [illegible] prepared to do so, if similar offences were punished in Transjordan, as the above recital shows them to have been, in fact, punished. For the rest, it is the hope of His Majesty's Government that Mr. MacDonnell's investigation will further elucidate the facts regarding the raids in question and pave the way for a settlement of claims arising out of them.

15. The views of His Majesty's Government on the whole of this important question may be summarised as follows: The investigations conducted by Mr. MacDonnell and the consequent arbitral decision of His Majesty's Government will, it is to be hoped, lead to the complete liquidation of the past. As to the present and the future, the Transjordan authorities, on their side, have adopted measures which have already produced a material improvement in the situation; they are about to adopt [illegible] measures which [illegible] confidently expected lead to a still more marked improvement. A necessary condition of such improvement, however, must be that the Hejaz Government, for their part, will lend their whole-hearted co-operation by making every effort to control the tribes of the Hejaz and Nejd by giving instructions for the fulfilment of their undertakings under article 8 of the Hadda Agreement and securing that their local authorities in the region of the Transjordan frontier collaborate fully and loyally with the local authorities of Transjordan, by communicating to the Transjordan Government full information regarding punishments inflicted on Hejazi and Nejdi raiders, by taking effective steps to confiscate and return looted property, and, finally, by agreeing to the establishment of the tribunal provided for in article 6 of the Hadda Agreement, and assisting in making it an effective instrument for the settlement of claims arising from raids from either side.

E 5331/223/91] **No. 56**

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Jedda, October 2, 1930.*

MY telegram No. 173.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned this morning, without having had to visit the Seat to say that telegraphic [illegible] have been sent to His [illegible] (1) to conform with Mr. MacDonnell's procedure in the matter of oath [illegible] Hejaz Government is useless [illegible] (except of course those concerning Ibn Mashhur) which have been duly notified to Hejaz Government through this Legation. He added (3) King maintained his objection to voluntary settlements on ground that his subjects, having entrusted their claims to their Government, are now debarred from seeking independent solution.

I thanked [illegible] argument to persuade Hejaz Government to allow their tribal representatives to

enter into voluntary settlements, even to doubtful point of representing such procedure as inherent in all arbitral proceedings. I fear further attempt at mere persuasion would be useless. Unless you [illegible] Ibn Saud's [illegible] such settlements is clearly in nature of interference with His Majesty's Government's discretionary powers. I recommend that point be dropped. Instructions foreshadowed in your telegram No. 156 have not yet been received, but in view of the above I do not propose to act on them unless I hear from you further.

As to (2). I observed that condition attached to it had all the appearance of a final attempt to fetter discretionary powers vested by His Majesty's Government in Mr. MacDonnell to interpret phrase "within a reasonable time" as he thought fit. I should, however, [illegible] depend on whether point is purely academic, or whether there are in fact Transjordanian claims already accepted for investigation although not formally notified to Hejaz Government.

I have heard no echo of altercation of 24th September as yet.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 255.)

E 5343/223/91] No. 57

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 182.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Jedda, October 4, 1930*

MY telegram No. 180, last sentence.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has telephoned to say that the King has [illegible] insult levelled on 20th September (*sic*)* by Hamid bin Jasr, of Hommitat, at Hejaz agent and Government. He added that, no adequate apology or punishment of culprit having apparently materialised, Ibn Saud was considering official representations to His Majesty's Government.

I thought it wiser not to disclose my knowledge of the incident, but impressed on Fuad that it was very desirable to confine the effect of any wordy strife between the [illegible] Mr. [illegible] and [illegible] Abdullah rather than enlarge them into the international sphere.

His reply was non-committal, and I fear still another obstacle may block investigation unless I can be supplied immediately with more adequate means to prevent its taking concrete form than have been given in Transjordanian telegrams to Colonial Office ending with No. 77.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 257.)

E 5386/3080/91] No. 58

Sir S. Barton to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 131.)
Sir, *Addis Ababa, September 15, 1930*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 73 of the 9th June last on the subject of the visit to be paid to the Yemen by the German Minister here, I have the honour to report that the German Legation interpreter, who accompanied Dr. Prufer to Sanaa, has recently returned here with despatches.

2. The German Chargé d'Affaires informs me that Dr. Prufer left Sanaa without signing the treaty with the Imam. The negotiations apparently broke down on the two points indicated in paragraph 3 of my despatch under reference, namely recognition of the Yemen's independence and integrity and of the right of jurisdiction.

3. With regard to the first point, Dr. Melchers added that he had been particularly [illegible] Dr. Prufer [illegible] the Imam's insistence on the recognition of the integrity of the kingdom and its boundaries was principally [illegible] considered that our frontiers, was more important to Germany than that of the Yemen, he had maintained his Government's refusal to agree to the insertion in the treaty of the articles providing for such recognition.

4. I also gather that, during Dr. Prufer's passage through Aden, for the purpose of [illegible] with a letter of introduction to the Resident, an incident occurred with the Aden police, who apparently suspected him and his

* The word "sic" is cyphered.

interpreter of espionage. Dr. Prufer is said to have the intention of bringing the matter [illegible] His Majesty's [illegible] at the [illegible]

5. Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and to the Political Resident at Aden.

I have, &c.
S. BARTON

E 5396/92/91] No. [illegible]

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 259.)
Sir, [illegible] *Jedda, September 19, 1930.*

I HAVE [illegible] Lady [illegible] Mr. [illegible] weeks [illegible]

2. [illegible] Beirut [illegible] the Reys [illegible]

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 59

Jedda Report, July and August 1930

I.—Internal Affairs

1. *Local Government*

IBN SAUD spent the whole of July at Taif surrounded by his sons, his Ministers, and the leading men of the Hejaz, who were assembled at the summer capital from Mecca and Jedda to discuss internal reorganisation. Ibn Saud was said to be severely overworked, his intention to reign rather than rule.

Little is known of the deliberations, which were many, and less of their results, which are still barely visible. The Mecca "Umm-al-Qura" did indeed publish early in July the formation and composition of an Inspectorate of Government Departments. There was also a shuffling of the occupants of Administrative posts and an increased immixture of Nejdis designed to stay corruption in the Customs and elsewhere. Talk of the reorganisation of the Foreign Office has not yet taken concrete form.

The King, still apparently more dictator than sovereign, refreshed himself during the first part of August by slaughtering gazelle at the purifying risk of being thrown from his Mercédès Benz.

2. *Religion*

(*a*) A report was received in July from Simla containing the opinion delivered by an Indian Moslem that Ibn Saud intended to proclaim himself Caliph of Islam. This lacks a representative [illegible] and is there prominent. His evidence is the only one which has come to hand lately of Ibn Saud's penchant for the Caliphate.

(*b*) [illegible] shown by the representations made by the All India Shia Conference to his Excellency the Viceroy, a copy of which was received in July. The conference had sought British diplomatic intervention to restrain Ibn Saud's Government from "deliberately and continuously trampling down the religious susceptibilities of Moslems and of other sects," but his Excellency had replied that the settled policy of His Majesty's Government was one of neutrality in religious matters and non-interference in the holy places of Islam. No other similar repercussion has been recently noted.

(*c*) The Puritan Wahhabi faith has at last claimed Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby, who on the 8th August made a unique entry into Mecca, there to make his first profession of faith. He was closely followed into Islam by two other members of the European colony in Jedda, an Italian mechanic and a German commission agent.

3. *Agriculture.*

(*a*) One of the July issues of the "Umm-al-Qura" described the policy whereby certain of the Nejd Bedouin are being "civilised" by Ibn Saud, who collects them into villages, grants them gifts and subsidies to attach them to the soil, and, as their feudal lord, calls upon them in time of war for the supply of armed contingents and camels. There has been no other reference to the agricultural possibilities of central and northern Arabia.

(*b*) Representations were made to the Hejaz-Nejd Government by His Majesty's Minister in July with a view to permitting the International Locust Bureau of Damascus to send a scientific mission to investigate the extent and nature of the breeding grounds of the Nejdian locust. The expected reply was received that Ibn Saud considered it undesirable to send such a mission at present.

4. *Finance*

(*a*) Indications multiplied during the last two months that all was still further from well with the [illegible] exchequer. It has become [illegible] the habit to meet government obligations by [illegible] the Consular April report, paragraph 7). Money was extremely tight throughout July and August. Credit fell to very near zero.

(*b*) Arms and ammunition bought last year from the Government of India (Mess. 1929 report, paragraph 4) [illegible] yet be paid for, yet more have just been bought [illegible] the method of [illegible] one's tailor. Payment of the Eastern Telegraph Company's [illegible] has been seriously in arrear. Messrs. Gellatley, Hankey and Co. and the Netherlands Trading Society, hitherto

purveyors of credit to the Government, will give no more. A bumper pilgrimage next year is already [illegible] Government [illegible] as [illegible] in England, where he still preferred to buy them although beset with offers from Poles, Germans and the rest. The [illegible]

(*c*) Ibn Saud also asked in July for the remission of the 2 per cent. transit dues at Bahrein [illegible] his troops, but the Government of Bahrein has been unable to accede to the request.

5. *Commerce*

Complaints made by the Calcutta Marine Insurance Association about the heavy [illegible] increased between ship and [illegible] at Jedda were again brought to the notice of the Hejaz Government, and were mentioned by His Majesty's Minister to the King. As a result regulations were issued governing the registration and loading of dhows, the local form of lighter. It remains to be seen whether they will be strictly applied. Commerce generally has become as dull as is usual in the "off" season.

6. *Social*

The "Umm-al-Qura" published in August the news that the Government had, [illegible], referred to the Legislative Council a measure ordaining [illegible] age for all upon reaching maturity. It was said that the excess [illegible] are to be checked in the shape of lighter dowries and cheaper weddings, but the problem of how to stall and feed a wife is to be left for private solution. There can be no [illegible]

II.—Frontier Questions

7. *Transjordan.*

(*a*) The preparations [illegible] Mr. MacDonnell's proposed visit to Nejd [illegible] Government accepted [illegible] Sharif Abdel Aziz, and his secretary, Imaum, left Jedda for Amman on the 13th August in five cars to collect the tribal representatives on the way. To Mr. MacDonnell's [illegible] by their [illegible] Mission [illegible] hospitality. Wireless [illegible] were requested by the Jordan Government to enable their agent to communicate from Amman with Jedda and Aqaba.

A duplicate of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply to His Majesty's Minister's [illegible] paragraph 7 [illegible] for the [illegible] raids [illegible] discarded induced in Nejd by Transjordan raiders as good and sufficient reason why Mr. MacDonnell should not pursue his investigation in Nejd territory. Mr. MacDonnell's further study of the situation led him to the provisional conclusion that there was no immediate necessity for him to visit Nejd, and that question was therefore left in abeyance. [illegible] His Majesty's Government had definitely decided to allow Mr. MacDonnell to use his own discretion in interpreting the "reasonable" delay to be permitted for past notifications of raids. His Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs was also instructed to represent to the Hejaz Government the practical advantages of encouraging voluntary settlements between tribes to be [illegible] concerned. No reaction to either communication was received by the end of August.

(*b*) Raiding continued in July and August on a relatively small scale. The Transjordan Government protested against two raids from Nejd, made on the 1st and 8th July, in which twenty-five camels were taken, two men killed and three wounded. The Hejaz Government protested against six raids alleged to have been

[illegible] 20th, 22nd and 26th July and on the [illegible] and 21st August, and to [illegible] were able to report, on very good authority, however, that the first three [illegible] were [illegible] the desired results. Raids, he said, had not ceased, but had, [illegible] that they could no longer be regarded as [illegible] or plunder but looked more like organised expeditions designed [illegible] official note [illegible] the Mac[illegible] Mission, and [illegible] ism as to the effects at the Mac[illegible] Mission, and [illegible] respond [illegible] develop[illegible]

[illegible] to the 1st August [illegible] that he was [illegible] reply. [illegible] that [illegible] parallel [illegible] Ibn Saud's [illegible] account, given at [illegible] the Hejaz [illegible] measures the unsatisfactoriness of his answer about [illegible] raiding, and his continued failure to [illegible] of the Hejaz Agreement. In a [illegible] 29th [illegible]

His Majesty's [illegible] inquiries into the [illegible] His Majesty's Foreign Affairs [illegible] the [illegible] alleged raids into Hejaz [illegible] of the Hejaz Government.

(d) The Hejaz Government [illegible] report, paragraph 11) against the alleged exceptional [illegible] passed Abdullah ar Rihani at the frontier post [illegible] reply [illegible] It was [illegible] anything exceptional was [illegible] officers [illegible] with a view to preventing [illegible] His Majesty's Minister was able to make good use of his [illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs the effects of non-co-operation [illegible] the Central Government [illegible] frontier officials.

8. *Iraq.*

[illegible] British spade-work the Treaty of Friendship and *bon* [illegible] Hejaz Nejd [illegible] report, paragraphs 12-14) [illegible] Foreign Minister wrote on the 27th July to his opposite number in Bagdad to say that his Government had now [illegible] the treaty provided that negotiations were at the same time [illegible] and he asked whether the Secretary could be sent [illegible]

(b) [illegible] His Majesty's Ministers persistence in seeking payment of the interim recompense for raids from Iraq and Koweit promised by Ibn Saud in January (June report, paragraph 15). A cheque

[illegible] days previously to acknowledge King Feisal's judgment in the matter of the total compensation due by the Hejaz Nejd to Iraq in respect of past raids. His letter, however, [illegible] taking it as evident that the sum of £30,000 adjudged by King Feisal represented the reduced total of Iraq claims [illegible] of Nejd counter claims amounting to £20,000. He pointed out that this sum included damage by aeroplanes (a matter of something over £4,000) and tactfully left it to the British and Iraq Governments themselves to determine responsibilities. The matter is still under consideration. No raids were reported on this frontier during July and August.

(c) Representations were made to the Hejaz Government in August on behalf [illegible] Iraq Government, who had drawn the High Commissioner's attention to the [illegible] to the authoritative and menacing tone of a letter received from Ibn Saud by one of the Dhafir Sheikhs. A reply was received and transmitted to Bagdad, stating that in certain cases the Nejd [illegible] officials, that other cases were being investigated, and that the letter was all a mistake having evidently been wrongly addressed by an underling detailed to distribute [illegible]

(d) Progress was made with the Ibn Mashhur affair (June report, paragraph 13) but it has not yet been disposed of. Ibn Saud answered King Feisal's letter in July, confirming his promise "concerning the guarantee of Ibn Mashhur's life and his well being in the same way as others like him" and enclosing a letter of pardon to Ibn Mashhur himself. It was still uncertain at the end of August whether these letters would be considered as sufficient by King Feisal.

9. *Koweit.*

(a) The seriousness of the commercial [illegible] Koweit [illegible] and the need of conclud[illegible] Nejd [illegible] Minister [illegible] to the [illegible] Persian Gulf [illegible] and seem to have [illegible] own pretensions in that area. No conclusion has yet been reached.

(b) Ibn Arfaj, Ibn Saud's representative on the Koweit border (A[illegible] paragraph 8) [illegible] or camels supposed to have been stolen from Nejd. His Majesty's Leg[illegible] has not so far been called upon to intervene.

(c) It was currently said at the beginning of July that the bestowal published in the birthday honours of the Honorary Knight Commander of the Indian Empire on the Sheikh of Koweit had greatly [illegible] Ibn Saud [illegible] Honorary Knight Grand Commander of the same Order) as being a "further proof that the rule of Koweit had passed from the Sheikh's to British hands."

10. *Yemen.*

R[illegible] Ibn Saud [illegible] to attack the Yemen [illegible] cropped up in July and were garnered into the Cairo press. A *démenti* was published in August in the Mecca "Umm-al-Qura." Owing to persistent local talk that His Majesty's Government would welcome, or at any rate would not view with disfavour, any offensive measures in that direction, His Majesty's Minister was authorised, should occasion arise, to deny any such suggestion. Mahmoud Nedim Bey, who was supposed to be employed by Ibn Saud in connexion with his Yemen aspirations, was told by him that his services would not be required and left the country in July.

III. [illegible]

11. *Great Britain.*

(a) The traditional [illegible] and friendly relations were still further consolidated when His Majesty's Minister got well into his stride. July and August were busy months diplomatically. Matters treated at Sir A. Ryan's June audiences of the King were followed up in conversations with his Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who visited Jedda from the 11th to the 18th July and the 1st to the 4th August.

Fuad Bey let fall the remark that considerably more than three-quarters of the work [illegible] proceeded on the 15th August on four months' leave of absence, and Mr Hope [illegible] assumed the duties of Chargé d'Affaires

(b) Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, first Hejaz Nejd Minister to the Court of St James [illegible] left Jedda on the 1st July for London, via Egypt (June report, paragraph [illegible] [illegible] 1929 [illegible] 12th August [illegible] His Majesty's Government for deposit.

12 *France.*

(a) Negotiations for the conclusion of a Franco Hejaz Treaty, similar to the [illegible] concede to France what he had only conceded to Great Britain as "part of the price [illegible]

(b) The [illegible] left on the 7th August in a French despatch vessel [illegible] M [illegible] President of the French Republic The sole object of his [illegible] a succession [illegible] the 20th August

13 *Iraq*

(a) It is [illegible] see 12 (a) above, in regard to [illegible]

(b) It is [illegible] during July and August [illegible] been credited [illegible] above)

14 *Germany.*

(a) The Treaty of Friendship between Germany and Hejaz-Nejd, signed at [illegible] 1929 [illegible] 1928 [illegible] paragraph 21 [illegible] has been approved [illegible] the 28th July, 1930

[illegible] Saud's Syrian entourage, Husein Bey and Ali Hakim, have been in [illegible] transport, in two loads, was landed from the steamship "Cracow" at Jedda on [illegible] August The rifles were part new and part used, and the whole consignment [illegible] [†] and an artillery expert was also on board The Red Sea kit favoured by the "Cracow's" crew, consisted of a cap and *cache sexe*

16 *Russia.*

There has been nothing of special note to record in regard to Soviet activities in Hejaz Nejd or in the Yemen

17. *Turkey*

(a) The Treaty of Friendship concluded between Hejaz-Nejd and the Turkish Republic on the 3rd August, 1929, was approved by the latter on the 15th May last It is not yet known whether ratifications have been exchanged

(b) The Turkish representative in Jedda informed his colleagues on the 11th July that the Turkish *représentation diplomatique* had been raised to the status of a Legation, with himself as Chargé d'Affaires. Sami Bey proceeded on leave of absence on the 1st August His *remplaçant*, Memduh Bey a very sick and aged Turk, died on the 14th August Abdullah Mahfuz Bey arrived from Alexandria on the 25th August to take interim charge of the Legation

18. *Syria*

The "Mecca Convention" of the 19th March, 1926, made between Hejaz-Nejd and Syria for two years, has continued to be maintained in vigour every three months

19 *Palestine*

The Hejaz-Nejd Government, on the 16th August, signified its approval of the text of a Money Order Agreement with Palestine

20 *Egypt*

Nothing was achieved in July and August to place relations between Hejaz Nejd and Egypt on a satisfactory footing Nahas Pasha had intended on his return from [illegible] the air, and the Egyptian consul in Jedda has experienced a certain amount of friction with the local authorities as a consequence

21 *Persia*

(a) The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs communicated to His Majesty's Minister in July a Green Book containing the text of the Treaty of Friendship between Hejaz Nejd and Persia signed on the 24th August, 1929, and for which ratifications were exchanged at Jedda on the 10th June last (June report, paragraph 18).

(b) The Persian Chargé d'Affaires closed his Legation on the 30th July and [illegible] correspondence was to be addressed direct to the latter

IV.—Air Matters

22 *Hejaz Air Force*

Chief Pilot Morris received orders form the Hejaz Nejd Government on the 1st July to move the Hejaz Air Force from Darin to Jedda via Iraq and Transjordan (June report, paragraph 19 (2)) [illegible] His Majesty's Government's suggestion that the Royal Air Force pilot and mechanic, who were to be lent for the purpose of flying the [illegible] in a flight of three Royal Air Force machines, which would then escort the Hejaz Air Force to Hinaidi for refitting. The flight left for Darin on the 22nd August, and all seven machines arrived in Iraq the next day The refit was to take a fortnight

23. *Royal Air Force Visits to Darin*

The protest made by the Hejaz Nejd Government on the 4th May (May report paragraph 9) was conclusively answered on the 2nd July His Majesty's Minister reminded the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the part played by His Majesty's Government in the creation of the Hejaz Air Force and of their continued interest in its welfare He explained that it was solely in order to render technical assistance that British aircraft visited Darin on the 24th January and the

13th April, the latter call being paid at great inconvenience by an air boat returning from India. While recognising that there was a technical omission in not obtaining the previous assent of Ibn Saud, he added that His Majesty's Government regretted the vigour of the language in which the protest was made.

24. *Pearling Flights.*

Some further progress was made in July towards preparing Ibn Saud's mind to [illegible] of His Majesty's Government to open up the Hasa coast to aerial communication by [illegible] 25th June, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that Ibn Saud has issued orders to the authorities concerned with a view to studying the subject and searching in the islands off the Hasa coast for suitable landing grounds. In conversation with Sir A. Ryan on the 15th July, Fuad Bey amplified his statement, adding that it was [illegible] Something has therefore been achieved in getting Ibn Saud to the point of recognising the possibility of allowing the flights and taking the question of landing grounds seriously. Sir Andrew proposed to go into the matter fully when on leave.

V. [illegible]

25. *Yemen "Front."*

No reports of a reliable nature were received to indicate that Ibn Saud really intends to attack the Yemen (see 10 above). He maintained his outpost at Jizan.

26. *Transjordan "Front."*

Towards the [illegible] reliable suppl[illegible] place behind [illegible] determine wh[illegible] exaggerated, of tribal representatives by the Hejaz agent [illegible] to do with Ibn Saud's impression that the frontier situation was critical (see [illegible] above). Local rumours were naturally stimulated by the arrival of the "Cracow's" cargo of munitions. The "Daily Mail" of the 6th August contained a statement that Ibn Saud's plans for an assault on Transjordan were complete. A categorical denial was issued by the Hejaz Nejd Minister in London to Reuter's agency.

27. *Munitions.*

A large consignment of arms and ammunition from Poland was delivered at Jedda by steamship "Cracow" on the 28th August (see 15 above).

VI. Naval Visits.

(a) *H.M.S. "Clematis."* Captain E. B. C. Dicken, R.N., who had recently taken over the command as senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops, from Commander Ratsey, R.N., visited Jedda in H.M. sloop "Clematis" from the 15th to 17th July. The usual courtesy visits were exchanged, and Captain Dicken was able to cover with His Majesty's Minister all the ground of mutual interest. [illegible] the 18th July. The French despatch-vessel "Montmirail" arrived on the 6th August and left the next day with the French Chargé d'Affaires on board (see 12 (*b*) above).

VII. [illegible]

29. *"Asia" Disaster.*

The official enquiry into the burning of the "Asia" (June report, paragraph 24) [illegible] "Umm-al Qura." They were quite non-committal on the main points, the committee,

unaided by experts, having signally failed to get to the bottom of any of the [illegible] The gutted wreck still lies on a reef at [illegible] 15 degrees, a blot on Jedda's Red Seascape. The burning questions to which she gave birth seem to lie as dead as she.

30. *Health.*

No reaction has yet been noted to the protest addressed by the Hejaz-Nejd [illegible] cast upon the cleanliness of the last pilgrimage (June report, paragraph 25). In conversation in July with His Majesty's Minister, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] her head high, he was reminded that it was a mistake to hold one's head high until one had the feet to stand on.

31. *Indian Destitutes.*

[illegible] pilgrims to take advantage of [illegible] pilgrimage by the overland [illegible] Indian destitutes at the [illegible] the 20th August [illegible]

32. [illegible]

[illegible]

VIII. [illegible]

33. *"Matin" Articles.*

Twenty cuttings from the Paris "Matin" of the 20th May to the 15th [illegible] were received [illegible] contained a series of articles on the subject of slavery in this part of the world, its origins in Africa, its traffic across the Red Sea, and its market in Arabia, written by a French [illegible] Mr. Bo[illegible] the 6th March except for some hard words about the French Governor of Jibuti.

34. *Interdepartmental Conference.*

The record of an interdepartmental meeting held at the Foreign Office to [illegible] for the question [illegible] in July. After a close examination of the legal, political and traditional bases, the conference agreed that, (1) as regards Hejazi and Asiri vessels, the practice of [illegible] be discontinued; that dhows carrying slaves should, as hitherto, be taken to a [illegible] [illegible] the question of arms separately.

35. *Manumission.*

Nine slaves were manumitted by the Legation during the period under review [illegible] despatch of four of them. When they were already on board the Italian boat for Massowa, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs rang up the local authorities to order them to hold up the ship and the Italian consul to request him to have the slaves disembarked. M. Sollazzo loyally replied that, having been received by the British Legation, they could only be handed back to that Legation. Fuad Bey thereupon rang up to ask His Majesty's Minister to return the slaves on the grounds [illegible] own property, lent to one of his Ministers. Upon Sir A. Ryan's request for a written statement to this effect, coupled with apt allusions to the League of Nations and public opinion, the matter was quickly dropped at the Mecca end and the vessel left with the manumitted slaves on board.

IX. [illegible]

36. *Jedda Cemetery.*

His Majesty's Minister took up in July the question of the proper care and maintenance of the Christian cemetery in Jedda, the whole aspect of which is desolate and repellant. It contains some 100 graves, of which only about twenty are marked with any sort of monument. The Legation has now taken over the charge for a year, archives are being searched for information about the past, and future improvements are to be studied in the winter when the European colonies will have reassembled.

37. *Collapse of Legation Building.*

On the day following His Majesty's [illegible] all the floors of one wing of the office build[illegible] bancery with them. By [illegible] nobody was killed the [illegible] [illegible] His Majesty's Minister [illegible]

[E 5397/89/91] No. 60.

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 7.)

No. 260.)

Sir, [illegible]

[illegible] that war was about to be made on the Yemen, that large forces were concentrating on the Transjordan front, and that a dispute had arisen between Nejd and Iraq, were the work of mischievous people whose aim was to discourage Moslems from making the pilgrimage. These rumours, it asserts, are false and groundless, relations between Hejaz-Nejd and its neighbours being of the friendliest character.

3. The article is followed by an official statement to the effect that the news of a [illegible] His Majesty's most earnestly wishes his relations with neighbouring Governments to be based on friendship and complete accord.

4. The publication of this statement is probably due to my conversation of the 2nd September with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. I sounded Fuad Bey about the rumoured tribal concentrations at Tebuk and Hail, and he told me how the Hejaz Minister in London has been instructed to deny them. To my comment that it was a pity that [illegible] official check, he replied that it was impossible to reply to every idle word that was said. [illegible]

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Jerusalem and Bagdad.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 5398/2/91] No. 61.

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 261.)

Sir, [illegible]

Jedda, September 20, 1930.

[illegible] in which I reported the [illegible] as to the rumours [illegible] I have the honour to add that the [illegible]

3. The editor explains that the truth of the matter is that the Government [illegible] decided to employ some foreign pilots under contract for a fixed period in order to train Arab officers to fly. It had also been decided to station the air force at Jedda, but military operations had necessitated its temporary quartering at Darin. As a [illegible] Hejaz coast opposite Darin Island. The circumstances which had led to this temporary use of Darin having changed, the air force [illegible] British aerodrome and as the British Residency in the Persian Gulf.

5. Being of necessity ill-served here with news of the outer world, I am unable to say whether such [illegible] put up as skittles in order to impress people with the very independence of this would-be very independent country.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Bagdad and Bushire.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 5427/223/91] No. 62.

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 8.)

No. [illegible]

Telegraphic.

Jedda, October 7, 1930.

My telegram No. [illegible]

I have received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs note stating that [illegible] ful effect that it has been found necessary to order Hejaz agent to refrain from attending proceedings until he has obtained proper satisfaction.

Latter has been instructed to request—

1. Written apology from Transjordanian Government, to be publicly read in session and delivered to Hejaz Government through diplomatic channel.
2. [illegible] Ibn Jazi

[illegible] and expresses hope that he may be informed at earliest opportunity of decision taken.

[illegible] he had thought fit to take action on what might prove to be insufficient basis, and said that I would inform you.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 260.)

E 5477/223/91] No. 63

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope-Gill (Jedda).

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 9, 1930.*

[illegible] Hejaz Nejd raid claims insult to Hejazi agent.

Following is repetition of telegram No. 89 of 9th October from High Commissioner for Transjordan to Colonial Office:—

"Following from MacDonnell:—

"'In the light of knowledge that Ibn Saud informed by his agent here [illegible] investigation I am here to make. I see no prospect of making any further [illegible] admitting of no subsequent modification to the effect that its repre[illegible] them from their Government upon any matter appertaining to my mission [illegible] representatives do not understand why, when they are ready to follow the course prescribed by your investigator, Hejaz people should have unlimited latitude to [illegible] nothing of a convincing one, for continuance of such a state of affairs. Failing an assurance of this kind, I must with all respect ask to be relieved of any further responsibility to His Majesty's Government for conducting enquiry any further, as I can see no reasonable prospect of a successful issue under existing conditions.'"

[E 5481/223/91] No. 64

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 10.)

(No. [illegible])
(Telegraphic.) R. *Jedda, October 9, 1930.*

[illegible] telegrams Nos. 87 and 88.

[illegible] wording of apology and nature of punishment to His Majesty's and Transjordanian Governments. It is, however, naturally to be supposed that, as the insulted party (it being borne in mind that Ibn Saud is effective "Hejaz Government"), he will [illegible] what he considers inadequate reparation.

[illegible] possession of full details, but Mr. MacDonnell's telegraphic report [illegible] is a fact to be faced and a lever which Ibn Saud will hold on to.

[illegible]

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 263.)

[E 5475/223/91] No. 65

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope-Gill (Jedda).

(No. 166.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 10, 1930.*

YOUR telegram No. 186 of 8th October and Transjordan telegram No. 89 to Colonial Office of 9th October. [illegible] incident.

Please reply to Hejazi Government on following lines:—

His Majesty's Government while regretting occurrence of incidents such as that complained of, cannot admit that they can have any bearing on main question of investigation.

Incident did not occur in presence of British investigator, who, in any case, as [illegible] conduct of private individual connected with one of the parties whose claims he is investigating. Transjordan Government was in no way associated with conduct of [illegible] immediate steps to express regret for incident and to endeavour to effect reconciliation.

In circumstances, His Majesty's Government must protest most strongly against [illegible] —success of which is admittedly important in interests of all three Governments—dependent on settlement, on Hejazi Government's own terms, of incidental occurrences of this kind.

You should therefore make urgent appeal to Hejazi Government to withdraw their demands, and to cancel instructions which they have apparently issued to Hejaz-Nejd agent to refrain from attending proceedings. If they refuse, His Majesty's Government [illegible] purpose.

You may add that Mr. MacDonnell has stated that unless Hejaz-Nejd agent is instructed to afford him full co-operation in enquiry and to refrain from further obstruction he must ask to be relieved of his duties forthwith which would of course, make it impossible for His Majesty's Government to give their arbitral award [illegible] question of fate of investigation, see my immediately following telegram.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 166. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 76.)

E 5475/223/91] No. 66

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope-Gill (Jedda).

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 10, 1930.*

MY immediately preceding telegram. Hamid bin-Jazi incident.

[illegible] express his regret that incident had occurred, and to ask him to come to palace to see him. At palace Amir took steps to reconcile Hejaz-Nejd agent with Hamid bin-Jazi, who had previously been strictly ordered to [illegible] of the country.

Hejaz Government were evidently unaware of above when they put forward their demands. You should accordingly explain position to them and point out that, as regards their first request, expression of regret has already been made by Amir to Hejaz Nejd agent, and as regards second request, offender has already been severely reprimanded.

In circumstances, and seeing that Transjordan authorities were not directly involved, His Majesty's Government do not consider that Amir can reasonably be expected to do more, and, in their view, to pursue matter further would be to give it wholly exaggerated importance.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 167. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 77.)

E 5489/223/91] No. 67

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 193.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Jedda, October 11, 1930*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 166 and 167.

[illegible] and a personal letter embodying the latter part of your telegram No. 166. They cannot reach him before the evening of 13th October, but I will also see what can be done by telephone to-morrow morning. If I had had this information at once [illegible] could certainly have forestalled, and probably discounted, Hejaz agent's version, and possibly have prevented his Government from committing themselves to a public standpoint from which they may now find it incompatible with prestige to withdraw.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 267.)

E 5490/3094/91] No. 68

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 194.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Jedda, October 11, 1930*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I strongly feel the necessity for closer liaison by Jerusalem and Bagdad with [illegible] of our powers of persuasion and pressure.

[illegible] poison like Mashhur's before it becomes active.

E 5548/223/91] No. 69

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Jedda, October 13, 1930*

MY telegram No. 193.

I learn from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government (1) consider satisfaction inadequate, (2) agree to separate incident from main course [illegible] sentatives again at Mr. MacDonnell's disposal, but to have nothing to do with Transjordanian representatives until satisfaction requested is given. This meant no joint sittings.

I pointed out contradiction between this and (2). Fuad admitted that it interfered with established procedure, but insisted that, Hejaz Government having been publicly insulted, their honour was at stake. This was as far as they could go to meet His Majesty's Government's wishes and [I omitted was] sufficient to ensure continuance of investigation.

In reply to my further repres[illegible] withdrawal of remaining condition, he developed his Government's views on inadequacy of Amir's action to efface the insult laid openly on a friendly Government and not merely on their agent. Decision could not be altered. Something public and exemplary is evidently wanted. I am to receive official replies to my notes on 15th October, when I will telegraph gist.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 268.)

E 5539/223/91] No. 70

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received October 13.)

(No. 197.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Jedda, October 13, 1930*

MY telegram No. 196.

I have received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs note dated 11th October reporting occurrence of another incident. Mutlaq bin Zaal is said to have insulted Hejaz tribal representatives.

[illegible]

Had Hejaz Government had any idea that such things would happen where their representatives were gathered to liquidate old differences they would not have exposed them or their Government honour to insult.

He feels sure that His Majesty's Government disapprove and will show their displeasure by the action which they will order to be taken against these two persons.

Translation by bag.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 269.)

E 5591/223/91 [illegible]

Mr. MacDonnell to Lord Passfield.—(Communicated by the Colonial Office, October 15.)

My Lord, *Jerusalem, October 10.*

A SHORT interim report on the progress of my enquiry up to the present may be [illegible] to send your Lordship a brief account of the proceedings up to date.

Immediately the Hejaz agent arrived in Amman at the begin[illegible] September, having taken some six weeks to get there, I started checking with him the lists handed me at Jedda. They contained 226 claims, of which forty-nine had been notified to His Britannic Majesty's Minister in June 1930, after I left Jedda. He immediately [illegible] in my 6/A/110 B of the 2nd instant. The alterations were stated by the Hejaz agent to result from a careful examination of the claims by himself and the tribal representatives of the Hejaz-Nejd. Representatives from one important tribe were, however, not present at the time and have not even yet arrived, so that it is probable their [illegible] 14th September there was sufficient material ready to allow of the enquiry to be begun. At the opening meeting I explained that I was there merely to investigate, that the final word was with His Majesty's Government and that the functions of the Government agents and tribal representatives was to assist me to arrive at the facts rather than to fight their case before a judicial tribunal. I also encouraged them to settle what cases they could *à l'amiable* having construed Jedda's telegram No. 228 of the 10th September, 1930, as conveying Ibn Saud's agreement to the principle of voluntary settlements.

The actual business of examining the cases began next day when the Shararat of Nejd claims against the Huweitat of Transjordan were started on. After spending some three hours on the first case, I adjourned the meeting and suggested that as both sides were probably aware of the facts they might get together and report to me in half an hour what they had agreed upon as being the facts. At the end of this interval the Transjordan people asked permission to go into the whole Shararat-Huweitat dossier of about fifty cases as they thought they could probably come to

an agreement on them all. I readily agreed to this and adjourned the sittings of enquiry for five days, at the end of which period the Transjordan agent reported to me that no progress had been made because the Hejaz agent was not prepared to contribute anything towards the settlement. The latter informed me he had no instructions, so this attempt to arrive at a settlement was dropped and the ordinary procedure of enquiry reverted to.

I am writing this from Jerusalem [illegible] so cannot state the exact number of cases gone into so far, but prog[illegible] The procedure is as follows: The claimant states [illegible] This is or should be [illegible] the affair and [illegible] and the agent himself appears [illegible] material provided by his own [illegible] some extent counterbalan[illegible] tribal spokesmen, who are [illegible] number of cases the Nejd spokesmen are not and admit not having heard of the raid till they were informed of it by the Hejaz agent. Feeling is very bitter, the Nejdis not concealing their view that the Transjordan Arabs are practically infidels, while the other side looks on them as emissaries of King Ibn Saud rather than as spokesmen for their tribes. Each side has confided in me the absolute unreliability of the other and assumed that this was as patent to me as to them. I should say there was little to choose between them as regards veracity, though I do think that the facts are better known in Transjordan [illegible] of the latter country.

I am not now optimistic as to the results to be obtained even if the Hejaz Government [illegible] partly because of the intolerant spirit of each side towards the other, and partly because [illegible] have been excluded from the enquiry. The reasons for conducting the enquiry on the lines I have adopted were made clear by Sir A. Ryan at the time and I do not even now see what other method could have been adopted, but in the light of my experience so far, I am far from feeling that, even had the enquiry started under more auspicious conditions, very satisfactory results could ever have been expected.

I have &c.
M. S. MacDONNELL.

E 5573/1/91] No. 72

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 15.)

(No. 482.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Bagdad, October 14, 1930.*

REFERENCE your telegram No. 386.

Discussion on alternatives (1) and (2) has taken place. The chief British [illegible] representative. And [illegible] Mashhur should not be [illegible] mitted to travel by way of Transjordan, as the tribes are at feud with him. King Ibn Saud states [illegible] been unable to persuade Ibn Mashhur to fly. He and the Prime Minister are strongly in favour of Ibn Mashhur travelling viâ Damascus and Haifa, and leaving Suez for Jedda on the 21st October.

The Iraq Government is undertaking full responsibility for the arrival of Ibn Mashhur at Jedda, and will send one of their own men with him. A French transit visa has been secured, and it is suggested that Ibn Mashhur should leave Bagdad on the 18th October.

This seems to be the only feasible solution if Ibn Mashhur's departure is not to [illegible] route. I shall be glad if you will telegraph urgently whether you approve.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

E 5566/223/91] No. 73

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 15.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) [illegible] *October* 14, 1930.

YOUR telegram No. [illegible] Mr. Mac[illegible] [illegible] Hejaz [illegible] lorable consequences upon [illegible], but would also involve His Majesty's Govern[illegible] in greatly increased difficulties.

[illegible] so, therefore, impossibility of meeting Hejaz Government's [illegible] proclamation (if constit[illegible] Transjordanian sheikhs [illegible]

[illegible] Mr. Mac[illegible] [illegible] fear of [illegible] impossible moment, and [illegible] Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

E 5539/223/91] No. 74

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope-Gill (Jedda).

(Nos. 172 and 173.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1930.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 196 and 197 of 13th October: Transjordan-Hejaz Nejd [illegible] investigation.

Colonial Office telegram No. 81 of 14th October to Transjordan repeated to you will have shown you views of His Majesty's Government [illegible] taking [illegible]

(R.) At end of afternoon sitting of 29th September sheikh mentioned [illegible] Mr. MacDonnell, knowing that Hejaz agent was still sore about first incident, [illegible] morning sitting of 30th September. Ibn Zaal's demonstration was not directed against Hejaz Nejd agent or his Government. (End of R.)

While Transjordan authorities will make every effort to facilitate liquidation of these incidents, it is not yet possible to say what action will prove practicable. If then matter is again raised by Hejazi authorities you must, apart from explaining facts as above, play for time until I inform you of later developments. I realise fully your difficult position.

ransjordan authorities have been asked to repeat all telegrams to you in future

(Addressed to Jedda, Nos. 172 and 173. Repeated to Transjordan.)

[E 5587/1/91] No. 75

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 16.)

(No. 393.)
(Telegraphic.) P *Colonial Office, October 15, 1930*

OUR telegram No. 482 of the 14th October.

In view of Hejaz telegram of the 11th September to Minister for Foreign Affairs, enclosed in your secret despatch, the 17th September, and of Jeddah telegram to you of the 14th September No. 233, regret that, unless Ibn Saud has definitely stated that he has no objection, must strongly deprecate proposal to send Ibn Mashhur through Syria.

Risk of his escape in Syria very great, and result could not fail to have most serious consequences. Only course, since Transjordan route now considered impracticable, appears to be to renew efforts to get him to fly or travel by sea.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

E 5663/223/91] No. 76

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 200.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Jedda, October 18, 1930*

MY telegram No. 196, last paragraph.

Owing to messenger's mistake I did not receive Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs' replies dated 13th October until last night. The one on incident is long [illegible]

The first states that Hejaz Government only agreed reluctantly to Transjordania as the scene of investigation and to procedure of joint sittings being [illegible] Government's wishes as arbitrator and to assist Mr. MacDonnell. Had they imagined that British and Transjordanian Governments would overlook such irregularities they never would have agreed, but they trusted the honour of both Governments [illegible]

[illegible] Ibn Saud and his Government, they are the more hurt to receive from His Majesty's Government firm request to renounce satisfaction. Neither property nor money is at stake, but the honour of the Hejaz Government, who cannot consent to the offender going unpunished, a course which would run counter not only to Arab tradition but also the principles of diplomatic courtesy.

[illegible] punishment if they so [illegible] silence and insist [illegible]

[illegible] heartily desire settlement of the [illegible] British Government to carry through [illegible] Nevertheless [illegible] result on their [illegible] Government at foreign country [illegible] assembled to [illegible] past differences.

[illegible] they have instructed their agent to hold himself [illegible] at Mr. MacDonnell's disposal and to offer him every [illegible] from attending joint sittings until Transjordanian Government offer the required reparation.

I have also received personal letter from Fuad trusting that I will realise that [illegible] His Majesty's Government's wishes. As regards co-operation with MacDonnell for which I particularly asked, "the necessary instructions have been sent."

Translations by bag.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 272.)

[E 5689/223/91] No. 77

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 19.)

No. 201.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, October 19, 1930*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

First note lays itself open to criticism and reply, but further dialectics will only waste time in discovering the already patent truth that the Hejaz Government are [illegible] to obtaining full satisfaction.

Second note is logical and shows strength of their position [illegible] possibility cannot be entirely discounted. If they are, then they are gambling, and [illegible] to draw their trump. If they are not, then they are in [illegible] leave with them. I can see no [illegible] justify different tactics on ours [illegible] em is still further clarified by [illegible] British authorities in Transjordan to [illegible] Majesty's Government's views as [illegible] No. 81 than for British [illegible] we even if endorsed by [illegible]

[illegible] offer, can, I fear, on [illegible] result. Even if eventually [illegible]

Repeat to Jerusalem No. 27.

E 5686/223/91] No. 78

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 20.)

No. 203.)
Telegraphic.) *Jedda, October 20, 1930*

JERUSALEM telegram No. 102.

My views for what they are worth are as follows:—

[illegible] Ibn Saud [illegible] unless the latter is [illegible] Majesty's [illegible] worst case [illegible] Majesty [illegible] mouse born [illegible]

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 275.)

E 5678 96/91] No. 79

Foreign Office to Chargé d'Affaires (Jedda)

No. 179
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 20, 1930*

FOLLOWING has been sent to Government of India —

"Foreign and Political Department. Please see Jedda telegram No. 178 of 1st October to Foreign Office—copy by air mail of 3rd October—and Ryan's private letter to Ibn Saud of 28th August—copy by mail of 25th September under P 6128

"2. Ibn Saud's reply is reasonably satisfactory, though it is not clear that his prejudice is wholly removed. Subject to your observations, I am inclined to think negotiation between Biscoe and Hejazi delegation the best course, though risk that delegation may be unwilling or unable to commit Ibn Saud on controversial points and that negotiations may therefore prove abortive cannot [illegible]

"3. It seems clear that discussion of Ibn Saud's Persian Gulf desiderata is inevitable if meeting is to take place. Subject to your observations, we should [illegible] further information as to their nature. It would also be made clear (without [illegible] that no matters of importance relate to Koweit is not understood and that Koweit questions referred to in Ryan's private letter of 28th August must form integral part of any programme of discussions.

"I shall be grateful for very early reply"

E 5720 89 91] No. 80

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope-Gill (Jedda)

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 22, 1930*

MY despatch No. 380 of 2nd October Transjordan-Nejd Hejaz frontier.

Necessary sanction having now been obtained for proposed measures, you should communicate memorandum to Hejaz Government as soon as possible

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E 5717/1 91] No. 81

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 23.)

(No. 491.)
(Telegraphic.) P *Bagdad, October 22, 1930*

I PERSUADED King Faisal on receipt of your telegram No. 393 to cancel the arrangements which had been completed for Ibn Mashhur's journey to Jedda. The King [illegible] Government in a matter which concerned himself and Ibn Saud alone" He pointed out that—

1. Ibn Mashhur cannot be forced to return to Nejd against his will, but that he had just succeeded in persuading him to return voluntarily Any [illegible]
2. He had pledged his honour that Ibn Mashhur would reach Jedda, and the latter's family and dependants, numbering fifty souls, were remaining in his hands as hostages
3. Ibn Saud was not concerned with route except as regards place where Ibn Mashhur would be taken over. Moreover, Ibn Saud had written him in letter dated 20th Safar: "We left the matter to your Majesty's wisdom and we approve all you may do" It would be inconsistent with his dignity to correspond with Ibn Saud further on the matter
4. He was confident, provided that the French did not interfere with him, of [illegible] Government's assistance should there be any doubt on this point.

5. Ibn Mashhur had definitely refused in any circumstances to travel by air Ibn Mashhur had strong superstitious objections that if he did so his [illegible] Dawish. Ibn Mashhur also definitely refused to travel by Basra. Ibn Saud was himself anxiously [illegible] Neju frontier Only alternatives were two natural routes for a Bedouin by car via Damascus or Amman.

British officials whom I have consulted here agree that Amman route would [illegible] becoming suspicious, they consider that it would be dangerous to press Ibn Mashhur further

I [illegible] Ibn Mashhur [illegible] stopping *en route* and that the Foreign Office should settle direct with the French [illegible] safe passage through Syria [illegible] would be Leave Bagdad 27th October, Damascus Haifa 28th; Kantara, [illegible] arrive 29th October and leave 1st [illegible] will probably stay indefinitely in Iraq and responsibility for delay and expense and [illegible] confident Nejd Iraq relations would be [illegible]

I request reply by 25th October
(Repeated to Jedda.)

E 5818/223 91] No. 82

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 26.)

No. 112
(Telegraphic.) P *October 25, 1930*

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda

"I should be glad if you would inform [illegible] His Highness Emir Abdullah desires me [illegible] Majesty the expression of his sincere [illegible] investigations which are being [illegible] His Highness has also [illegible] binding [illegible]

E 5819/1/91] No. 83

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner of Iraq.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 26.)

(No. 411.)
(Telegraphic.) P *Colonial Office, October 25, 1930*

YOUR telegram of the 22nd October, No. 491 Ibn Mashhur

His Majesty's consul-general, Beirut, reports that French authorities while having nothing against Ibn Mashhur, ca[illegible] prevent his escape in Syria, where [illegible] You will, moreover, realise that, if [illegible] Government would have no right [illegible]

It should also, perhaps, be remembered that French authorities were very [illegible] escape in Egypt of Dr Shalsandar on way from Iraq to Italy some years ago [illegible]

Risk of escape is more serious, therefore, than when you telegraphed, and if journey were not completed situation *vis-a-vis* Ibn Saud would be exceedingly embarrassing.

If you consider, in spite of this danger, immediate departure via Syria least [illegible] report that there will be no possibility of keeping Ibn Mashhur in actual custody while in Syria.

As regards [illegible] Egypt, His Majesty's Minister in Cairo is prepared to arrange for escort of secret police. This escort I regard as essential, but expense must be met from Iraqi funds. Please arrange details direct with Cairo.

(Repeated to Jedda, Beirut and Cairo.)

E 5790/223/91] No. 84.

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 208.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, October 26, 1930.*

TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 102.

[illegible] unfortunately [illegible] unfortunate Amir's message to Sultan at once. I fear that it will be misinterpreted by state [illegible] His Majesty's Government may now be regarded as [illegible] Hejaz Government would thereby [illegible] themselves to insisting on publicity and punishment. Still more time and also some ground would thus be lost.

I [illegible] regret [illegible] giving of guarantees [illegible] for future [illegible] as not [illegible] to Hejaz Government [illegible] His Majesty's Government to the King. This might conveniently take the form of reply to his message of [illegible] His Majesty's Government's desiderata in regard to future investigation procedure).

[illegible] paragraph of His Sultan's message, however, I am not [illegible] countries as more vital to prestige than regrets and guarantees. Although we may [illegible] of the Hejaz Government [illegible] shall be faced with deplorable *de facto* situation made even worse by [illegible] his tribes, and possibly also in the press, to purely Hejaz point of view. [illegible] Transjordan [illegible] necessity for it so [illegible] that I request Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to visit Jedda or [illegible] at Beirut for purpose. My only normal means of communication at present are post office and a bad telephone.

[illegible] Hejaz Government will be ready to accept satisfaction now offered, I consider danger of refusal (even in the face of categorical message from His Majesty's Government) and of resulting situation sufficiently great to weigh the balance between (*a*) further concession in the way of punishment and publicity and (*b*) presentation of regret and guarantees in the form of ultimatum—definitely in favour of (*a*).

(Repeated to Jerusalem No. 27.)

E 5732/561/91 No. 85

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Matsudaira.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, October 27, 1930.*

WITH reference to your note of the 21st August, in which your Excellency was so good as to inform me that the Japanese Government were prepared to sign the proposed convention for the maintenance of certain lighthouses in the Red Sea provided that the Governments of all the other Powers who were to be parties to the convention were also prepared to do so, I have the honour to inform you that the

text of the proposed convention, as concurred in by the Japanese Government, has now been accepted by all the Governments concerned.

2. I transmit to you the accompanying copies of the final text of the convention in the form in which His Majesty's Government propose that it shall be signed.* You will observe that this text differs in certain minor respects from that of the revise of the 1st May, 1930, copies of which are in your possession. The alterations and additions in question are indicated by underlining in red ink. It will be seen that they fall into the following three categories:—

(*a*) [illegible] to bring it into closer harmony with the French, together with the addition of the usual formula regarding the communication of full powers.

(*b*) In articles 2 and 15 and paragraph 1 of the annex, the substitution of the words "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" for the words "Great Britain," and the corresponding alteration of the King's title.

(*c*) The filling up of certain blanks in articles 1, 2 and 4 of the agreement [illegible] Red Sea Trade [illegible] to bring the dates mentioned in the agreement into line with that of the entry into force of the convention.

3. In view of the fact that these amendments in no way alter the nature or scope of the convention, I am confident that they will not affect the Japanese Government's readiness to become parties to the convention.

4. [illegible] Government in the United Kingdom consider it to be of great importance that the convention be brought into force without further delay; they propose that it shall be signed in London by the diplomatic representatives of the various Powers concerned, and by me on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, at a date as early as possible in November. I trust that these arrangements will be agreeable to your Excellency, and that it will be possible for you to sign the convention at the desired date. Should the necessary full powers not arrive from Tokyo in time, a formal notification that they have been sent would, in accordance with the usual practice in this country, be sufficient.

5. His Majesty's representatives at Paris, Rome, Berlin and The Hague are being instructed to make a similar communication to the Governments to which they are respectively accredited, and to invite them to send the necessary instructions to their representatives in London as soon as possible.

I have, &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON

E 5732/561/91] No. 86

Mr. A. Henderson to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).†

(No. 2213.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 27, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1879 of the 10th September, relative to the proposed convention for the maintenance of lighthouses in the Red Sea, I have to inform your Lordship that the text of the proposed convention as finally concurred in by the French Government has now been accepted by all the Governments concerned. There is therefore no further delay to its immediate signature.

2. I now have the honour to enclose the final text of the convention in the form in which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom propose that it should be signed.* You will observe that this text differs in certain minor respects from that of the revise of the 1st May, 1930, copies of which were forwarded to you under cover of my despatch No. 1147 of the 20th May. The alterations and additions contained in this final text are indicated by underlining in red ink. They fall, as you will see, into the following three categories:—

(*a*) In the preamble, certain verbal alterations in the English text, intended to bring it into closer harmony with the French, together with the addition of the usual formula regarding the communication of full powers.

* Not printed.
† Also to His Majesty's representatives at Rome (No. 1165), Berlin (No. 1036) and The Hague (No. 476), mutatis mutandis.

(*b*) In articles 2 and 15, and paragraph 1 of the annex, the substitution of the words "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" for the words "Great Britain," and the corresponding alteration of the King's title

(*c*) The filling up of certain blank spaces in articles 1, 2 and 4 of the agreement between the Board of Trade and the company in order to bring the dates mentioned in the agreement into line with that of the entry into force of the convention

3. I request that your Lordship will communicate the enclosed final text to the French Government with an explanation as to the nature of the above verbal amendments. You should explain that these amendments in no way alter the nature or scope of the convention, and express the hope that the Government to which you are accredited will be prepared to accept them.

4. In view of the urgent necessity of bringing the convention into force without further delay, His Majesty's Government propose that the convention shall be signed in London by the diplomatic representatives of the various Powers concerned, and [illegible] of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom at a date as early as possible in November. You should invite the Government to which you are accredited to accept these arrangements and in the event of their doing so to send the necessary instructions to their representative in London as soon as possible. Should their representative in London require full powers in order to sign the convention, you should request that these may be forwarded to him without delay. I shall be glad if you will inform me by telegram of the result of your representations.

5. Similar communications are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Rome and Berlin, and to His Majesty's Minister at The Hague, and I enclose a copy of a note which has been addressed to the Japanese Ambassador in London.*

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON

E 5790/223/91] No. 87.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope-Gill (Jedda)

(No. 192.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 28, 1930*

YOUR telegram No. 205 of 26th October: Transjordan Hejaz Nejd raids arbitration.

His Majesty's Government are not prepared to bring further pressure to bear on Transjordan authorities, but I am ready to accompany message from Amir by message from His Majesty's Government on lines you suggest.

You should accordingly convey to King Ibn Saud through Hejazi Government a message from Amir contained in Transjordan telegram No. 102 to you of 25th October, followed by message from His Majesty's Government in reply to His Majesty's message reported in your telegrams Nos. 204 and 205. You should express their sincere regret that [illegible] British [illegible] enquiry and explain that they have taken all possible measures to ensure liquidation of incidents and prevent their repetition. You should add that in their opinion action which Transjordan Government have [illegible] taken is such as Government might accept as affording honourable satisfaction. You should point out that neither of the offending sheikhs was a Transjordan official, that heated language on both sides is frequent characteristic in such cases and that investigator has refrained from taking [illegible] towards himself of Hejaz Nejd representatives [illegible] enquiry to speedy and successful conclusion. All three Governments must share this desire, and time has now come, in opinion of His Majesty's Government, to make fresh start with enquiry and to [illegible] the door on the past without further discussion. His Majesty's Government rely on co-operation of King Ibn Saud and his Government, and trust that Hejazi Government will now undertake definitely that Hejaz Nejd agent and tribal representatives will in future resume full participation in joint sittings of enquiry and raise no further objections to procedure laid down by Mr. MacDonnell.

* No. 85.

Main object is ultimate success of enquiry, and I abstain, therefore, from replying in detail to statements contained in Ibn Saud's message reported in your telegrams Nos. 204 and 205, which have since been met in great measure by memorandum in my despatch No. 360 of 2nd October. You may, if desirable, supplement above message by oral explanations based on material furnished by Mr. MacDonnell in recent telegrams, *e.g.*, Transjordan telegram No. 106 to Colonial Office.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 192. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 93.)

[E 5884/223/91] No. 88

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, October 30, 1930*

YOUR telegram No. 192.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that in spite of incomplete satisfaction and in response to His Majesty's Government's wish to close the door without further discussion, Ibn Saud has decided to regard the matter as closed, and that instructions are being sent to Hejaz agent to place himself entirely at Mr. MacDonnell's disposal.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 285.)

[E 5900/663/91] No. 89

High Commissioner, Transjordan, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 31.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) *October 30, 1930*

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda:—

"Considerable raids from Nejd against Howeitat took place near Jebel Wadrat on 25th [illegible] and 29th [illegible] respectively. Details of looting and casualties will be communicated after the conclusion of investigation now proceeding. Please lodge protest and demand restitution."

E 5884/223/91] No. 90

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope-Gill (Jedda)

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 1, 1930*

YOUR telegram No. 214 of 30th October: Transjordan Hejaz Nejd raids arbitration.

You may, if you think it desirable, express to Ibn Saud appreciation of His Majesty's Government of the manner in which he has [illegible] His Majesty's action will materially [illegible] the prospects of a fruitful issue to the enquiry, to which they realise he attaches no less importance than do His Majesty's Government and Transjordan Government.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 96.)

E 6981/4309/91] **No. 91**

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 287.)

Sir,

Jedda, October 18, 1930.

[illegible] "Um el Qura" of the 3rd October published a summary of the Hejaz-Nejd Government's achievements during the past twelve months, which I think it may be useful to record briefly, if somewhat literally, as follows:—

I.—*Foreign Relations.*

1. The "establishment of political contact" with Germany, Poland, Persia and Afghanistan—i.e., the recognition of the Hejaz-Nejd Government.
2. The conclusion of treaties with Germany, Turkey and Persia.
3. The meeting of King Ibn Saud with King Feisal in the Persian Gulf, which [illegible] of a settlement of past difficulties between the country and Iraq and opens up a hopeful view of the future.
4. The raising of foreign legations of the rank of their representatives at Jedda to that of Minister.
5. The establishment of a Hejaz-Nejd Legation in London.

II.—*Domestic Affairs.*

1. Royal opening of the new Legislative Council.
2. Disarmament, restoration of complete or [illegible] and reorganisation of the police.
3. Reformation of Government departments and constitution of an inspectorate of departments.
4. Improvements of facilities for pilgrims and constitution of a pilgrimage committee.
5. Increase in the number of schools and of scholars sent to study in Egypt.
6. Establishment of a Government motor repair shop and of the "Kiswa" carpet factory at Mecca.
7. Importation by Government of well machinery, which has encouraged private individuals to follow suit.
8. Publication and free distribution of a work on agriculture, written by a prominent Medina landowner.
9. Reorganisation of the army and purchase of aeroplanes and new war material.
10. Organisation of a motor postal service, erection of new telephone lines, [illegible]
11. [illegible] of agreements [illegible] at the [illegible] Congress of 1929.
12. [illegible] of new reservoirs at Mecca and repair of existing system at [illegible] so that water for pilgrims is now plentiful.
13. Street widening at Mecca, [illegible] the pilgrim routes and introduction of [illegible] of motor sprinklers for the streets and of fire engines.
14. Decision to establish up to date slaughter houses.
15. Constitution of an [illegible] committee to study electric light, water and mineral development.
16. Introduction of modern hospital appliances of all kinds and despatch to Europe of two doctors to study X-rays and bacteriology.
17. Establishment of a hospital at Bahra and orders for more elsewhere, introduction of [illegible] and distribution of pamphlets containing medical advice in the different pilgrim languages.
18. Survey of the Medina-Al Ula, Medina-Wadi Birban and Mecca-Khurraba roads.

This is not an imposing catalogue of national achievement, but an indication that the will to improve exists even though the means are still woefully lacking or misused.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 6151/1/91] **No. 92**

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, November 14.)

No. 541.)

Telegraphic.) R

Baghdad, November 12, 1930.

I SAW King Feisal on the receipt of Jerusalem telegram No. 137 (repeated to you as No. 315). He expressed himself as very angry and ashamed at the trick played on him by Ibn Mashhur. It was arranged, after discussion, as follows:—

1. Nuri will telegraph explaining the delay to Fuad Hamza.
2. King's Arab aide-de-camp is being sent to Damascus to explain to Nuri Shaalan that unless he induces Ibn Mashhur to proceed to Jedda as arranged Feisal will regard him as his enemy.
3. Ibn Mashhur's relatives and dependents held in Iraq as hostages will be made over to Ibn Saud, and Feisal will make other amends acceptable to Ibn Saud if Ibn Mashhur breaks faith.

King Feisal stated that his honour was involved towards both Ibn Saud and His Majesty's Government, and he was confident that he would be successful in meeting his responsibility.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

[E 6135/1/91] **No. 93**

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Hope Gill (Jedda).

(No. 203.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 14, 1930.

BAGDAD telegram No. 541 to Colonial Office.

Following is paraphrase of Jerusalem telegram No. 137 to Bagdad:—

"Ibn Mashhur has not yet arrived in Palestine, but is reported to be consorting with Nuri Shaalan in Damascus. I shall inform you by telegram if and when he passes through Palestine *en route* for Egypt."

E 6181/1/91] **No. 94**

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 15.)

(Unnumbered.)

(Telegraphic.) R

Beirut, November 15, 1930.

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad:—

"Your telegram No. 56 S to me (No. 542 to Colonial Office).

Acting Secretary-General to H. C. [illegible] writes to me personal letter complaining that Ibn Mashhur, who has expressed definite desire to remain here, is being constantly urged by Iraq Government agents to go on to Nejd, latest emissary is a chamberlain of King of Iraq. Pressure which is being brought to bear in Syria by foreign agents on a Syrian national travelling with a passport issued by French Chargé d'Affaires, Bagdad, is misplaced and likely to cause worst impression locally especially amongst Bedouin. He prefers to bring matter unofficially to my notice before contemplating action to be taken if agents' activities continue."

[E 6214 863 91] No. 95

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, November 16.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) *November 15, 1930*

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, No. 111.—

"In continuation of my telegram of 30th October, No. 107, the situation in regard to raids [illegible] shepherds who have not yet been found. About 100 men took part in each of the two raids. Both took place on 26th October, and not 25th October and 26th October, as previously reported, and it is certain that loot amounted to not less than 500 camels.

"British Resident now reports that a further raid took place on 30th October near Shweiki, west of Jebel Tubaik, when 200 camels were taken from the Darawsha of Howeitat. This raid was not heard of till 3rd November because the shepherds were carried off by the raiders, who were fifty Nejdians and were released after two days in Jebel Tul.

Please lodge protest and demand restitution."

[E 6231/223/91] No. 96.

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 298.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note to the Hejaz Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 21st October, respecting a resolution as to the period to be covered by the MacDonnell enquiry.

Jedda, October 21, 1930.

Enclosure in No. 96.

Mr. Hope-Gill to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Your Excellency,
(After Compliments.) *Jedda, October 21, 1930.*

I AM instructed to inform your Excellency that my Government, having considered the question of procedure in relation to claims for raids made (1) before the 1st August, and (2) since that date, have sought and obtained the agreement of the Transjordan Government to the following resolution: That the present arbitral enquiry shall be regarded as covering all raids made before the 1st August, 1930, and that no claims shall hereafter be submitted in respect of such raids.

I have the honour to invite the Hejaz Government similarly to agree to this resolution, the object of which is to set a definite term to the period covered by the arbitration.

With highest respects.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

[E 6237/223/91] No. 97.

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 311.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him translation of a note from the Hejaz Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 27th October, respecting the procedure as regards claims arising from raids.

Jedda, October 29, 1930.

Enclosure in No. 97.

Hejaz Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Hope-Gill.

(Translation.) *Taif, October 27, 1930.*

WITH reference to your note of 21st October (29.8.1349) relating to the question of the procedure of dealing with claims arising from raids before the 1st August and with claims arising from raids after that date, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government agree to the following decision:—

"The present arbitral enquiry shall be regarded as covering all raids made before the 1st August, 1930, and no claims shall hereafter be submitted in respect of such raids."

With highest respects.
FUAD HAMZA.

[E 6326/1/91] No. 98.

Consul General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Beirut, November 22, 1930.*

YOUR telegram No. 19.

I had already, on receipt of Bagdad telegram No. 376, made representations without result. I saw Acting Secretary General again this morning with special reference to Bagdad telegram No. [illegible] Office about alleged abduction by French police. His Majesty's consul, Damascus, reports that he had been informed by Kadi's emissary that [illegible] Deleuze of Beirut central took Ibn Mashhur away from Ruwalla camp at Adra to Damascus, where he subsequently disappeared. I am asking him if possible to obtain independent confirmation of this. Secretary-General said that he saw nothing unusual in Captain Deleuze's giving man whom he saw [illegible] to Ibn Mashhur. In any case, according to him, Ibn Mashhur on reaching Damascus, had definitely made up his mind to remain there. This, in the circumstances, seems not improbable. I would recall with reference to Bagdad telegram No. [illegible] that French undertaking was that man on entering Syria would be free to remain or leave as he saw fit.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Jedda.)

[E 6325/1/91] No. 99.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, November 24.)

(No. 568.)
Telegraphic.) P. *Bagdad, November 22, 1930.*

MY telegram No. 541.

Before leaving for Cyprus Kurd Hassan informed me that his aide-de-camp had returned from Damascus and reported that the French police had arrested Ibn Mashhur in his presence and had refused to reveal his whereabouts. Aide-de-camp could therefore do nothing further. Kurd Hassan requests that Ibn Saud be informed through His Majesty's Minister at Jedda that he is filled with distress and shame at this occurrence and that he is prepared forthwith to secrete to Ibn Saud Ibn Mashhur's family and followers [illegible] Iraq. He is writing personal letter of apology to Ibn Saud, but desires that Ibn Saud should be assured in the meantime of his good intentions and of the sincerity of his friendship.

The report of the French interference to which Beirut telegram No. 33 of 15th instant lends colour should, I suggest, if possible be verified, as it appears inconsistent with the French undertaking that Ibn Mashhur would be free to leave Syria (*vide* your No. 411 of 25th October).

(Repeated to Beirut and Jedda.)

[E 6382 4522 91] No. 100

Mr Hope-Gill to Mr A Henderson.—(Received November 25.)

(No 231.)
(Telegraphic.) *Jedda, November 25, 1930.*

A COMMUNIQUÉ has been published by the Hejazi Government explaining that in May last Ibn Saud, wishing to assist the Idrisi's province, which had been placed under his protection by the terms of the Treaty of Mecca of 1926, despatched a Royal Commission to Asir to examine and report on its administration in consultation with the Idrisi and his legislative council. In letters exchanged between the Idrisi and Ibn Saud as a result, which are also published, the former agrees with pleasure to "entrust to your Majesty the finance and administration of our country and charge is piously assumed by the latter. Details of administration are being worked out at Mecca, where the Idrisi delegation now is. Hamad Ash-Shuwair has replaced Ibn Saud's representative at Sabia with the title of Amir of Asir.

Thus article 6 of Agreement of Mecca is virtually abrogated, though not specifically. It is thought likely that this change, following on recent announcement by Imam, which is reported to have appeared in Yemen press, that Ibn Saud could not be so foolish as to occupy Asir, will drive Imam to take action. Troops are reported to be on the move from Taif southward. I suppose such movement is precautionary, or possibly defensive. Resident at Aden has, however, no information of activity on part of Yemen.

(Repeated to Aden.)

E 6743 4587/91] No. 101.

Mr Hope-Gill to Mr. A Henderson.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 334.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to [illegible] enclosing copy of the Treaty of Friendship concluded between the Governments of Hejaz Nejd and the German Reich.

Jedda, November 18, 1930.

Enclosure 1 in No. 101

Memorandum.

(Translation.)

THE Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has the honour to send his respects to you and to enclose herewith a copy of the Treaty of Friendship concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Government of the German Reich, which was ratified on Thursday, the 6th November, 1930, at Cairo.

(Sealed) Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Mecca, November 13, 1930.

Enclosure 2 in No. 101

Treaty of Friendship between the Kingdom of Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies and the German Reich.

(Published in the "Um-al Qura" of November 7, 1930.)

(Translation.)

IN the name of God the most merciful, the compassionate.

Praise be to God alone and prayer and peace be upon the last Prophet.

We, Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdurrahman-al Faisal-al-Saud, King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies;

A Treaty of Friendship for the establishment of friendly relations between our [illegible] concluded between us and His Excellency the President of

the German Reich, and signed by two plenipotentiaries on our behalf and one plenipotentiary on his behalf [illegible] duly and mutually authorised at Cairo on the 16th day of Dhul Qa da in the year 1347, corresponding to the 20th day of April, 1929.

It is as follows:—

Treaty of Friendship between the Kingdom of Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies and the German Reich.

His Majesty King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies and his Excellency the President of the German Reich, desiring to establish and strengthening friendly relations between the two countries and believing that the establishment of relations between them will serve the growth of the two nations and aid their prosperity, have decided to conclude a Treaty of Friendship, and for this purpose Sheikh Hafez Wahaba, His Majesty's counsellor and Sheikh Fawzan-as-Saleq, His Majesty's agent in Egypt, on behalf of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies, and Herr von Schturr, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of the German Reich to Egypt, on behalf of the President of the German Reich, have been appointed as their authorised representatives.

Having produced their credentials and proved their validity, they agreed upon the following articles:—

ARTICLE 1.

[illegible] friendship will prevail between the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the German Reich.

ARTICLE 2.

The two contracting parties, intending to establish diplomatic and consular relations between them in due course, have agreed, each for its parts, that the political and consular representatives of both should enjoy in the territories of the other country the treatment laid down by the principles of general international law, provided such treatment be mutual.

ARTICLE 3.

The subjects of both the contracting parties shall be accepted in the territories of the other [illegible] the principles of general international law and in conformity with its known necessities and shall enjoy there, as far as their persons and property are concerned, the same treatment as is enjoyed by the subjects of the most favoured nation. The ships and their cargoes of both countries shall be treated in all respects in the ports of the other country with the same treatment as is enjoyed by the ships and their cargoes of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 4.

The products and the manufactures of both countries which enter the territories of the other country for consumption, reshipment or transit shall be treated with the same treatment as is enjoyed by the products and manufactures of the same kind of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 5.

[illegible] Arabic and German, the two texts having equal value. The treaty shall be ratified and ratifications exchanged at Cairo as soon as possible, and it shall be considered effective as soon as ratifications have been exchanged.

In confirmation of the above the authorised representatives of both parties have signed and sealed this treaty.

Cairo, the 16th Dhul Qa da, 1347 (20th April, 1929).

HAFEZ WAHABA
FAWZAN AS SALEQ
VON SCHTURR

After reading the above treaty and carefully considering it, we have ratified, accepted and [illegible] it [illegible] separately in every article and paragraph. We confirm and ratify it and undertake and give a Royal and true promise that, by the might of God, we will carry out and observe with full honesty and sincerity what is written therein, and that we will never, God willing, allow any infraction to occur to it in any way so long as we are able to do so.

For further confirmation of the validity of all that is written therein, we have ordered our seal to be affixed to this document and we have signed it with our hand God is the best witness

Written on the 1st day of Muharram-al Haram in the year 1348, corresponding to the 7th day of June, 1919

(Royal signature.)

PROTOCOL

Exchange of Ratifications of the Treaty of Friendship concluded between His [illegible] and His Excellency the President of the German Reich

The undersigned have assembled for the exchange of ratification of the Treaty of Friendship [illegible] between His [illegible] and of New Zealand and its Dependencies and the President of the German Reich and signed at Cairo on the 16th day of Dhul Qa'da [illegible] 1347 [illegible] (corresponding to the 26th April, 1929). After the copies of the protocol of ratification of the above treaty have been [illegible] to be a true copy of the other, the exchange was effected this day in the usual manner

In confirmation whereof this protocol is signed.

Written at Cairo on the 15th Jamad ath Thani, 1349 (6th November, 1930)

(Representative of the Hejaz Nejd Government.)

(Representative of the German Government.)

[E 6518/96/91] No. 102

Mr A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No 219)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, December 22, 1930*

MY telegram No 179 of 20th October. Proposed visit of Resident to Koweit and Persian Gulf questions between Ibn Saud and Colonel Biscoe.

We do not know result of action which Hejaz Nejd Minister promised at your dinner party on 30th October, to take about visit of Resident to Ibn Saud during His Majesty's short visit to Nejd.

Government of India and Resident agree that visit should be primarily one of courtesy, and that Sheikh of Koweit should therefore not accompany Biscoe. As King's visit is likely to be short, arrangements for meeting must be made soon if at all I leave to your discretion any action to secure invitation by King to Resident

Correspondence with Government of India (copies went to you by bag of 11th December) shows that Resident welcomes courtesy visit as providing favourable opportunity of reaching understanding with Ibn Saud over Koweit affairs We recollect your warning against rushing Ibn Saud into discussion of Koweit affairs under cover of courtesy visit, and Resident will be reminded of this if visit eventuates

We incline to Resident's view that there would be no objection to Colonel Dickson accompanying him as member of his staff in circumstances now envisaged, but I await your observations on this point

(Repeated to [illegible] Bassrah by [illegible] No 95.)

E 6371/1308/91] No 103

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 23.)

(No 609)
(Telegraphic) *Baghdad, December 18, 1930*

JEDDA telegram No 237 to Foreign Office

I have discussed with Prime Minister, who expressed his readiness to proceed to Jedda [illegible] with [illegible] Bon Voisinage Agreement and negotiating an extradition agreement on clear understanding that Hejaz-Nejd Government will agree to [illegible] Bon Voisinage Agreement first and that [illegible] signature dependent upon extradition agreement negotiations. He would also bring with him personal messages from King of Iraq on the subject of Ibn Mashhur in amplification of a personal letter which King of Iraq wrote on 14th December to King Ibn Saud, and would also be prepared to discuss general questions of claims He [illegible] negotiation, which he is now free to undertake Do His Majesty's Government see any objection to proposal? If not, I will suggest that he should telegraph direct to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jedda, in this sense

(Repeated to Jedda.)

E 6900/96/91] No 104

Sir A. Ryan to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received December 23.)

(No 245)
(Telegraphic) *Jedda, December 23, 1930*

YOUR telegram No 219

Hejaz Minister did not tell me [illegible] what if anything had passed between him and the King I cannot enquire here, in view of his hostility to Fuad and inaccessibility of Ibn Saud himself It might be worth while to ask Minister [illegible] King [illegible] report [illegible] proposed to see you but I do not think it specially important to do so

I think best course will be for me to write personal letter to Fuad referring to his personal letter [illegible] of 7th October [illegible] when [illegible] opportunity at this end [illegible] that [illegible] to pay his respects to the King during his visit to Nejd [illegible] to His Majesty to receive him at Riadh [illegible] between there and Persian Gulf [illegible] courtesy character of proposed visit, letting Fuad understand that proposal arises out of his own suggestion to me that I should take some further action to placate Ibn Saud.

I see no objection to Dickson accompanying Biscoe, and would propose to mention in my letter to Fuad probability of his doing so. I would suggest not enlarging party further except of course [illegible] necessary servants [illegible] is desirable to avoid any appearance of negotiation. In my opinion extent to which business can be discussed must depend entirely on Ibn Saud's attitude if and when visit actually takes place. He will almost certainly touch on pending questions himself, but I see no prospect of his settling any of them. Best hope is that, if King agrees to proposal, visit will restore completely friendly personal relations and enable us to judge better how to approach stage of formal negotiations on Persian Gulf questions. Biscoe may find it possible to agree on list of matters to be discussed, which, I think, will have to include not only those relative to Koweit but also Bahrein questions especially in view of recent exchange of somewhat acrimonious letters between Ibn Saud and Sheikh of Bahrein.

I am preparing letter to Fuad, but should like to be assured of your approval before sending it. It [illegible] as soon as possible as King is unlikely to spend more than three to four weeks in Nejd.

(Repeated to India, No. 310, and Bushire, No. 311.)

E 6900/96/91] No. 105

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 223.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 27, 1930*

[illegible] of the 23rd December. Proposed visit of Resident in Persian Gulf to King Ibn Saud.

His Majesty's Government approve your proposals. Should any observations by Government of India or Resident be repeated to you, you should [illegible] so far as possible, [illegible] your action [illegible], but you should not postpone action unless essential.

(Repeated to Government of India, No. 48, and Bushire (by Colonial Office), No. 96.)

E 6941, 2229/91] No. 106

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 362.)
Sir, *Jedda, December 10, 1930*

I HAVE the honour to report that Ibn Saud paid a private visit to Jedda on the fifth December and returned to Mecca to-day. There were no official functions of any kind.

2. His Majesty received me on the 7th December, when half an hour was passed in friendly [illegible]. Only general topics were touched upon and no specific reference was made by His Majesty to current questions. He more than once mentioned, however, the value which he placed on the friendship of His Majesty's Government and his desire for the closest co-operation.

3. [illegible] intends to leave very shortly for Riadh and to return to Mecca by the beginning of Ramadan, which falls on the 20th January. His Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs will remain here for a few days longer.

I have, &c.
C. G. HOPE GILL.

E 6943/4622/91] No. 107

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 364.)
His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to his telegram No. 231 of the 25th November, translation of a letter dated the 6th November from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Mecca on the subject of the administration of Asir.

2. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Resident at Aden.

Jedda, December 10, 1930.

Enclosure 1 in No. 107.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Hope-Gill.

(Translation.) *Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mecca, November 15, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith for your perusal a copy of the Green Book issued concerning the administration of the Idrisi Province.

With highest respects,
FUAD HAMZA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 107.

(Translation.) Official Green Book

IDRISI PROVINCE

(Published in the "Um-al Qura" of 23 Jumada-ath-Thani, 1349.)

Sealed: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mecca. Government of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies

Official Communiqué from the Press Department.

HIS Majesty's attention was directed, after the completion of the last pilgrimage season, towards the introduction of many improvements in the internal affairs of His Majesty's dominions. One of the things to which His Majesty has given his high attention is the Idrisi Province, which, in accordance with the treaty concluded at Mecca on the 22nd September, 1926, is under His Majesty's protection. His Majesty, may God preserve him, desired to help it for its welfare and the prosperity of its people. So he issued his [illegible] to [illegible] a special loyal [illegible] Sheikh [illegible] and Ahmad-bin Hleil, to be sent to the Idrisi Province to discuss and consider jointly with the Legislative Council there such affairs as would lead to the reformation of the [illegible] of its subjects. The commission actually set about the beginning of Muharram this year (the 28th May, 1930) and began its work with the authorities there under the supervision of As Sayyid Al Hasan. The commission worked for more than four months after which it forwarded to His Majesty a report in which they [illegible] the Idrisi Province. After he had studied the report, His Majesty found it better to send another commission to consult As Sayyid Al-Hasan-al-Idrisi, his Government and his Legislative Council on matters necessary for the administration of the State and the introduction of improvements. The second commission left about two months ago under the presidency of Hamad-al-Abdali, and co-opted the members of the first commission as well as the Legislative Council in the Idrisi Province. After careful consideration and discussion an agreement was arrived at as to the ways and means to be followed for the administration of the country.

On the 9th October, 1930, the following telegram from As Sayyid Al Hasan-al-Idrisi was received by His Majesty the King:—

> "Your letters by the hand of Al Abdali have arrived. We have discussed them with your deputation, and it has been decided with our consent and agreement to entrust the administration and finance of our country to your Majesty's charge. We desire thus to inform you.
>
> "17th Jamad al Awal 1349.
>
> "AL HASAN BIN ALI-AL IDRISI."

His Majesty sent the following telegram in reply:—

> "As Sayyid Hasan al Idrisi, Jizan. Your brother has taken note of your confidence in God and in him, and of your reliance upon him. This is the hope expected from you and your brotherhood. You will only see from us, by the grace and might of God, that which pleases you. As to us, be sure before God that we will please God [illegible] that which improves your affairs and the following three results will flow. First, your comfort, tranquility and the preservation of your administration to yourself; secondly, the comfort of your subjects; and thirdly the protection of your honour and the honour of your Province against all aggression.—ABDUL AZIZ."

As Sayyid Al [illegible] and the Legislative Council then decided to send a special deputation [illegible] to present [illegible] His Majesty [illegible] agreed upon together with two letters from As Sayyid Al Idrisi and the Legislative Council.

The letters are as follows:

Peace be [illegible]

I [illegible] His Majesty the King of the Hejaz Nejd and its Dependencies [illegible] Abdul Aziz [illegible] Faisal al Saud

Peace [illegible] be upon you.

I thank God who is the [illegible] God and I pray for His last Prophet his relatives and [illegible]

I [illegible] your prosperity, good health and tranquillity. I pray God the Almighty that [illegible] your Majesty [illegible] Your Majesty's affairs [illegible] and I [illegible] by the grace of God as well as [illegible] There is nothing but good health and prosperity. I have received your Majesty's second letter [illegible] I have noted that [illegible] you [illegible] and courtesy [illegible] prosperity.

Your three letters [illegible] Hassan Abdali have been received and their contents noted. I thank your Majesty for the advice you have given to my country and for the care you have shown towards our interests and the regulation of our affairs in a way that will maintain our honour and comfort.

I [illegible] with your suggestions and friendly advice with which I agree. I sent [illegible] Majesty's [illegible] with them the matters you referred to which [illegible] are the administration and the establishment [illegible] country. I believe an agreement is the [illegible] your Majesty [illegible] letter of [illegible] So there is nothing left amiss on my part [illegible] people regarding the measures which have to be undertaken towards the country and its improvement and concerning consultation with your Majesty. I pray God may grant success to all.

"I wish to draw your Majesty's attention to the fact that I, on my part, have proved my friendship and connexion with your Majesty, and I believe that I have increased your Majesty's inconvenience, that is to say, I have laid upon your Majesty's shoulders my task and my hopes for the protection of my honour and the comfort of my country, trusting that your Majesty's endeavour for me in this connexion is better and more hopeful (than mine own). I am therefore confident that your Majesty will act in this respect as you would do for the interests [illegible] and by this means I would attain the end that I desire and expect.

In truth your Majesty will realise that our connexion is not of recent date and is full only of the faithfulness and the noble character registered in the white pages of your Majesty's prestige.

I swear by God the only God that I am keeping faithful and loyal to your Majesty outwardly and inwardly. I have never thought of anything contrary to friendship. Anything attributed to me contrary to friendship and courtesy is false and groundless. Here I am registering my sincerity as only a proof of the truth of what I have said. I am trusting the protection of my country, my comfort and my honour to the hands of your Majesty as a trust and I am making your Majesty responsible for all of this. I am quite sure of your noble and pure character and honour. I await your reply to reassure me as to that which I expect namely the maintenance of my rights and my honour and the regard of my private people and relatives and the expansion of their connexion with and services to me. Your Majesty will then be entitled to whatever facilitates the aim and helps the realisation of the desired end. Notwithstanding that I am sure of all this nevertheless as Al Khalil (Abraham) said I want my heart reassured. God is the best witness to what we say.

The letter of the Legislative Council —

"His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, Abdul Aziz bin Abdurrahman al Faisal al Saud. May God help him!

"Peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you.

"After enquiries about your health and comfort we hope please God that you your [illegible] and all your [illegible] are enjoying the best of health and [illegible] We have [illegible] are by the grace of God [illegible] there is nothing but [illegible] We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your [illegible] we would [illegible] your safety and most [illegible] your [illegible] and property. As regards the [illegible] with your Majesty [illegible] necessary for the [illegible] of our country [illegible] As Sayyid Al Idrisi [illegible] Your Majesty's [illegible] affairs [illegible] Majesty.

Hoping that [illegible] please God may your life be protected [illegible] Majesty.

October 10, 1930.

" LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, SABIA.

Copy of the Decision of the Council

In the name of God the Most Merciful, the Compassionate. [illegible] is made by our order [illegible] on the [illegible]

Sealed: AL HASSAN BIN ALI BIN MUHAMMED AS IDRISI.

On the 9th October [illegible] we had a meeting with the friends the delegates of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Abdurrahman al Faisal al Saud. May God protect [illegible] the [illegible] of the letter As Sayyid Al Idrisi has [illegible] the measures that should be taken for the improvement of the country of the Idrisi Government and the organisation of its affairs and the protection of everything that is [illegible] Accordingly and the presidents of the [illegible] parties are agreed together with the delegation in order to extend the [illegible] of the said country in the organisation of its affairs to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Abdurrahman al Faisal al Saud. [illegible] advice to the [illegible] Written at Sabia.

Members of the [illegible]

MUHAMMED EL AMIN ASH SHAUQATI
MUHAMMED YAHYA AWADH BASAHI
ABDUL QADER BIN MUHAMMED BIN AWADH BASAHI
HAMID BIN ABDULLAH-AL-HAZMI
YAHYA IBRAHIM ZAKI.

The delegation arrived at Mecca on Wednesday, the 13th October, 1930. The members are:

As Sayyid Muhammed al-Arabi al Idrisi
As Sayyid Muhammed as Sufiani,
Qadhi Muhammed bin Ibrahim Mabjar,
Sheikh Muhammed Abdullah Basahi,
As Sayyid Hasan-bin-Zafer, and
Sheikh Makki bin Yahya Zaki

Some questions are being discussed now between the delegation and the authorities of His Majesty's Government concerned regarding certain details of administration and finance and [illegible]

[E 6944/4522/91] No. 108

Mr. Hope-Gill to Mr A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)

(No 365.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to his despatch No. 364 of the 10th December, translation of a further note, dated the 27th November, from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Mecca on the subject of the administration of Asir.

2. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Resident at Aden.

Jedda, December 15, 1930.

Enclosure 1 in No. 108.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr Hope-Gill.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Mecca, November 27, 1930.

(Translation.)

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith a copy of the second part of the Green Book concerning the administration of the Idrisi Province, to complete your information.

With highest respects,
FUAD HAMZA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 108.

(Translation.) Official Green Book

IDRISI PROVINCE, PART II.

In the Name of God the Most Merciful, the Compassionate.

THE IDRISI PROVINCE.

We, Abdul Aziz ibn Abdurrahman al Faisal al Saud, after ratifying the treaty concluded between us and As Sayyid Al Hasan-al-Idrisi on the 22nd September, 1926, and after perusing the decision of the Idrisi Legislative Council approved by As Sayyid Al Hasan on the 9th October, 1930, and after perusing the report made under the presidency of our Son and Viceroy Faisal by the representatives of our Government and representatives of As Sayyid Al-Hasan al-Idrisi, have issued our order as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

We have approved the arrangement defined in the report signed by the representatives of our Government and those of As Sayyid Al Hasan al Idrisi on the 25th Jamad ath Thani, 1349 (16th November, 1930), and attached to this order and we have issued our order for it to be confirmed and carried into effect.

ARTICLE 2.

A Legislative Council for the Idrisi Province shall be constituted and its members elected by the competent authorities in the province.

ARTICLE 3.

The Legislative Council of the Idrisi Province shall be composed of five members who must be of the natives of the country and honest and upright.

ARTICLE 4.

The Legislative Council shall be presided over by a representative of the Amir, and the decisions of the council shall not have effect unless they are approved by As Sayyid Al-Hasan-al Idrisi.

ARTICLE 5.

The chefs of the tribes shall be invited to participate with the competent authorities in the election of the Legislative Council, from the villagers (i.e., not Bedouin) of the province and those elected shall be villagers.

ARTICLE 6.

The duties of the Legislative Council are the consideration of the interests of the [illegible] and subjects, and [illegible] to securing peace in the interior, to improving commerce, cultivation and education provided that this will not cause confusion to the interests of the neighbouring countries.

ARTICLE 7.

The Amir shall consider the interests of the country, the security of the roads, and arrest aggressors and those who are fond of causing disturbance, whether they be citizens or Bedouin.

ARTICLE 8.

All judgments, punishments and restrictions shall be applied by the Sharia Law.

ARTICLE 9.

The Legislative Council shall have nothing to do with diplomatic or foreign affairs.

ARTICLE 10.

The council shall have no right to object to any action which the Amir takes to enforce the [illegible] of Hejaz and Nejd in respect of foreign affairs and [illegible].

ARTICLE 11.

The council is entitled, if it notices any infraction by the Amir or the Director of Finance of the legal regulations, to submit the matter to us or to our Viceroy in the Hejaz under two conditions:—

(1) That it shall be signed by As Sayyid himself.
(2) That the criticism must be true and relating to actual facts.

ARTICLE 12.

Our Viceroy shall put our order into force.

Issued on the 20th November, 1930.

(Royal Seal.)

Report.

In view of the provisions of the Treaty of Mecca, concluded on the 22nd September, 1926, between His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies on the one side, and As Sayyid Al Hasan al Idrisi on the other, by which Saudian protection was extended to the Idrisi Province, and, in view of the fact that As Sayyid Al Hasan-al Idrisi and his Legislative Council have abdicated the administration of all affairs to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies according to an official decision passed by the Idrisi Council and approved by As Sayyid Al Hasan on the 9th October, 1930, and in view of the fact that His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its

Dependencies has accepted this abdication, and that His Majesty took upon himself the administration of all affairs, besides the rights and the privileges to which His Majesty is entitled in the Idrisi Province according to the afore-mentioned Treaty of Mecca

The following have assembled under the presidency of His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal, His Majesty's Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government :—

Abdullah al Fadhl,
Fuad Hamza
Yusuf Yasin
Abdullah as Sulaiman al Hamdan

and the following on behalf of As Sayyid Al Hasan al Idrisi

As Sayyid Al Arabi-al-Idrisi,
Sheikh Mustafa an Nuaimi,
Qadhi Mohammed Ibrahim Mabjar,
Makki bin-Yahya Zakari,
Mohammed bin Abdullah Ba Sahi, and
As Sayyid Hasan-bin-Zafer,

to lay down the rules of administration to be followed in the Idrisi Province. The following articles have been agreed upon :—

ARTICLE 1

As Sayyid Al Hasan-al-Idrisi shall remain as head of the Idrisi Government, and all orders are to be issued in his name on behalf of His Majesty the King in that province

ARTICLE 2

His Majesty the King will appoint an Amir for the administration of affairs in the Idrisi Province and for the supervision of internal improvements, the security of peace and order, and to give effect to the Sharia Laws there, in accordance with the principle mentioned in the first article

ARTICLE 3

There shall be a Legislative Council for the province to assist the Amir and its duties shall be to give the necessary advice to the Amir in everything concerning the administration of the country

ARTICLE 4

His Majesty the King shall appoint a Director of Finance, and his duty shall be to organise the collection of Government taxes and to make arrangements for the expenditure of such money to the general good in accordance with the approved budget.

ARTICLE 5

All civil and military officials, whether appointed direct by His Majesty the King or by the local Governors and Amirs, shall pay due regard to the position of As Sayyid Al Hasan al Idrisi in the country and protect his prestige and honour and those of his family in all respects

ARTICLE 6

All decisions of the Legislative Council shall be submitted to As Sayyid Al Hasan for his endorsement and approval. They shall have no value unless they bear his endorsement and approval, and, in case of dispute between the council and As Sayyid, the matter shall be referred to His Majesty for solution.

ARTICLE 7

Detailed instructions will be given as to how the Legislative Council is to be constituted [illegible] and its work done

Those present have unanimously signed this report this day, the 16th November, 1930

FAISAL

ABDULLAH AL FADHL
FUAD HAMZA
YUSUF YASIN
ABDULLAH AS SULAIMAN AL HAMDAN
MOHAMMED [illegible] IDRIS
MUSTAFA AN NUAIMI
MOHAMMED IBRAHIM MABJAR
MAKKI BIN YAHYA ZAKARI
MOHAMMED-BIN-ABDULLAH BA SAHI
HASAN BIN ZAFER

E 6871/1308/91] No. 100

Mr A Henderson to Sir A Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 225)
(Telegraphic) R *Foreign Office, December 30 1930*

BAGDAD [illegible] No. 606 of 1930 [illegible] you No. 413 Proposed visit of Iraqi Prime Minister to Jedda

Please telegraph observations

It is not yet known what line Iraqi Government propose to adopt regarding extradition and claims

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA.

E 3782/231/89] No 110

Consul Hole to Mr. A Henderson.—(Received July 15.)

(No 35.)

Sir, *Damascus, June 17, 1930*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 30 of the 27th May, regarding the promulgation of the Syrian Constitution, I have the honour to report that the 11th June, the anniversary of the first session of the dissolved Constituent Assembly, was selected by Nationalist headquarters as the appropriate occasion for manifesting their dissatisfaction with the changes in the Constitution, the manner of its promulgation and, above all, the 116th article, which virtually reduces it to a dead letter.

2. A strike was called and a meeting convened at the house of Fakhri Baroudi. The strike was by far the most successful that I have seen in Damascus; almost every shop was closed throughout the city, even in the Salhiya quarter, which has taken on a [illegible] during the last few years and rarely concerns itself with manifestations. Large but well behaved assemblies occupied the principal thoroughfares, and there was a general move towards the quarter in which Fakhri Baroudi resides.

3. The new Minister of Interior, Jemil-el Elshi, who has just exchanged portfolios with Toufik Shamieh, with the object of rigging the elections, was curiously inept in his handling of the situation. A cordon was drawn round Fakhri Beg's house, and the police or gendarmerie invited disorder by throwing stones at the crowds, an invitation that was readily accepted. Eventually a few shots had to be fired in the air, and the fire brigade brought their hoses into action.

4. The meeting was removed to Jemil Mardam Beg's house, near the Residence, and speeches were made among general acclamation; some schoolboys also held an impromptu meeting outside the Residence itself. M. Bruère gave orders that they should not be interfered with, and no further incidents took place.

5. This strike is the latest of a series which have been organised in protest against octroi and other municipal taxes, which have been largely increased. French official circles have affirmed that its purpose was the same, and that the Syrians are delighted with the Constitution; this is exactly contrary to the facts.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.
E. C. HOLE.

E 4062/2242/89] No 111

Acting Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 29.)

(No 56. Confidential.)

Sir, *Aleppo, July 12, 1930*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 3 of the 22nd May, I have the honour to transmit the enclosed memorandum regarding a journey to Mosul of seven days' duration, which I undertook after having previously ascertained that no inconvenience would be caused thereby either to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq or to the administrative inspector of Mosul Liwa. I was accompanied by Mr. Dallal, the consular clerk, whose presence was very helpful to me.

2. The purpose of this journey was to study the Aleppo–Mosul trade routes which are certainly growing in importance, as is witnessed by the increasing number of visas granted for Iraq, especially in transit to Persia. I also desired to discuss various outstanding questions with the police and customs authorities and with the administrative inspector at Mosul, and to become acquainted with the conditions prevailing in the eastern portion of this consular district.

3. For the sake of convenience, I have thought advisable to divide the report into the following headings: Route, towns visited and general observations.

4. It is very much regretted that, owing to pressure of work, this report has not been despatched at an earlier date.

5. Copies of this despatch and enclosure are being sent to the Comptroller-General, Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad, His Majesty's Ambassador, Istanbul, to the Acting British consul-general, Beirut, His Majesty's consul, Damascus, and to the British liaison officer, Beirut.

I have, &c.
GEOFFREY MEADE.

Enclosure in No 111.

Memorandum respecting a Journey to Mosul by Acting Consul Meade.

Aleppo–Mosul Route.

THE route taken lay viâ Deir-ez Zor, Souar, Fadjhami, Ain Ghazal and Tell Afar. This is [illegible] as it offers water facilities, and is still followed by shepherds and flocks coming from Iraq to Alexandretta. The only serious obstacle is the Euphrates at Deir-ez Zor, where an hour must be allowed for crossing, including delays, by means of a very primitive ferry. No crossing is possible between sunset and sunrise. At Souar the Khabour is crossed by a good suspension bridge. The next [illegible] Works Department, but this section of the [illegible] road.

On leaving Aleppo the new road is followed, which for 40 miles offers a perfect surface. Beyond that, however, save for a short stretch near Meskene, along the banks of the Euphrates and for a distance of some 30 miles from Tibni to Deir-ez Zor where there is a metalled surface, only a desert track exists, which often resembles a switchback course. I am informed that the river is never crossed at Rakka even in winter, when a higher desert track can be followed. The time taken to cover approximately 340 kilom. was ten hours, including a luncheon interval, but the construction of the main road is being actively carried forward, and on its completion, according to official statement [illegible] the end of 1931, but more probably in two or three years [illegible] journey will be reduced by two or three hours. Meanwhile the curves of the [illegible] perhaps [illegible] road [illegible] there are [illegible] No. 34 [illegible] 14th June 1930 [illegible] it was [illegible] Some [illegible] the street [illegible] Deir-ez Zor [illegible] road.

From Deir-ez Zor about two hours are required to travel to Mosul a distance of approximately 37 [illegible] Euphrates [illegible] good desert track [illegible] to Souar [illegible] course of [illegible] until [illegible] The portion of desert which is [illegible] between this latter place and [illegible] the Iraq frontier post [illegible] at a very [illegible] almost straight at rapid speed [illegible] various types of land [illegible] this desert region [illegible] after the [illegible] and towards [illegible] upper. At Ain [illegible] there is a good rest house where food and sleeping [illegible] and after [illegible] tents [illegible] Tell Afar [illegible] Mosul.

On leaving Mosul for Kamishli the Tell Afar track is followed for some 20 miles and then bears towards Ain [illegible] where there is [illegible] less [illegible] however than that at Ain Ghazal. The worst bits of the track have been patched up but must present considerable difficulty after rain. At Tell Rumeilan a bridge has been recently erected by the Iraq Public Works Department and after this the track [illegible] a smooth surface [illegible] the French military [illegible] of the Dikes Bridge much work has been undertaken there. After rain however this is probably the worst stretch between Mosul and Kamishli and cars may very easily get bogged while attempts to metal it have proved fruitless. Between Ain [illegible] and Demirkapu, 60 kilometres of Lines marks the German [illegible] and [illegible] iron posts of Beyers (Limited) London mark the old embankment of the Bagdad Bahn.

Between Kameshlié and Deir-ez-Zor the desert track is generally good, and passes through Kurdish Bedu or Armenian settlements. The land appears arid, but it is said that the exodus of the Christians from Turkey and also Kurds will no doubt greatly improve its fertility.

For merchandise to Mosul, the Deir-ez-Zor–Ain-Ghazal route is always employed, as it is the only suitable organised one at the present moment. It is possible, however, that it will be soon cheaper to send goods by rail to Nisibin and thence by road to Mosul. Members of the Mosul Chamber of Commerce whom I saw expressed the hope that a customs post would be established on the Mosul–Nisibin–Aleppo route, as they considered that the import of goods from Europe via Alexandretta, instead of Basra, as at present, would cause a saving of about 11 per cent. This route would also, they thought, be adopted for the export of wool, skins and gall nuts, as even if this route were no cheaper than Basra, a very considerable economy in time would be effected. I informed them that a Customs [illegible] was to be established at Aleppo in the course of the following week (vide despatch No. 47 of the 7th June, 1930). But, although this route has been [illegible] recognised for transit trade since the 1st April, there are as yet no facilities either of transport or customs beyond Nisibin save for passengers, and even for them no prices are quoted for Mosul, but only for Nisibin and Kirkuk.

The alternative route via Jerablus, mentioned in Mr. Monck Mason's despatch, may be left out of account. The track, although actually shorter, is bad in many parts and impracticable in winter, but, more important than this, the way is definitely unsafe on certain sections where it follows the Turkish frontier. Absolute security, on the other hand, may be said to reign on the other route, and the stretch between Aleppo and Deir-ez-Zor is frequently covered at night to avoid the heat of the day.

General Remarks.

The best months for undertaking this journey are April and October, to avoid the likelihood of rains or excessive heat. From a touristic point of view little of interest is offered, and the most picturesque part of the journey is undoubtedly between Mosul and Kameshlié, when mountain ranges are always in sight. A driver with a knowledge of the road is still advisable but no longer essential, as the French are erecting sign-posts on the well beaten desert tracks. For night driving, which is by far the most pleasant time in hot weather, a guide is indispensable.

I was [illegible] from the [illegible] that the French appear to be concentrating greater efforts on the upkeep of roads and tracks than is the case with the Iraqi authorities. This is no doubt due to the great French preoccupation of establishing security, best assured by rapidity of transport and consequent facility of patrolling, and in this respect General Callais deserves unstinted praise.

Towns Visited.

Deir-ez-Zor.

Although the only town of any importance in the sanjak which bears its name, and in spite of its position on the Aleppo–Mosul trade route, Deir-ez-Zor does not appear to be a prosperous town. Rents are very low, and there are [illegible] modern buildings save a school and a hospital, which are nearing completion. There is no electric [illegible] or water system. It is the local seat of government under General Callais, who is both [illegible] and in command of the troops in that district. He is assisted by [illegible] Jaeger, a retired officer who was liaison officer in Aleppo under the British occupation, with the title of [illegible] administrator, and an efficient [illegible].

I was [illegible] to see General Callais on my visit, and dined with him [illegible] in the [illegible] part of the district where he was [illegible] the High Commissioner on a tour of inspection. I [illegible] his chief staff, and also called on the officers of the "Service des Renseignements."

One of the most important branches of administration is perhaps the customs, as all goods passing between the northern parts of Syria and Iraq have to be examined at this town. The director is generally considered as a hard, disagreeable and tactless man, who openly flouts General Callais, but who is nevertheless amenable to bribery. Shortly before my arrival his methods of refusing to recognise as Syrian any goods coming from the east which were not certified by officers of the "Service des Renseignements" and the refusal of these officers to give such a certificate had all but resulted in a boycott of the town. General Callais found himself powerless to arrange the dispute, which was only partially settled after a personal visit to Beirut.

Health is said to be improving, but there are many mosquitoes this year, and a recent order has forbidden officers' wives to live there.

Mosul.

During my two days' stay in Mosul I called on the administrative inspector, the mutessarif, the director of [illegible], the chief of police, the special service officer, the French consul and the R.A.F. mess. In the course of these meetings various outstanding affairs between Mosul and Deir-ez-Zor were discussed, and I [illegible] facilities of passport and customs facilities. I then [illegible] arranged a meeting for [illegible] the [illegible] members of the Mosul Chamber of Commerce, who had many [illegible] to put forward. In the first place, they were very emphatic against the continued prohibition of the import of [illegible] transit for Egypt, which, they stated, meant a loss for Mosul of approximately £100,000 a year, as the Deir-ez-Zor–Alexandretta route was the only suitable one. I subsequently ascertained from the French consul that this attitude was due to the absence of a British veterinary surgeon, as the French, considering that a Syrian certificate would be [illegible] as the same is value to an Iraqi certificate. Another complaint was the question of [illegible] transit, which, according to information received from M. Lavisse, delegué at Aleppo, I was able to [illegible] was without sight of a [illegible] solution. The same was hoped of the question of transit [illegible] sheep, for which the same tariff was desired as that prevailing for Turkish sheep, but both these matters were dependent on negotiations between Baghdad and Beirut, which it was expected would be held in the near future.

Demirkapou.

Demirkapou had taken on a temporary importance in view of the imminent occupation of the Dunes Bridge, and [illegible] it several thousand [illegible] were [illegible]. It is [illegible] that, owing to the security offered by the proximity of troops and the influx of Kurdish immigrants from Turkey, settlements and cultivation will increase considerably in this district. Indeed, the whole region between Demirkapou and Kameshlié seems already well cultivated and fairly populous, the inhabitants being Kurds of [illegible] first class, [illegible] Kurdish-speaking Armenians who work for them.

Kameshlié.

The expansion of Kameshlié continues rapidly, and apart from its [illegible] it boasts, unlike Deir-ez-Zor, a cinema and electric light plant. The train from Nisibin [illegible] the [illegible] two towns entirely [illegible] Kameshlié [illegible] supplies. The French exercise no control over [illegible] between the two towns, and [illegible] a few yards within Syrian territory. I [illegible] representations to the Turks to be [illegible] terms with the French, as thefts of sheep, goats and horses are frequently committed chiefly, I am informed, by the Turkish soldiery, who can hardly supplement their insufficient food rations with their miserable pay of 6d. a month. The specimens I saw in Nisibin itself were indeed very wretched. In spite of the extradition arrangement with Turkey, it has been found practically impossible to recover stolen goods, save when a counter-theft has occurred, when stolen goods are bartered for stolen goods.

While Kameshlié still consists mainly of mud huts, inhabited chiefly by Kurds and Kurdish-speaking Armenians, Government buildings have sprung up, a school has just been completed, and it is intended to build an infirmary and a hotel, though in my opinion the latter will be a somewhat doubtful venture. The railway terminus is extended beyond Nisibin. This settlement has been laid out on a modern symmetrical pattern, possessing fine streets, have already been traced out on which it is forbidden to build, and competent authorities are at present dealing with 270 demands for sites. Rents, which stood at 50 per cent. two years ago, have now fallen, but still stand at about 30 per cent.

The River Jaja has a plentiful water supply all the year round, and irrigation would make the surrounding plain very fertile. This has, however, been practically prohibited, pending a proper regulation, owing to danger of malaria. The place, although it enjoys a certain elevation, is exceedingly unhealthy. Soldiers and officers' clothes are prescribed by the medical officer, and the taking of quinine is compulsory. A variety of unpleasant insects, including poisonous centipedes and tarantulas, abounds, and the place is infested with fleas.

The French consul at Mosul had told me that he had heard that the sandjak of [illegible] adjoint, possibly General Callais, would be appointed at Kameshlié. The intelligence officer at Mosul had also heard this rumour, but I have not been able to verify whether or not there is any truth in it.

Nisibin

Nisibin, which I visited in company with an "officier de renseignement," is still an attractive little town with trees and an abundance of water, but economically it is absolutely dead, and the inhabitants for the most part spend their time sitting [illegible] Nisibin was not left in Syrian territory to form the nucleus of what is now [illegible] ignorance of their diplomatists, who were deluded into believing that Nisibin lay to the north of the railway line, where, indeed, it is marked on certain maps.

Mahmakié

From Nisibin we went to Mahmakié, the present Syrian terminus of the Bozanti Alep Nisibin and Prolongements Railway. The works of the prolongation of the line are under the superintendence of a French engineer lieutenant, who, with thirty six soldiers, forms the permanent nucleus of the labourers, who are for the most part Turkish Kurds. I proceeded a few miles down the old track of the Bagdad Bahn, and saw the new track which is being laid alongside, but in a straighter line than the German one. There is as yet very little ballast, as the [illegible] extension to Tell Zowan, 11 kilom. from Mahmakié, will be completed, but difficulties are anticipated from the Turkish authorities who even now are extremely unwilling to allow anything but military equipment to proceed as far as Mahmakié.

From Kameshlié it had been my intention to return to Alepp[illegible] frontier as far as Jerablus. This, however, I found to be impossible, as a turbulent tribe inside the Turkish border rendered the region between Ras el Ain and Tell Abiad unsafe, and, owing to the concentration of forces in the north-east corner, no armoured cars were available for patrolling this district. On various occasions when incursions of this tribe had been reported aeroplanes had been sent to fire at them and drop bombs. On one occasion, however, a French airman had been wounded by fire from the tribesmen, and this somewhat rough and ready measure had now been discontinued. In the circumstances therefore, I proceeded southwards to Hassetché.

Hassetché

Hassetché has not developed greatly in the course of the last year or two, but [illegible] "officier de renseignements," have given a fair amount of trouble, as it is difficult to keep them strictly behind the 30 kilom. line from the frontier. The intelligence officer also hinted that his work was often hampered by vexatious instructions from Deir-ez-Zor. The track between Hassetché and Deir-ez-Zor is entirely desert. We only passed three cars, and two of these were stranded for lack of water.

General Observations

Passport and Customs Control

One of the unpleasant recollections left by the journey to Mosul is the complexity of passport and customs formalities, which compare very unfavourably with those prevailing on the Palestine route.

Passports are examined and endorsed in no fewer than nine places, and this [illegible] formalities are even more numerous. I believe that in view of my official position certain facilities were granted to me, but these formalities must be very irksome to the ordinary traveller, especially when aggravated by the extreme inefficiency of the passport clerks.

One of the difficulties which the authorities have to contend with is the [illegible] number of shepherds who cross the Iraq-Syrian frontier without papers. Th[illegible] comparatively easy, and is, in my opinion, encouraged by the endless formal[illegible] necessary to be "in order."

Security

This is one of the main objectives of the French Administration, and in this [illegible] Meharistes (Camel Corps), by the "Gardes Mobiles" and a Syrian gendarmerie. The officers of this latter body [illegible] machines are only kept at Deir-ez-Zor and Hassetché.

Refugees

[illegible] military.

The Armenian archbishop in Aleppo states that he has most [illegible] Moslem influence increases in Syria at the expense of the French. This information [illegible] Russo-Persian frontier under Bolshevik machine-gun fire, and she had subsequently heard many tales of persecution from the fourteen survivors.

Meanwhile, it is certain that Northern Syria can absorb many more [illegible]

Administration

On passing from Syria to Iraq a remarkable contrast is noticeable in the methods of administration. In Deir-ez-Zor the French soldier rules supreme, and the mutessarif [illegible] days at a time on the banks of the Euphrates [illegible] he locusts, and is a very different person [illegible] t arrogant [illegible] regarding th[illegible] t, but I feel that, through [illegible] de that they might expect indeed. I do not think [illegible] ch are sending their best, or even their second [illegible] only consider of use as having a [illegible]

In conclusion, I would add that I was received very hospitably throughout my journey and I [illegible] Mr. M[illegible] Meade's statement that distrust of the Beduin [illegible] perhaps [illegible] certain [illegible] element with whom, however, there is not so much a suspicion of spying as a dislike of the foreigner viewing their methods at close quarters.

E 4609/231/89] No. 112

Acting Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 27.)

No. 58.)

Sir, *Aleppo, July 24, 1930.*

I HAVE the [illegible] to inform you that notices in Arabic purporting to emanate from a regional committee of the Syrian Socialist party, were posted up in Aleppo [illegible] of the 7th instant and were removed shortly afterwards by the police.

2. This notice, of which I enclose a translation, is chiefly devoted to an attack on the French, [illegible] Syria [illegible] of destroying property, and of causing misery and unemployment. The Constitution is also [illegible] as [illegible] all influential and prominent Syrians [illegible] Nationalists are responsible for [illegible] country. The word "Constitution" is [illegible] Russian [illegible] of the oppressed, and the League of Fighters in Berlin is also held up as working in the good cause.

3. I am informed that similar notices were posted up on the same day in Damascus, [illegible] Tripoli, [illegible] and other places [illegible] a few weeks previously the Syrian Constitution had been declared. I am also informed and authorities [illegible] that although these proceedings [illegible] a certain [illegible] the French [illegible] have been made to [illegible] responsible certain arrests, however, have been made.

4. According to [illegible] this outburst is attributed to the extreme Nationalists [illegible] Armenian organisation [illegible] working [illegible] with Russian Armenians is responsible. In this connexion it is perhaps worth noting that it is believed by a large section of Syrian Armenians [illegible] in Aleppo that the Bolsheviks are well disposed towards them.

5. It would appear that there are at least three Armenian Nationalist organisations, each madder than the other, who are always prepared to take part in any scheme. The idea, for instance, of helping the Kurdish revolt is one which appeals to them, with the ultimate object of making a triumphal march through Turkish Kurdistan.

6. In the present instance it is considered possible that the extreme Syrian Nationalist group have inveigled an Armenian organisation into helping in this affair. [illegible] the [illegible] of the Syrian [illegible] rebellion be dictated by a desire to shift responsibility on to other shoulders, or by the dislike which exists between Syrian and Armenian. I would add that if Armenians are indeed involved their action cannot be condemned too strongly, as their lot would indeed be miserable should they lose the protection of the French.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, to the acting British consul-general at Beirut, and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.
GEOFFREY MEADE

Enclosure in No. 112

Proclamation of the Syrian Socialist Organ

Translation.

To the Workers, Peasants, Artisans and Syrian Free Thinkers.

THE French colonisers have proclaimed the Constitution of Syria, in spite of the Syrians, and have divided Syria into several small States. They have bound the nation with fetters, and the working people are ground down and sacrificed to the French capitalists' ambitions. Their fortune will increase, while we and our families will have to suffer from unemployment, misery and hunger.

O workmen and peasants! Since years you are fighting for the independence of your country, while the lives of hundreds of you have been sacrificed by the colonisers, who have demolished Damascus on the heads of the little children, women and old people. They have burnt the villages, razed the houses, hanged hundreds of the workmen and peasants, and shot many of you. Can you allow all these sacrifices to be in vain! Will you consent to be the slaves of the colonisers who are exploiting you and stealing your rights!

We categorically repudiate the Constitution proclaimed in the Syrian country, and do hereby notify all those who would accept it, either directly or indirectly, that they will be considered the enemies of Syrian unity and of its independence.

Workmen and peasants, you have been several times deceived, you must in consequence put an end to this treachery. The chiefs among the Nationalists have betrayed the rebellion and started negotiations with the colonisers, who had promised an amnesty. But they did not comply with their promises, and, in consequence, hundreds of our rebel brethren are left behind in the desert, exposed to every suffering and misery.

The colonisers had also promised to the people freedom in promulgating their own Constitutional Law. This has meant that the rich and the influential have made use of this opportunity to issue a Constitution for their friends composed of 115 articles, of which not one safeguards the rights of the peasants and prevents the exploitation of the workmen.

The profits we gained by the rebellion have all been lost by the policy of compromise of the Nationalists.

[illegible] and the [illegible] [illegible] are absent, the workmen and peasants, and we accept among us all people devoted to the cause of complete independence.

O labouring people of Syria! We are not the only tools against colonisation, for there are hundreds of millions of oppressed peoples in India, Indo-China and [illegible] countries [illegible] East and [illegible] are also several millions of workmen and peasants who have rebelled against it and are supporting our plans. Bolshevik Russia, the saviour of oppressed peoples, is doing all in her power to crush the forces of colonisation and to deliver the weak from oppression. Russia itself is with us in our struggle against colonisation, and we are also supported by the [illegible] of the Fighters [illegible]

O peasants and workmen! The Syrian Socialist party ask you—

(*a*) To repudiate categorically the Constitution promulgated in Syria.
(*b*) To denounce the leaders of the Nationalists as traitors.
(*c*) To organise a conference of the people of all Syria in order to elect free members who may work in accordance with the real wishes of the populations.

Down with the policy of compromise, with the oppressors and colonisers!
Down with the exploitation of the people!
Long live the Government of the workmen and peasants!
Long live complete independence and Syrian unity!
Long live a conference of the Arab countries against colonisation!
Long live the League of Fighters against Colonisation!
Long live the Socialist International party!
Long live the Syrian Socialist party!

The Regional Committee of the Syrian Socialist party, branch of the International Socialist party.

Sefer 5, 1349 (July 1, 1930).

E 5017 1542 89] No 113

Acting Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 65. Confidential.)

Sir, *Aleppo, August 27, 1930*

WITH reference to Mr Monck-Mason's confidential despatch No. 22 of the 13th February, 1930, I have the honour to forward the following views regarding the sanjak of Alexandretta, based on my own impressions and also on a report which I have received from Mr Catoni, British vice-consul at Alexandretta, according to which it appears that a certain unrest exists among the commercial and other leading elements of the population as to the policy followed by the mandatory Power in that sanjak.

2. The policy, indeed, is negative, and it is held that, while France is concentrating all her efforts on the development of other parts of Syria, and more [illegible] Alexandretta. Work on small portions of roads and the erection of a few Government buildings appear very paltry in comparison with the projected railway line from Homs to Deir-ez Zor and the harbour works contemplated for Tripoli and Lattaquié. Accordingly, spirits refuse to be calmed by a mile or two of road repair, and various theories are put forward in explanation.

3. The surrendering of Payas to Turkey on the 3rd June, consequent on the signing of the frontier agreement, was viewed with disfavour and considered as perhaps the first of various Turkish encroachments in a district still largely populated by Turks. It is also thought possible that France has in some vague way committed herself to granting Turkey certain facilities with regard to Alexandretta, including, perhaps, the creation of a free zone. Although economically this would be of advantage to the town, it would, nevertheless, be considered as giving Turkey a foothold in part of her old dominion.

4. Another view is that France is nursing hidden schemes for the development of this district [illegible] France may have no policy at all and that she takes no interest in the development of this district.

5. I venture to submit these opinions for what they are worth. I fully concur with Mr Catoni in considering that there is no really sound basis for these views, but it must, nevertheless, be admitted that French policy in this district is strikingly negative in comparison with the energy shown in other quarters.

I have, &c.
GEOFFREY MEADE.

E 5018 1511/44] No 114.

Acting Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)

Sir, *Aleppo, August 29, 1930*

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 64 of the 24th August regarding the Kurdish rising, I have the honour to forward certain supplementary [illegible] Aleppo which may be true and possibly of interest. My informant is a notable Kurd, who is considered to be reliable and impartial.

2. It appears that there are three main Kurdish societies:—

(a) *Kurd Ta'ali*, in Northern Kurdistan, comprising the sons of Sheikh Said. They are said to be in close touch with the Bolsheviks.

(b) *Khayboun*, in Syria, whose head office is in Beirut, and who have enlisted the support of the Armenian National Society called Tashnaks.

(c) *Khalaskaran*, in Turkey and Persia, of which many leading Turks and Persians are said to be members.

3. It is only natural that all the developments of this rising should be followed with great interest by Kurds in Syria. The rebels, however, would not appear to have enlisted their complete sympathy, as the rising is held to be based on religious

rather than political motives, and the Syrian Kurd is waiting and hoping for the rallying cry of independence. Meanwhile, the French authorities are keeping watch to repress any movement, and although raids across the frontier are reported, it is probable that the chief activity in Syria is propaganda.

4. The Turkish Kurds near the Syrian frontier are reported to be only too willing to help [illegible] Turks have sent to Diarbekir to guard against any trouble in that quarter. Besides, these Kurds are not born fighters, and so they prefer secret activities, such as attempts to rouse feeling in Syria.

5. It further appears that the rebels are in close correspondence with the [illegible] necessity, as British help was not forthcoming. Kurds here believe, however, that the "Khalaskaran" Society is actively engaged in an attempt to enlist British support.

6. According to the latest reports, it is stated here that the 53rd [illegible]

7. I am sending copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul, to the acting British consul-general at Beirut, and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.
GEOFFREY MEADE.

E 5469 5469 89 No 115

Consul Monck-Mason to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Aleppo, October 2, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a Syrian decree relative to the formation of a new sanjak, the Jezireh Sanjak.

It will be noticed that the village of Hadivar, about which I wrote in my despatch No. 16, paragraph [illegible] of the 22nd January, 1930, is to become the capital of the caza of the Tigris.

According to my information, the first assistant delegate at Hassetche will be a military man.

I have, &c.
A. MONCK MASON

Enclosure in No 115.

Arrêté No. 2382

LE Président du Conseil des Ministres,
Vu l'arrêté 2980 du 5 décembre 1924 organisant l'État de Syrie,
Vu l'arrêté 1812 du 14 février 1921 portant sa nomination,
Vu l'arrêté 1814 du 15 février 1928 fixant ses attributions,
Vu la rétrocession des territoires faite par la République turque à l'État de Syrie [illegible] population, à créer un nouveau sandjak dans la région de Djézireh,
Sur la proposition du Ministre de l'Intérieur,

Arrête

Article 1er. Les Cazas de Kamechlyé et de Hassetché sont détachés du Sandjak [illegible]

Art. 2. Il est créé un Sandjak de Djézireh, avec Hassetché pour chef-lieu et [illegible] l'État de Syrie par la Turquie, entre les limites du Caza de Kamechlyé et le Tigre.

Art. 3. Les circonscriptions administratives du nouveau Sandjak du Djézireh sont les suivantes :

Les Nahies de Cheddadeh et Ras-el Ain rattachés directement au chef-lieu du sandjak ;

Le Caza de Kamechlyé comprenant les Nahiés de Karamnyé, Amouda et Bouerat ;

Le Caza du Tigre ayant pour chef-lieu Andiwar et comprenant Moustaphouna et Deroun Aghu.

Art. 4. Un arrêté ultérieur déterminera les limites des circonscriptions nouvellement créées à l'intérieur du Sandjak de Djézireh.

Art. 5. Les Ministres de l'État de Syrie sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

Damas, le 1er septembre 1930.

TAJEDDINE-EL-HASSANI.

Vu :
Le Ministre de l'Intérieur,
[illegible]

Vu sans objection :
Le Délégué du Haut-Commissaire,
A. Burdon

Vu et approuvé :
Beyrouth, le 9 septembre 1930
Le Secrétaire général par intérim,
H. Hoppenot

CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

[E 4032/51/93] No. 116

M. Cambon to Mr. Oliphant.—(Received July [illegible])

(Personnelle.)
Mon cher Oliphant,

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 27 juillet 1930.

JE vous envoie quelques précisions sur notre conversation de ce matin. Elles sont destinées à votre information personnelle.

Le conseil de l'Irak Petroleum Company, qui devait discuter jeudi prochain le tracé du "pipe line" des pétroles de Mossoul, se réunira probablement demain dans les conditions suivantes.

Ainsi que vous le savez, la société en question envoya une mission technique étudier sur place deux projets de "pipe lines." L'un aboutit à Tripoli et l'autre plus au sud. En plus, cette même société adressa à Beyrouth et à Jerusalem deux questionnaires relatifs aux conditions de l'exploitation [illegible]

La mission [illegible] Beyrouth répondit : [illegible] renseignements demandés. Entre-temps [illegible] à l'étude détaillée du tracé aboutissant à [illegible]

La question en était là lorsque [illegible] qu'au prochain conseil Sir John Cadman demanderait l'adoption [illegible]

[illegible] Il désirerait, pour des raisons [illegible] de Transjordanie. Ceci imposerait à la [illegible] pour la pose du tuyau que pour [illegible]

[illegible] les terrains [illegible] Massoul. Il [illegible] Massoul. La société abandonnerait par [illegible] de terrains et est [illegible] que pourrait susciter l'acte [illegible] des adjudicataires et une [illegible]

La [illegible] Cadman imposerait à la [illegible] du "pipe line" et une convention qui, loin de constituer une contre-partie, serait elle-même moins avantageuse que le régime actuel. Aussi, le groupe français est il opposé à ces deux [illegible]

En 1929—je crois que [illegible] ne saurait subir, [illegible] actuelles. C'est ce principe que [illegible] Sir John Cadman.

M. [illegible] abandonne les intérêts [illegible] de Mossoul [illegible] par rapport [illegible]

La question [illegible] l'Irak, mais avec la [illegible] M. [illegible] pas motivé.

M. [illegible] et éventuellement le Roi Feysal connaissent ces préoccupations avant le prochain conseil. Si une réunion a lieu demain le groupe français ne pourra, malheureusement, y assister. Au cas où la proposition de

Sir John Cadman serait maintenu, le groupe français ne pourrait s'y rallier et serait assuré, pour y faire opposition, du plein appui de son Gouvernement.

Veuillez excuser cette très longue lettre et croyez, mon cher Oliphant, que je vous suis bien reconnaissant de votre bon accueil.

Vôtre bien cordialement,
ROGER CAMBON.

E 4032/51/93] No. 117.

Memorandum communicated to the French Embassy on August 1, 1930.

THE representations which were made by M. Cambon, under instructions from the French [illegible] from Iraq to the Mediterranean, were duly communicated to Sir John Cadman, who has stated, in reply, that the intentions attributed to him are completely devoid of foundation, and that he can only consider the matter on its merits, without the intervention of either Government.

2. M. Cambon explained that the French Government desire to deal with His Majesty's Government direct over this question, and, further, suggested that it is for His Majesty's Government eventually to communicate the preoccupations of the French Government to King Feisal, no doubt with a view to inducing His Majesty and the Iraqi Government to modify their present attitude.

3. These suggestions are difficult to reconcile with the view taken by the French Government in the winter of 1928–29, when their whole complaint was against [illegible] Government on the question of the alignment of the proposed pipe-line. It will be remembered that the undertaking given by His Majesty's Government to the French Government, as a result of the negotiations which then took place, was primarily an undertaking that His Majesty's Government would not bring any political pressure to bear on the Iraqi Government with a view to influencing them in their attitude towards this question. This point was made clear in paragraph 3 of the memorandum communicated to M. Berthelot by Mr. Nevile Henderson on the 29th April, 1929, which ran as follows:—

> "It will be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government cannot oblige the Iraqi Government to extend the company's concession without such equivalent as that Government may think desirable in their own interest, and that His Majesty's Government can give no guarantee whatever as to the [illegible] revised draft. His Majesty's Government will, however, put no pressure on the Iraqi Government either to maintain or to withdraw the particular condition in regard to the survey of the Haifa route to which exception has been taken."

The French Government, indeed, recognised in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the memorandum enclosed in M. Berthelot's letter of the 31st May, 1929, to His Majesty's Ambassador that the question (in its then existing form) of the alignment of the pipe-line was one "relevant exclusivement de la compagnie et du Gouvernement irakien." Their main request was that His Majesty's Government should refrain from any intervention between the two parties concerned.

4. His Majesty's Government have loyally observed the undertaking which they [illegible] ment in any way in reaching their present decision in favour of a southern alignment. That decision has been taken by the Iraqi Government alone, and is supported by arguments altogether different from those indicated by M. Cambon. His Majesty's Government are, however, equally determined not to bring pressure to bear on the Iraqi Government in order to induce them to abandon their objections to the northern route, and regard the undertaking which they gave to the French Government in 1929 as equally precluding them from bringing pressure to bear on King Feisal in favour of the adoption of a Syrian alignment.

5. The possibility of any intervention by His Majesty's Government in either direction being thus precluded, His Majesty's Government are surprised to learn of the intention of the French Government to give their full support to the French group within the Iraq Petroleum Company in resisting the demands of the Iraqi Government. The promise of such political support to a group which [illegible] Government, and so strongly resented, and is therefore, on the thesis of the French Government themselves, inadmissible.

Foreign Office, August 1, 1930.

[E 4418/51/93] No. 116.

Peral Bey to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 13.)

Ambassade de la République turque,
Londres, le 14 août 1930.

[illegible] Excellence n'ignore certainement pas que les dispositions de la [illegible] du Traité d'Ankara, signé le 5 juin 1926 par la Turquie [illegible] et trois autre part, n'ont au jusqu'à présent aucun commencement d'exécution, le Gouvernement de l'Irak n'ayant pas imposé à la Turkish Petroleum Company l'application du contrat de concession du 14 mars 1925, qui est la base fondamentale de l'article 14 du traité susmentionné.

D'autre part, le Gouvernement turc vient d'être informé que le Gouvernement irakien poursuit actuellement des négociations avec la Turkish Petroleum Company [illegible] le dessein de modifier ou d'abroger le contrat de concession du 14 mars 1925.

Ces deux faits venant de créer une situation entièrement nouvelle, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les considérations suivantes:

1. Le Gouvernement de l'Irak ayant assumé, d'après l'article 14 du traité [illegible] l'obligation "de payer au Gouvernement [illegible] vingt-cinq ans à partir de l'entrée en vigueur du traité, 10 pour cent sur toutes les redevances qui lui reviendront:

(a) De la Turkish Petroleum Company en vertu de l'article [illegible]

(b) Des compagnies ou personnes qui pourront exploiter [illegible] terres [illegible] de la concession susindiquée;

(c) Des compagnies subsidiaires qui pourraient être constituées en vertu des termes de l'article 33 de la concession susindiquée."

Il résulte de ce qui précède que les quotes-parts destinées au Gouvernement turc constituent, au point de vue juridique, une compensation et une indemnité pécuniaires redevables par l'État de l'Irak.

C'est avec la certitude d'une réelle et loyale application [illegible] la Turkish Petroleum Company [illegible] ainsi que l'exploitation immédiate des mines pétrolifères de Mossoul par les [illegible] Gouvernement turc accepta et signa le traité turco-anglo-irakien du 5 juin 1926.

C'est cette certitude en outre qui détermina le Gouvernement turc à limiter à vingt-cinq ans à partir de l'entrée en vigueur du traité [illegible] Mossoul.

[illegible] la [illegible] que [illegible] de toute responsabilité résultant de la non-exécution de l'article 14 du traité du 5 juin 1926, que ce manquement soit imputable à la carence de la Turkish Petroleum Company [illegible] que les [illegible] entreprit l'exploitation effective des mines auront commencé à payer les versements prévus par le traité.

Il est bien évident que la non-application du contrat de concession pendant une [illegible] indéterminée et qui aurait pour conséquence l'aliénation totale ou partielle des [illegible] non seulement à l'encontre des buts poursuivis par les signataires, mais encore constituerait une négation manifeste du droit établi.

[illegible] Company est une partie intégrante du traité turco-anglo-irakien du 5 juin 1926, et forme, par conséquent, un engagement contractuel international. Toutes modifications [illegible] point de vue au sujet de l'abrogation, de la modification ou du renouvellement éventuels du contrat de concession du 14 mars 1925.

[illegible]

J'aime à espérer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, reconnaissant la [illegible] et saisie, &c.

FERIT

E 4401/51/93 No. 119

Foreign Office to Colonial Office

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1930

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of the 7th August enclosing a copy [illegible] to the proposed pipe-line from Iraq to the Mediterranean, I am directed by Mr [illegible] the French Ambassador on the 14th August.

2. [illegible] not be treated as an official reply to the Foreign Office memorandum of the 1st August, but as a verbal explanation.

3. [illegible] Treasury, Admiralty, Air Ministry and Petroleum Department.

I am, &c.
MONTEAGLE

Enclosure in No. 119

Memorandum communicated by French Ambassador on August 14

Mr OLIFIANT a bien voulu remettre, le 1er août, à M. Roger Cambon un aide-mémoire exposant le point de vue du Gouvernement britannique sur la question du tracé du pipe-line qui doit être construit vers la Méditerranée.

[illegible] par M. Cambon après le Mr Oliphant [illegible] Sir John Cadman [illegible] pression politique sur l'Irak Petroleum Company, le Foreign Office estime difficile [illegible] l'Irak [illegible] la position prise [illegible] Irak Petroleum Company [illegible] intérêts [illegible]

Les conclusions du mémorandum britannique reposent en réalité sur une confusion, qu'il est nécessaire et d'ailleurs aisé de préciser.

L'intervention, au cours de l'hiver 1928–29, du Gouvernement français se justifiait par la situation suivante : l'Irak Petroleum Company négociait avec le Gouvernement de l'Irak une prolongation du délai fixé par l'acte de concession de 1925, délai dans lequel elle devait choisir les 24 lots qui lui sont réservés. Le Gouvernement de l'Irak avait alors suggéré, comme contrepartie à cette modification du contrat, l'étude et éventuellement le financement d'un chemin de fer en direction de la Méditerranée.

Prenant sur lui de modifier la proposition faite à ce sujet par le Conseil de l'Irak Petroleum Company [illegible] du tracé d'un chemin de fer sur Caïffa, et il avait écrit à l'un des représentants du groupe français que cette offre avait pour objet d'assurer à la compagnie "le plein appui de la Puissance mandataire."

Le Gouvernement français avait dû s'élever contre cette initiative d'ordre politique et il avait fait observer que "toute action exercée sur la Turkish Petroleum Company soit par la Puissance mandataire de l'Irak, soit par le Gouvernement irakien, tenu, en l'occurrence, de prendre conseil de la Puissance mandataire et ayant pour effet de grever d'une charge politique les exploitations de cette compagnie, constitue un manquement aux accords de San Remo." Il avait insisté auprès du Gouvernement [illegible] 20 janvier 1929, pour que "la compagnie fût clairement informée de l'entière latitude qui lui était laissée à ce sujet et conservât à l'avenir la complète liberté de gérer ses intérêts en ne s'inspirant que de considérations purement économiques dans le cadre des accords internationaux."

Dans sa réponse en date du 29 avril 1929, Sir Austen Chamberlain s'est déclaré d'accord pour qu'aucune pression susceptible de nuire aux intérêts de la compagnie ne fût exercée tant sur celle-ci que sur l'Irak. Il indiquait toutefois, comme l'[illegible] rappelle la note anglaise du 1er août 1929 [illegible] à compagnie sans recevoir en échange [illegible] pourrait la trouver désirable dans son propre intérêt.

Le Gouvernement fran[illegible] Sir Austen [illegible] faction de cette assurance ainsi [illegible] du 1er juin 1929.

Il ne renonce [illegible] ministère des Affaires étrangères [illegible] 1929 que "les charges [illegible] politique.

Le Gouvernement français tient toujours pour convenu que la question du "pipe-line" doit être exclusivement traitée sur le terrain économique. Pour cette raison même, sans prétendre aucunement s'immiscer dans les tractations de la compagnie, il entend s'élever contre toute pression politique, quelle qu'en soit l'origine. Ce serait jouer sur les mots que de soutenir qu'à veiller ainsi à ce que la compagnie conserve la libre gestion de ses intérêts, il exerce une action politique inconciliable avec sa propre thèse.

Or, l'intervention du Gouvernement irakien auprès de la société en vue de l'amener à adopter pour le "pipe-line" le tracé sur Caïffa a manifestement le [illegible] expliquent sans doute ses préférences, mais aucun ne répond aux intérêts propres de la compagnie. On ne s'en étonnera pas si l'on sait que, suivant les conclusions mêmes de la mission que l'Irak Petroleum Company a envoyée sur place pour comparer les deux itinéraires, le tracé nord est à tous égards plus avantageux pour elle, parce que plus court, plus économique et [illegible] de dollars, et les frais d'entretien devant être de 20 pour cent au moins inférieurs à ceux du tracé sud.

Le Gouvernement de l'Irak de la question du pipe-line à cette de la revision [illegible] de la convention de 1925. [illegible] régit la concession de la société. A la [illegible] du Département des Affaires étrangères l'économie de ce projet de revision consisterait à accorder la pleine jouissance d'un certain permettre à la compagnie qui a abandonné ses droits sur le reste des vilayets. Or l'acte de concession de 1925 stipule [illegible] 24 ans et à accepter la taxe aux enchères des taxes sur les [illegible] de sauvegarder l'acquisition gratuite de ces terres [illegible] du gouvernement [illegible] des [illegible] [illegible] pas [illegible] contrat [illegible] a été [illegible] approuvé par [illegible] a été porté à la connaissance de la Commission des Mandats de la Société des Nations. [illegible] une modification [illegible] se mettre à l'abri des critiques qui pourraient [illegible] l'absolutisme des droits que lui reconnaît l'acte de 1925, consentant à [illegible] l'Irak [illegible] bénéfice des nouvelles [illegible] et d'une intensification de la production.

Si le Département des Affaires étrangères a cru devoir rappeler le détail et les [illegible] c'est [illegible] ressort exclusif de la compétence [illegible] Irak et [illegible] de celle-ci qu'elle se prononce pour le [illegible] national [illegible] Mais [illegible] regard des Etats à supplanter la compagnie n'a pas [illegible] possible, sur le tracé à accepter.

A la suite de cette [illegible] de 1925 pour sortir des [illegible] aussi [illegible] intérêts [illegible] plus que [illegible] dans le contrat de concession [illegible] soumettre [illegible] au Gouvernement [illegible] Mais [illegible] ne peut envisager sans appréhension la possession exercée par le Gouvernement [illegible] le territoire duquel elle est appelée à exploiter [illegible] Anglo-Persian [illegible] Sir John Cadman [illegible] par le Gouvernement [illegible] sur la [illegible] qui a pris en 1920 marqué déjà ses propres [illegible] pour l'Irak.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement français avait jugé nécessaire d'avertir M. [illegible] exposer [illegible] Haut Commissaire [illegible] Cadman et éventuellement de [illegible]

La [illegible] part des [illegible] du Gouvernement [illegible] Irak Petroleum Company [illegible] de [illegible] et dans son [illegible] du 1er août il a fait [illegible] que le Gouvernement [illegible] de ne pas intervenir [illegible] de [illegible]

Le Département des Affaires étrangères [illegible] argument [illegible] pour [illegible] Les deux [illegible] pour [illegible] pas [illegible] de l'Irak, mais, selon les propres termes de Sir Austen Chamberlain [illegible] pour des raisons politiques [illegible] Le Gouvernement français [illegible] Gouvernement de Sa Majesté [illegible] l'Irak libre de s'y soustraire. Les articles 4 et 10 du traité du 10 août 1920 [illegible] entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irak font une [illegible] Gouvernement [illegible] par la Grande-Bretagne et le [illegible] Conseil de la Société des Nations du 27 septembre 1925 [illegible] Gouvernement [illegible] à l'égard de tous [illegible] Société des Nations [illegible] et les dispositions du présent traité [illegible] le [illegible] par l'Irak, des dispositions dudit traité d'alliance."

Le Gouvernement français [illegible] les droits qu'il possède sur les pétroles de Mésopotamie. Les accords de San Remo [illegible] ne sont pas liés juridiquement à la rétrocession de Mossoul octroyée par la France à l'Angleterre, mais ils s'y rattachent par un lien moral. Ils ont assuré à la France 25 pour cent des pétroles de Mésopotamie libres de toute charge autre que celles qui sont [illegible] à leur exploitation.

[illegible] la part française [illegible] de se réduire. Elle s'est [illegible] avec la conférence de 1925 aux trois vilayets de Bassora et de Mossoul. Elle a été ensuite ramenée à 23·75 pour cent par suite de l'entrée dans la Turkish Petroleum Company de groupes [illegible] Le Gouvernement français [illegible] les raisons qui ont motivé ces modifications [illegible] Mais il estime que la Grande-Bretagne, signataire des accords de San Remo, ne doit pas permettre que

même indirectement et par des voies latérales, la part française soit touchée de nouveau par l'aggravation, pour des motifs politiques, des charges qui pèsent sur la compagnie.

Le Gouvernement de la République ne réclame nullement, comme paraît le croire le Foreign Office, dans sa note du 1er août courant, que le Gouvernement britannique fasse pression auprès du Roi Feysal en faveur du tracé syrien. Il demande seulement, et il s'estime en droit d'obtenir, que le Roi de l'Irak observe sur cette question la neutralité [illegible] entre les Gouvernements [illegible] et mandataire sur le terrain économique où ses intérêts essentiels se [illegible] d'une part avec ceux de la France puisque les deux pays ont le même désir de later l'exploitation des pétroles de Mésopotamie.

Paris, le 9 août 1930.

E 4396/1192/93] No. 120.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 416.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 15, 1930.

IT will be within your recollection that among the assurances given in November 1914 to the Sheikh of Mohammerah by the British resident in the Persian Gulf on behalf of His Majesty's Government was one by which the date gardens then in the sheikh's possession on the Turkish side of the Shatt-el-Arab should remain in full possession of him and his heirs, and be immune from taxation.

2. Protracted discussions, covering a period of some years, have taken place with the Iraqi Government concerning this immunity from taxation promised by His Majesty's Government in 1914 to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and the similar assurances given at the same time to the Sheikh of Koweit. It has proved impossible, despite the strongest pressure, to induce the Iraqi Government to recognise these promises as obligations which [illegible] them and after full consultation with the High Commissioner for Iraq (who is now in London), the Government of India and the political resident in the Persian Gulf His Majesty's Government have decided to authorise the Iraqi Government to negotiate direct with the sheikhs, while at the same time reserving their decision as to the action to be taken should direct negotiations break down.

3. In these circumstances, I shall be glad if you will forthwith approach the Sheikh of Mohammerah in the following sense. You should inform him that the Iraqi Government proposes to negotiate with him [illegible] for a direct settlement of the question of the immunity from taxation promised on the behalf of [illegible] in 1914. The settlement which the Iraqi Government have in view would take the form of the purchase of the date gardens [illegible] rights and [illegible] by them. The sheikh should be informed that [illegible] free to accept or not as he may think fit the offer made to him by the Iraqi Government. His Majesty's Government consider that the offer [illegible] the sheikh should be well advised to accept it, especially as the sale of his properties in Iraq would not only prevent his [illegible] but would also [illegible] the difficulties which would seem bound to arise sooner or later [illegible] the Iraqi Government [illegible] the accident of British control. The [illegible] the Iraqi Government are prepared to be free from British control after 1932.

4. It is probable that the sheikh will then enquire what is the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to the undertaking given to him on their behalf in 1914. In reply he may be informed that that undertaking is regarded by His Majesty's Government as a valid and binding [illegible] but that, in their view, this obligation has now devolved upon the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government however do not accept this view, but rather than come into open conflict on the point with His Majesty's Government are prepared without prejudice to the question of principle involved to attempt to reach a settlement of the issue on the basis of a reasonable composition, and in all the circumstances His Majesty's Government consider that this method will offer the most hopeful prospect of settling the matter in the best interests of all concerned.

5. If the sheikh should then ask what would happen if he is unable to settle with Iraq as regards the purchase price of his properties, and his direct negotiations

with the Iraqi Government should therefore break down, he should be informed that the matter would then fall to be dealt with between His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government. His Majesty's Government would do their utmost to obtain the formal acceptance of this obligation by Iraq. If their efforts were successful, and the Iraqi Government were forced to accept the obligation as devolving upon themselves, it seems almost certain that they would wish to compound their liability to the sheikh in very much the same manner as is now proposed. It seems doubtful whether, in such an event, the sheikh would obtain terms any more generous than those which are likely to be offered to him now, since the atmosphere in which the negotiations would [illegible] less favourable than it is now, when the Iraqi Government are anxious to please His Majesty's Government by disposing of a question at issue between the two Governments.

6. If, in the course of direct negotiations between the sheikh and the Iraqi Government, the sheikh should seek your advice in regard to any specific offer put forward by Iraq, [illegible] offer [illegible] himself best able to judge whether the terms offered by Iraq are or are not acceptable, and that you are unable to advise on this point. You should, however, without informing the sheikh that you were doing so, acquaint me with the terms of the Iraqi Government's offer, as disclosed to you by the sheikh. If that offer then appears to His Majesty's Government as wholly unreasonable, it would be for consideration whether the High Commissioner for Iraq should not be instructed to intervene [illegible] terms, but no hint of the possibility of such intervention should, of course, be conveyed to the sheikh.

7. A similar communication is being made to the Sheikh of Koweit through the political resident at Bushire and the political agent at Koweit.

I am, &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON.

E 4502/1193/93] No. 121.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 393.)

Sir, *Gulhek, August 12, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Sheikh Khazal Khan, in a recent conversation with the oriental secretary to this Legation, mentioned that he had heard from his agent in Basra that the Iraq Government had decided to collect in future the usual taxes from his date groves in the Basra district. This, the sheikh [illegible] the war, in virtue of which his date groves were exempted from all taxes as a reward for the services which the sheikh had rendered.

2. I have noticed in the news diaries from Bagdad that this question has in the past occupied the attention of the Iraq Cabinet, and that certain proposals in connexion therewith had been discussed, but I am unaware that any definite decision has been taken. In any case, the sheikh evidently expects the terms of the document given to him to be implemented, whatever the future status of Iraq may be, and looks to His Majesty's Government to see that the promises made to him by the then High Commissioner will continue to be carried out.

3. I beg that I may be informed in due course what reply I am to give to the sheikh. I should be glad to allay his fears, as the rent of his properties at Basra, [illegible] dependents in Iraq, is all that he has to live on at present, and he is naturally anxious to avoid any reduction in these revenues at this stage.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

E 4489/41/93] No. 122.

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Sir, *Foreign Office, [illegible] 19, 1930.*

WITH reference to [illegible] letter of the 4th November, 1929, relative to [illegible] Iraq for admission to membership of the League of Nations, I have [illegible]

Mr. Secretary-General, [illegible] that His Majesty's Government have to express their [illegible] between His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government after the admission of Iraq to membership of the League.

2. [illegible] 30th June, 1922, [illegible] Treaty of Alliance, [illegible] to the treaty [illegible]*

3. I am to state that the Secretary of State will be grateful if you will be so good as to communicate copies of this document to the members of the Council of the League.

I am, &c.
MONTEAGLE.

E 4418/51/93] No. 123.

Mr. A. Henderson to Ahmet Feret Bey.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, August 28, 1930.*

I HAVE [illegible] 11th August, [illegible] expressed uneasiness as to the effect which might result, from the [illegible] for the modification of certain provisions in the Convention of 1925 as [illegible] the share of royalties which the Turkish Government [illegible]

2. I take leave to assure your Excellency that these negotiations [illegible] certain [illegible] would have the effect either of retarding the payment of royalties or of diminishing their amount.

3. In your Excellency's note it is stated that article 14 of the Treaty of Angora [illegible] the Convention of 1925 would be fully and loyally applied, and the oil-bearing [illegible] of Mosul would be immediately exploited.

4. His Majesty's Government are advised that there has been [illegible] in the execution of the Convention of 1925. At the date of the [illegible] the existence of oil [illegible] such provisions were to meet in the event that [illegible] necessary to ensure that prompt steps would be taken to exploit the [illegible] was recognized that a period of several years must elapse before [illegible] the oil fields with the coast, must be constructed. The company could not be expected to embark

* Cmd. 3627.

[illegible]

I have, &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON

E 4076/1932/93] No. 124

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 536.)

Constantinople, September 4, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report that General Nuri Pasha, Prime Minister of Iraq, passed through Turkey this week on his return to Bagdad. [illegible] from there, and he had to leave for Bagdad before I could get back to Constantinople, but a member of my staff found him very pleased with his reception.

2. Nuri Pasha said that three main questions had been discussed:—

(1) *Oil fields.*—Nuri Pasha had said that he had seen the Turkish note [illegible] that it was quite unconvincing. He pointed out that Iraq's interest in the exploitation of the oilfields was nine times as great as the Turkish one, and that real efforts were being made to develop the oilfields as soon as possible. He knew that the question was still under consideration [illegible] the pipe-line, realising as they did that the French were pushing the northern, just as the British desired the southern.

(2) *Frontier.*—The Turks had told him that they had been entirely satisfied [illegible] Kurdish policy and general attitude on frontier questions since 1926. Nuri Pasha pointed out that [illegible] Government desired was trouble on the frontier, and gave quite definite assurances that no Kurdish intrigues would be encouraged. The Turks having referred to the Barzan incident, Nuri Pasha pointed out that the Iraq Government had themselves decided to deal this year with the Sheikh of Barzan. [illegible] sheikh had received arms and supplies, if not from the Turkish Government, then from Turkish sources independent thereof. He, Nuri Pasha, was only too anxious to put an end to the intrigues of the sheikh and had contemplated approaching the Turkish Government with a view to [illegible] dealt with the sheikh on the other. It was now too late for action to be taken this year but if the trouble continued, he would probably make proposals to the Turkish Government in this sense next spring.

(3) *Commercial Treaty.*—The Turks were anxious to complete this as soon as possible. Nuri Pasha said that [illegible] would probably be reached, as regards the judicial convention, in the next month. The Turks had now proposed to him that the commercial treaty should also include residence [illegible] He had replied that he was not competent to discuss this, but that they might make the proposal through the usual channels.

Nuri Pasha had asked the Turks what they thought of the new treaty. The reply was that the Labour Government had done two of the best things that had been done by the British Government since the war—the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty and of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty. The Turks were delighted about the latter, but efforts had been made by the French to make them critical. They told Nuri Pasha that the French had suggested that the Turkish press should criticise the treaty in the direction of showing that, for practical purposes, it would include Iraq in the British Empire. The Turks had replied that they could not dream of doing this, because they considered the treaty to be an excellent thing, not only for Turkey, but for Iraq, and Tevfik Rüştü Bey indicated that, at a suitable moment, he would have articles inserted in the Turkish press in a sense favourable to the treaty. Nuri Pasha much appreciated this indication, for a favourable attitude towards the treaty would be very valuable to him in Bagdad.

The Turks had asked Nuri Pasha about Great Britain's attitude towards Turkey. They realised that Britain was coldly friendly towards Turkey, but thought this did not get them very far. Nuri Pasha pointed out that it would, perhaps, be best for the Turks themselves to show real signs of friendship, for the British were not of a nature to curry favour. He gathered the impression that the Turks were still pretty well tied up with Russia.

[illegible] conversation Nuri Pasha had also referred to the Lawrence reports and pointed out what absurd rubbish they were. He had himself seen and talked with Colonel Lawrence in London, and the latter had [illegible] beginning, had emanated from French sources in the same way as the first reports of Lawrence intrigues in Afghanistan had done eighteen months ago. The Turks had a very definite impression that France was doing her utmost to prevent any further development of friendly relations between Turkey and Great Britain and Iraq.

4. When I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday he at once expressed his gratification at Nuri Pasha's visit and said that he was quite satisfied as regards the frontier and the Iraqi attitude towards the Kurds.

5. With respect to the oil question, his Excellency was clearly much perturbed at the thought that the delay in exploiting the oil diminishes by so much the twenty-five years during which Turkey [illegible] Treaty [illegible] start from the coming into force of the treaty, but Tevfik Rüştü certainly expected exploitation to begin within a year or two [illegible] of reading in your despatch No. 536 of the 1st instant the very complete reply returned to Ferit Bey and I hope that it will soothe Tevfik Rüştü's fears, for I need not dwell on the political disadvantage to our relations with Turkey of our seeming to encourage Iraq in anything which the Turks will be all too ready to interpret as a deliberate intention to put off as long as possible the day [illegible] payments to Turkey must start. The fact that, if the positions were reversed, this is just what the Turks would do themselves will not affect the Turkish point of view.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

P.S.—I have sent a copy of this despatch to the acting High Commissioner at Bagdad.

G. R. C.

E 4401/51/93] No 125.

Memorandum communicated to the French Embassy on September 19, 1930

ON the 14th August the French Ambassador was so good as to communicate to the Foreign Office a memorandum setting forth the views of the French Government [illegible] it reveal so complete a misapprehension of the facts of the situation, as to call for a detailed reply.

2. It appears from the final paragraph of M. de Fleuriau's memorandum that [illegible] grant to the Iraq Petroleum Company of a new concession, to replace the convention of the 14th March 1925 [illegible] Government are under an obligation to take this action, in view of the undertakings which they have [illegible] with the French Government.

[illegible] the whole case stated in his Excellency's [illegible] economic principles and independently of all political considerations. It is also [illegible] either on the Iraqi Government or on the Iraqi Petroleum Company in favour of either alignment for the pipe-line. His Majesty's Government, however, have never [illegible] Government as entirely free to express their preferences in this matter, and as fully entitled to impose whatever conditions they may think desirable in their own interests in return for the grant to the company of a revision of their concession—a revision [illegible] bring pressure to bear on the Iraqi Government to adopt an attitude of neutrality, His Majesty's Government have repeatedly and categorically stated that they are not prepared to take any such action.

4. [illegible] to M. de Fleuriau's note of the 28th December 1928. [illegible] in that note that the French Government held the view that, under the San Remo Agreement the claim of Iraq to fall to France [illegible] "free of all burdens other than those connected with its exploitation," and that "in consequence, any [illegible] Government [illegible] exploitation of the pipe-line would constitute a violation of the San Remo Agreement. So far, however, as the Iraqi Government was concerned, this view was never accepted by His Majesty's Government and on the contrary it was explained in detail in paragraph 5 of Sir A. Chamberlain's note of the 12th January, 1929, to his Excellency that "His Majesty's Government cannot [illegible] San Remo Agreement imposed by them any obligation whatever to resist the requirements of the Iraqi Government."

5. Notwithstanding this explanation the French Government in their memorandum of the 23rd January, 1929, reverted to their original contention and stated that, "from the general point of view, whether the action of the British Government or that of the Iraqi Government were in question, the French

Government could only maintain, in the most formal manner, the protest which it had made against an action, the effect of which would be to impose a political charge on the exploitation of the Turkish Petroleum Company in violation of the San Remo Agreement. This statement was answered in paragraphs 3 and 5 of Mr. Nevile Henderson's memorandum of the 29th April, 1929, in paragraph 3 of which it was again explained that His Majesty's Government could not oblige the Iraqi Government to extend the company's concession (and, *a fortiori*, to agree to its revision) without such equivalent as that Government might think desirable in their own interest, that His Majesty's Government could give no guarantee whatever as to the attitude of the Iraqi Government, but that they would put no pressure on the Iraqi Government either to maintain or to withdraw the particular condition in regard to the survey of the Haifa route, to which the French Government had taken exception. It was further explained that Sir A. Chamberlain did not understand that the French Government considered that the San Remo Agreement, either in the spirit or the letter, necessitated the construction of a pipe-line and trans-desert railway (if built) to a Syrian port, more especially as such a contention would, in Sir A. Chamberlain's opinion, be contrary to the clear stipulations of the agreement, which only provides that [illegible] participation of the French Government in certain oil supplies, that Government should give facilities, if desired, for the construction of railways and pipe-lines through French spheres of influence to the Mediterranean. Mr. Nevile Henderson's memorandum concluded as follows: "All that Sir Austen Chamberlain understands the French Government to contest is the placing upon the company for political reasons, of an obligation to incur an unwarrantable and unnecessary expense. He feels sure that the French Government will agree that this possibility is finally discounted by the explanations given above." These remarks are quoted in paragraph 18 of M. de Fleuriau's memorandum and an interpretation is placed on them therein which His Majesty's Government cannot admit. His Excellency's memorandum appears to contend that, in the above passage Sir Austen Chamberlain agreed that no obligation based on political reasons should be imposed on the company to incur any unnecessary or unwarrantable expense, and that he gave an undertaking to the French Government to this effect—an undertaking which covered the action of the Iraqi Government.

6. This interpretation is erroneous, for the following reasons. In the first place the passage [illegible] what Sir Austen Chamberlain conceived the position taken up by the French Government to be. It is nowhere stated or implied that Sir Austen Chamberlain was in agreement with that position. Secondly, it is impossible to interpret it as constituting an undertaking by His Majesty's Government to take steps to prevent any obligation being imposed on the company by the Iraqi Government, since any such interpretation would be in direct conflict with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the memorandum already referred to, where it was clearly stated that His Majesty's Government considered the Iraqi Government entitled to demand such conditions as they thought fit, that His Majesty's Government could give no guarantee as to the attitude of the Iraqi Government, and would put no pressure on that Government in favour of either of the alternatives then under discussion. The passage in question merely set out what was thought to be the view of the French Government, and indicated that the situation which then existed in no way conflicted with it.

7. It will be clear to the French Government from the foregoing explanation that His Majesty's Government have never agreed that the Iraqi Government are under any obligation to adopt a neutral attitude in this matter, but have, on the contrary, consistently maintained their decision to leave that Government complete freedom to deal with the question of the revision of the Iraq Petroleum Company's convention on whatever lines the Iraqi Government might consider desirable. In these circumstances the French Government's contention that His Majesty's Government are under an obligation to bring pressure to bear on the Iraqi Government to withdraw their condition regarding the southern alignment rests on no foundation of fact, while compliance with the French Government's present request, so far from being consistent with a policy agreed between the French Government and His Majesty's Government, would involve a complete reversal on the part of His Majesty's Government of the policy which they have consistently maintained.

8. Apart from this main misconception as to the undertakings and obligations of His Majesty's Government, on which the whole argument in his Excellency's memorandum is made to depend, there are certain other points in that memorandum on which comment appears desirable.

9. While His Majesty's Government do not dissent from the view expressed [illegible] of the oil of Iraq would be to the economic advantage both of France and of Iraq itself, it does not follow from this that the economic interests of Iraq and of France are necessarily identical as regards the choice of the alignment for the pipe-line. Iraq has, indeed, strong economic reasons for preferring the southern alignment, and, as was indicated in paragraph 4 of the Foreign Office memorandum of the 1st August, the Iraqi Government's decision in this matter is supported by arguments altogether different from those suggested in M. Cambon's letter of the 27th July and of a far more cogent nature.

10. Again, His Majesty's Government cannot accept the statement in his Excellency's memorandum to the effect that the adoption of the southern alignment would be, so far as the Iraq Petroleum Company is concerned, an unjustified or [illegible] since the matter is clearly one for the company itself to decide. His Majesty's Government have, indeed, no doubt that the board of the Iraq Petroleum Company are well able to protect their interests in this matter without external assistance or intervention, and to decide what kind of new agreement between the company and the Iraqi Government is in the company's own best interests.

11. Lastly, His Majesty's Government cannot accept the view set forth in paragraph 13 of the memorandum, that the Iraq Petroleum Company in the negotiations now proceeding for a revision of its concession is not in the position of the suppliant party in seeking a modification of the *status quo*. The position as regards the negotiations between the company and the Iraqi Government is as follows: As stated in paragraphs 13 and 15 of his Excellency's memorandum, the Iraq Petroleum Company is already in possession of a valid contract with the Iraqi Government—*i.e.*, the Convention of 1925—on which it is entitled to rely. As was [illegible] the 28th November, 1928, to the French Ambassador, it was on the initiative and to fulfil the wishes of the company itself that negotiations were opened with the Iraqi Government, after the conclusion of the 1925 Convention, for the extension of the period [illegible] twenty-four plots. These negotiations were subsequently extended with a view to secure a revision of the entire convention, the primary object being to agree on terms [illegible] conditions secured to it by the 1925 Convention, there would have been no object in its subsequent negotiations with the Iraqi Government—negotiations in which the company has aimed at securing economic advantages of a substantial nature, and not merely at protecting itself against possible criticisms as to the exclusive character of the rights secured to it by the Convention of 1925. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government cannot accept the view set forth in paragraph 13 of his Excellency's memorandum, that the company, in the subsequent negotiations for a revision of its convention, is not in the position of being the "demanderesse."

12. It is indeed clear that the company is fully entitled to ask for a revision on more favourable conditions, of its existing convention with the Iraqi Government. But as was explained in Sir A. Chamberlain's notes of the 28th November, 1928, and of the 12th January, 1929, to his Excellency, His Majesty's Government consider that the Iraqi Government are equally justified in endeavouring to obtain an adequate *quid pro quo* in return for the additional advantages which the company now desires, and in only agreeing to grant such additional advantages on their own terms.

13. [illegible] it will be apparent that His Majesty's Government have neither modified their policy nor in any way failed to observe the undertakings which they have, on various occasions, given to the French Government in this matter, and to which the French Government have now appealed.

Foreign Office, September 18, 1930.

E 5217/4259/93] No. 126.

Mr. Osborne to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 714.)

Rome, September [illegible]

[illegible] September, I have the honour to report that the King of Iraq arrived in this country on the 22nd September and proceeded at once to San Rossore, where he was received by the King of Italy. After luncheon at San Rossore His Majesty travelled to Leghorn, where he inspected the [illegible] the same evening he left by train for Rome, where he arrived at 11·50 p.m. A special saloon coach had been provided for his use, and he was accompanied on the journey by the head of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. [illegible] Under-Secretary of the Presidency of the Council, the Prefect of Rome and Signor Grandi's "chef de cabinet." In accordance with your instructions, His Majesty's Embassy was represented at the station by a senior member of the staff.

2. On the following morning I had an interview of half an hour with His Majesty, who evinced great interest in conditions in Italy and in particular in the Government schemes for agricultural development. I placed myself at His Majesty's disposal, but he replied that he anticipated that the programme arranged for him by the Italian Government, whose guest he was, would prevent him from taking advantage [illegible] Signor Grandi at his hotel, and in the afternoon he paid a visit to Signor Mussolini [illegible]

[illegible] Naples in time to [illegible] I instructed His [illegible] present on the quay at His Majesty's [illegible] departure I received a telegram from the Acting High [illegible] to place an aeroplane at His Majesty's disposal for [illegible]

4. The royal visit has aroused no great interest here. Little publicity was given [illegible] to have made any statement beyond the usual complimentary remarks [illegible]

I have, &c.
D. G. OSBORNE.

Enclosure in No. 126.

Mr. Osborne to Acting High Commissioner, Bagdad.

[illegible] September [illegible]

[illegible] King of Iraq, accompanied by two of his staff, would be pleased to continue journey by aeroplane, starting from Aboukir on morning of 30th September, and staying one night at Amman.

His Majesty leaves Naples on afternoon of 26th September [illegible] and arrives Alexandria on 29th September, where he proposes to stop the night.

(Repeated to Alexandria.)

[E 5363/41/93] No. 127

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Foreign Office, October 8, 1930

Sir,

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Henderson to invite a reference to Foreign Office letter of the 15th August, enclosing copies of the new Treaty of Alliance and Amity between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq. It will have been observed that under the second exchange of notes attached to that treaty it was agreed that all outstanding financial questions, such as those relating to the Iraq railways and the Port of Basra, and those which it was necessary to settle for the purpose of the operation of the treaty and of its annexure, should form the subject of a separate agreement which should be concluded as soon as possible and which should be deemed an integral part of the treaty and should be ratified simultaneously therewith.

[illegible] agreement has now been concluded in the form of a further exchange of notes between His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and the Iraqi Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated London, the 19th August, 1930, copies of which are enclosed herein.

I am to state that the Secretary of State will be grateful if you will be so good as to communicate copies of this document to the members of the Council of the League.

I am, &c.
G. W. RENDEL.

E 5509/1932/93] No. 128

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 13.)

No. 387.)

Constantinople, October 8, 1930

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Francis Humphrys, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, arrived here on his way to Bagdad on the 4th instant and left for his post this afternoon.

2. Sir Francis Humphrys and I went to Angora on the 5th October for two days, during which time he had interviews with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry; and this morning before leaving he also had an interview here with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who returned from Russia yesterday and leaves for Angora to-night.

3. The High Commissioner will no doubt report in due course to the Colonial Office the substance of these interviews and it is unnecessary for me to describe them at any length. But I may be allowed to put on record the excellent impression which Sir Francis Humphrys made upon the authorities as well as my feeling that the visit has established a valuable personal contact, that it came at a most opportune moment, and that it will be of great use to the High Commissioner when discussing with the Iraq Government the policy of that country towards Turkey.

4. The reception of the High Commissioner by the authorities at Angora left nothing to be desired. Both at the luncheon given by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and at the return luncheon given by me, at which the Prime Minister, contrary to his almost invariable habit, was present, and at the audience with the Gazi, the atmosphere was one of sincere friendship and cordiality. The Gazi was at his best and kept us for nearly two and a half hours discussing the autochthonic races of India and Mesopotamia, giving, with great frankness, his opinion of ex-King Amanullah, and telling us confidential stories of his relations with Enver Pasha during the last phase of Enver's career.

5. In the more official interviews with other Turkish authorities the Kurdish problem as affecting Turkey and Iraq was discussed frankly, but in the same friendly spirit; no direct complaint was made of the weakness of the Iraq Government, owing to which the Sheikh of Barzan had been able to support the Kurdish rebels in Turkey, and, indeed, due allowance seemed to be given to the fact that the Iraq Government had not yet been able to bring the Sheikh's district into complete control. But the High Commissioner was asked to press upon the Iraq Government the necessity for them to take effective measures in the interests of both countries, and I feel that

Sir F. Humphrys was able to convince the Turks that it was not goodwill so much as material force that was lacking in Bagdad, and his assurance that he would impress the facts upon the Iraq Government immediately on his return clearly gave confidence and satisfaction.

6. Sir F. Humphrys took the opportunity to point out that the Permanent Frontier Commission was designed for such matters and that [illegible] if [illegible] slowed a more active [illegible].

7. The High Commissioner's visit happened also to coincide with the receipt [illegible] Government seeking permission for their troops [illegible] Iraq [illegible] Telegram No. 141 of to-day, the Permanent Under-Secretary when describing the present situation of the Turkish troops on the frontier, [illegible] that there was no intention of asking for leave to cross the [illegible] and said that renewed instructions had been sent to the Turkish officer in command to respect the integrity of Iraq territory.

8. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Bagdad.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

CHAPTER IV.—PALESTINE.

E 3747/226/65] No. 1.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 1000.)

Sir,

Washington, July 2, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report that the breach which occurred in the American [illegible] Supreme Court Justice Brandeis and Federal Judge Mack, was healed, at least nominally, on the 1st instant as the result of action taken by the thirty-third annual convention of the Zionist Organisation of America at Cleveland, Ohio, in confirmation of an agreement reached by negotiation between the Brandeis-Mack group and the Zionist administration, of which Mr. Louis Lipsky has been president ever since the breach.

2. The machinery of reunion takes the form of a coalition, the relative future strength of the two factions in the various bodies composing the Zionist Organisation being carefully laid down. There is to be an "administrative committee" of eighteen members, twelve being adherents of the Brandeis-Mack faction (including Judge Mack and Dr. Stephen Wise), and six being supporters of the former administration (including Mr. Lipsky himself), an "executive committee" of [illegible] committee" of 150 members, 100 elected by the convention, and 50 chosen by the Brandeis-Mack group. Provision is also said to have been made for the representation of the latter group on the Jewish agency.

3. Press accounts of the convention, which was marked by stormy scenes, are, however, confused, and in particular no indication is given as to the extent to which agreement has been reached regarding the future policies of the American Zionist Organisation. I shall endeavour to obtain information on this point and embody it in a further despatch.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

E 6963/226/65 No. 130

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 2007. Confidential.)

Sir,

Washington, December 18, 1930.

[illegible] Mr. Louis Marshall, [illegible] New York. He [illegible] United States Ambassador [illegible] GB [illegible] Zionist Jew [illegible] Zionist that [illegible] copy of his message [illegible] day was more interesting. He said that the Jews were [illegible] he would hardly admit that there was any sincerity, conviction, or [illegible] behind their movement. Mr. Justice Brandeis, he said, had never realised that he was a Jew [illegible] ambitions of a legal career. The others were out for publicity and self glorification. Their object was to smash relations between America and Great Britain and unless care was taken they would succeed. And yet, he said, they were not truly representative of the best Jewish feeling in America, which was far more of his way of thinking. Felix Warburg, he said, was at heart anti-Zionist, but he had been coaxed into lending the authority of his name to Zionism and could not now get out again. Except Rabbi Wise, of New York, none of the great rabbis of America were in favour of the movement, which was lacking in real backing among the Jewish community.

2. A few days ago I lunched with the editorial staff of the "New York Times" and made the acquaintance of Mr. Adolph Ochs, controlling owner of that journal, also known as an anti-Zionist Jew. I said to him that I had been a good deal concerned at the recent manifestations of unrest among the Jews of America over

Palestine and feared it might cause [illegible] between Great Britain and [illegible] Mr. Ochs [illegible] Zionists [illegible] good [illegible] the Jews in the other camp.

3. To-day I spoke to Mr. Cotton at the State Department and voiced to him my apprehensions as I had voiced them to Mr. Ochs. Mr. Cotton [illegible] the matter a very serious one indeed. The Zionists, he said, now included in [illegible] organisation virtually all the orthodox Jews of America, [illegible] those who adhered faithfully to their religion. They were men of very great ability, influence and determination. He had asked for twenty minutes with Mr. [illegible] report [illegible] best document but completely inept. He had spent three months of the Court's vacation in an intensive study of [illegible] court, were not at present exerting any pressure on the State Department. They understood that His Majesty's Government [illegible] that [illegible]

4. I said that I looked forward with [illegible] the possibility of Palestine becoming a subject of official discussion [illegible] Such a contingency seemed to me [illegible] of fruitful result. [illegible]

5. Mr. Cotton said [illegible] had been completely non-committal. He had listened and said nothing at all. He had instructed his Department to act similarly. They had wanted to examine the [illegible] prepare reports on its various aspects—he had told them to refrain [illegible] activity.

6. I should infer that the Zionists of America are at present engaged in a campaign to bring all the Jews of America of any note within the [illegible] the moment for action comes [illegible] land have adhered to Zionism, [illegible] put up any strong resistance, for they will be represented [illegible] not as anti-Zionists, but as anti-Jews. If Mr. [illegible] a population of 4 [illegible] of policy by His Majesty's Government [illegible] look forward [illegible] of the [illegible] more than in [illegible] divert the policy of the whole Government [illegible] Mr. Cotton [illegible] his head in the sand is not encouraging.

7. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Ottawa.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 3728 506 65] No. 131

Mr A Henderson to M de Fleuriau

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, July 15, 1930*

ON the 15th October last your Excellency left at the Foreign Office a memorandum regarding the question of the claim of a French group in respect of a pre-war concession for the extraction of salt deposits from the Dead Sea. When making this communication, you expressed the hope of the French Government that His Majesty's Government would reconsider their previous decision, communicated to you in my note of the 20th August, 1929, to refuse arbitration on this question.

2. In view of your representations on the subject, His Majesty's Government [illegible] they are now prepared to agree to the submission of the present question to arbitration [illegible] following four conditions —

(a) That the French Government agree themselves to adopt and accept responsibility for the claim put forward by the French group

(b) That the French Government agree that the point to be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague is whether any right possessed by the French Government in international law [illegible] the refusal of His Majesty's Government to recognise the validity of the concession.

(c) That the French Government agree to the insertion in the terms of reference to the Permanent Court of a provision enabling the Court to award costs to the successful party.

(d) That the French Government agree to the reference to arbitration of the British claims arising out of disturbances in Syria in 1925 and 1926, as presented to the French Government by His Majesty's Embassy in Paris in November 1926 and April 1927

3. As regards this last condition, I shall be glad if you will draw the attention of the French Government to the fact that, in a note dated the 4th May, 1929, His Majesty's Embassy in Paris informed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government had no option but to make the formal request—which, in the [illegible] delayed—that the whole matter should be referred to arbitration, in accordance with articles 1 and 2 of the Anglo-French Arbitration Agreement of the 14th October, 1903. It was explained that if the French Government considered that neither the Permanent Court of International Justice, nor the Permanent Court of Arbitration were suitable for the arbitration of these claims, where the amount at issue was comparatively small, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider any alternative proposal which the French Government might put forward, and various suggestions were made as to the form of arbitration which might suitably be adopted No official reply has been received by His Majesty's Government to this proposal notwithstanding frequent reminders on the part of His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris.

4. If the French Government agree to the four conditions put forward above, His Majesty's Government will [illegible] arrangements for the submission to arbitration of the French group's claim to the Dead Sea Salts Concession.

I have &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON

[E 4183 107/ 89] No. 132

Mr A. Henderson to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 1652.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 7, 1930*

AS you are aware the informal [illegible] Syria [illegible] 19th July, resulted in an agreement between the British and French delegations to refer to their respective Governments for approval a formula providing for a reference of the question of the frontier to the League of Nations. A copy of the text of this formula [illegible] Iraqi and Transjordan Governments have now both concurred in its terms.

2. I shall, accordingly, be glad if your Lordship will now inform the French Government that the formula, the precise terms of which should be set out in the communication to the French Government [illegible] French Government, under cover of an official note, a map showing the frontier which they believe to be that defined by the Anglo-French convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

3. [illegible] You should accordingly [illegible] map in order to indicate the [illegible] convention, explaining at [illegible] ce, whose stock of the map [illegible] copy, [illegible] Tigris to El Hamme, and that two sets of these photographs will be put at the disposal of the French Government should they be prepared to agree to the above [illegible]

4. As the French Government will realise, little time remains for the exchange of correspondence [illegible] League of Nations [illegible] Government and ask them to be good enough to return a very early reply to your communication.

I am, &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON

Enclosure to No. 132.

Syria–Iraq and Syria–Transjordan Frontier.

Formula agreed on by the British and Foreign Delegations in Paris on July 19, 1930.

(A) IT is suggested that the two Governments should communicate to each other, [illegible] frontier which each [illegible] have [illegible] December, 1

(B) It is suggested that the two Governments should, at the next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations:—

(1) Inform the Council of the circumstances in which they have found it impossible to continue and complete the work of the commission established by article 2 [illegible] which they consider to be the frontier [illegible] the conventions to which they consider [illegible] that [illegible] proposed by the other Government to be subject

(II) Should invite the Council of the League :—

(1) To examine all the differences of every kind which exist between them in regard to the frontier laid down by the convention of the 23rd December, 1920, between the States of Syria and Jebel Druse on the one hand and Iraq and Transjordan on the other

(2) As a preliminary step towards this end, to appoint a commission which, after having taken cognisance of memoranda and counter-memoranda to be laid before them by the two Governments in order to define their respective points of view, will undertake on the spot all necessary enquiries and, when reporting to the Council, will indicate on a map to be prepared for the purpose by the two parties the frontier which they recommend. The commission shall take account of the physical configuration of the ground, tribal needs, administrative convenience and considerations of public security

(3) To formulate on the basis of the convention of 1920, and in the light of the commission's report, a definite solution of the questions at issue which shall be binding on all parties concerned.

[E 4863/1511/44] No. 133.

Acting Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 54. Confidential.)

Aleppo, August 24, 1930

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that in the course of a conversation I had yesterday with M. Lavastre, the assistant delegate, the name of Colonel Lawrence was mentioned, and I received the impression that it is held in official circles here that he is implicated in the Kurdish revolt. M. Lavastre, in fact, admitted that an official report stated that Colonel Lawrence was on the Turco-Syrian frontier to the north west of Aleppo. He himself did not seem inclined to believe it, however, and this is probably the work of a "renseignement" officer, who, from my short experience, appear as a class to be singularly credulous.

2. [illegible] the Arabic press fix his headquarters at Maku on the Turco-Persian frontier, while an official denial in the French press at Beirut is received with a smile. Anti-French elements hope that Great Britain is using this in order to make difficulties for France on the Turco-Syrian border, while many sections of the community blame France for appearing to go beyond the obligations of the "Bon Voisinage" agreement. I have heard on reliable authority that the French have ordered Kurdish chiefs near the frontier to move into the interior, while it is said that they have kidnapped a notable Kurdish religious leader of Syrian nationality, and have [illegible] Kilis. It is also stated that the Turks have stationed 3,000 regular troops between Severek and Diarbekir to frustrate any movement on the part of the Syrian Kurdish tribes.

3. Meanwhile the Armenians are watching developments, and there is certainly an important section who would welcome a combined effort with the Kurds.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.

[E 4895/506/65] No. 134.

M. de Fleuriau to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Communicated by French Ambassador on September 10.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 4 septembre 1930

M. le Secrétaire d'Etat,

PAR sa lettre du 15 juillet dernier, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire savoir que le Gouvernement britannique était disposé à soumettre au jugement de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale les réclamations du groupe français intéressé à la concession accordée avant la guerre pour l'exploitation des gisements de sels de potasse de la mer Morte.

[illegible]

A cet égard, j'ai été chargé de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence ce [illegible]

La première condition formulée au nom du Gouvernement de Sa M[illegible] [illegible] eût autant pour conséquence d'obliger celui-ci à soumettre ce différend au Parlement, ce qui entraînerait des retards préjudiciables.

La seconde condition qui paraît avoir [illegible] qu'avec le fait qu'il a été envisa[illegible] Justice internationale paraît [illegible] employées dans les compromis [illegible] soumettre les réclamations de leur [illegible] tiut pas assez en lumière que les [illegible] (1) si, selon le droit et l'[illegible] représenté par MM. du Boullay, Kiener [illegible] mer Morte est [illegible] droit de déposséder ce groupe, et (2) si le Gouvernement britannique a ce droit, moyennant quelle indemnité.

Quant à la question des de[illegible] [illegible] objet de la troisième condition énoncée par le [illegible] la Cour permanente de Justice internationale [illegible] exacte de l'article 36 de son règlement, qui vise de telles condamnations, n'est pas nettement définie, étant donné qu'en dehors des frais et [illegible] ne serait pas, dans ces conditions, en mesure d[illegible] quatrième condition posée par le Gouvernement de Sa M[illegible] [illegible] troubles survenus en Syrie en 1925 et 1926. [illegible] ses ressortissants à la suite des [illegible] que le Gouvernement bri[illegible] d'une Puissance mandataire [illegible] que le Gouvernement britan[illegible] sérieux motifs. Aussi n'a-t-il [illegible] ments de donner suite à leur [illegible] formulée par le [illegible] La question à soum[illegible] [illegible] ugée conformément aux indications four[illegible] on. Il n'y aurait plus d'objections à la clause proposée par le Gouvernement britannique au sujet de paiement des frais par la partie pedd[illegible] Il [illegible]

Veuillez, &c.

A. DE FLEURIAU.

E 4896 1077/89] No. 135.

Lord Tyrrell to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 1618.)

Sir, *Paris, September 10, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum received yesterday from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply to the communication addressed to them in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 1652 of the 7th August concerning the Syria–Iraq and Syria–Transjordan frontiers.

2. You will see that the French Government accept the procedure suggested for submitting this question to the Council of the League of Nations, and I therefore propose to proceed forthwith to the exchange of notes provided for in paragraph (A) of the formula of the 19th July, 1930, basing my communication on paragraph 6 of the letter addressed by Mr. Lloyd, of the Colonial Office, to Lord Monteagle on the 23rd August, copy of which was enclosed in Lord Monteagle's letter to Mr. Holman of the 25th August. A second communication will at the same time be made in the sense of paragraph 7 of Mr. Lloyd's above-mentioned letter.

3. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as you will see, have prepared a draft of the joint communication to be made to the Council of the League of Nations in accordance with paragraph (B) of the formula. I shall be glad to learn as soon as [illegible] whether it meets with your approval and whether I may so inform the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

4. As the result of an interview which a member of the staff has had with the Ministry, I understand that the French Government are quite willing that the question should be submitted to the present session of the Council if it is possible to make the necessary communications in the time available. The Ministry had, however, ascertained that owing to climatic conditions the proposed frontier delimitation commission could in any case not start work before March next and, this being so, they rather questioned whether it might not be preferable to reserve the question for submission at the January session.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
R. M. A. HANKEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 135.

Memorandum from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

PAR une note en date du 8 août dernier, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britan- [illegible] conclusions auxquelles s'est arrêté le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique après avoir pris connaissance du rapport de la délégation britannique ayant participé à l'échange de vues officieux qui s'est poursuivi à Paris du 16 au 19 juillet dernier au sujet de la frontière définie par la Convention de Londres du 23 décembre 1920.

[illegible] par la délégation britannique diffèrent sur certains points de la formule examinée au cours de la réunion du 19 juillet, la procédure proposée apparaît dans ses lignes générales comme acceptable pour le Gouvernement français.

La formule examinée au cours de la séance du 19 juillet ne comportait pas de recommandation d'après laquelle les deux Gouvernements se communiqueraient des cartes indiquant ce que chacun d'entre eux considère comme étant le tracé de la frontière de 1920. Le Gouvernement français est toutefois disposé à annexer cette carte, à titre d'indication, à la définition de la frontière de 1920 qu'il se propose de communiquer au Gouvernement britannique et accepte que soit utilisée à cette fin la reproduction photographique de la carte anglaise au 1,000,000e de 1916.

[illegible] au Conseil de la Société des Nations, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire parvenir [illegible] à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique un projet qui paraît répondre aux [illegible] Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Les pages 1, 2 et 3 de ce projet constituent l'exposé historique prévu par le paragraphe 1 de la note précitée de l'Ambassade.

La page 4 du projet correspond en substance aux trois alinéas du paragraphe 2 de cette même note.

A ce document seraient jointes :

1. L'interprétation donnée par le Gouvernement britannique aux termes de la [illegible] tion de 1920, définissant la frontière entre les États sous mandat britannique et les États sous mandat français ;
2. L'interprétation donnée par le Gouvernement français de cette même définition ;
   (Et éventuellement, si la critique de ces interprétations n'est pas réservée pour être développée, dans les mémoires et répliques) :
3. Les observations qu'aurait suggérées au Gouvernement britannique l'interprétation française de la convention, et
4. Les observations que suggérerait au Gouvernement français l'interprétation britannique de cette même convention.

Les quatre annexes constitueraient l'exposé du di[illegible] paragra[illegible] Sa Majesté.

Le Gouvernement français est tout disposé pour sa part, si le Gouvernement [illegible] Sa Majesté l'interprétation française des termes de la convention de 1920 définissant la frontière.

Le Ministère des Affaires [illegible] son désir de presser l'application [illegible] tion de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté [illegible] de correspondances nécessaires à [illegible] délai très court que représente la [illegible] impossibilité dans laquelle se trouverait [illegible] janvier [illegible] Gouvernements britannique et français à la préparation des mémoires et répliques [illegible] de la [illegible] l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique.

Au cas donc où les circonstances ne permettraient pas de saisir [illegible] Conseil le règlement définitif de la question n'en aurait pas [illegible]

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Paris, le 9 septembre 1930.

Enclosure 2 in No. 135.

Projet de Requête commune au Conseil de la Société des Nations.

AU mois de décembre 1920, les Gouvernements britannique et français, désireux [illegible] régler complètement les problèmes soulevés par l'application [illegible] traité sur la Syrie [illegible]

Les [illegible] signé à Londres [illegible]

L'article [illegible] les [illegible] britannique et les terres [illegible] français.

A [illegible] le [illegible] Société des Nations [illegible]

Les [illegible] par la suite [illegible] aux dispositions de l'article 29 du Traité de Sèvres relatives aux lignes à déterminer sur le terrain.

La commission se réunit en juin 1921 et procéda à l'abornement de la frontière jusqu'à El Hamme.

Au delà de ce point, elle se heurta à la difficulté d'établir un tracé qui tînt compte des conditions locales, en ce qui concerne notamment le sud de Djebel Druse. La commission, ayant constaté l'impossibilité dans laquelle elle se trouvait de résoudre cette difficulté, suspendit ses travaux, qui ne furent pas repris depuis lors.

La reprise de ces travaux supposait l'envoi à la commission de directives [illegible] entre les Gouvernements britannique et français, et un examen des conditions d'application de la Convention de Londres ne pouvait être utilement entrepris entre ces deux Gouvernements avant l'attribution définitive de toutes les parties des territoires auxquels s'appliquait cette convention.

Cette dernière condition s'étant trouvée réalisée du fait de la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations en date du 16 décembre 1925 et de la signature de l'Accord franco-turc du 22 juin 1929, les Gouvernements britannique et français procédèrent à une étude de l'ensemble du problème de la frontière non encore délimitée, telle qu'elle est définie par la convention du 23 décembre 1920.

Au cours de cette étude les deux Gouvernements constatèrent, d'une part, l'existence en divers points de la frontière de difficultés analogues à celles qui avaient arrêté la commission en 1921, et, d'autre part, des divergences d'interprétation portant sur les [illegible] sous mandat britannique et territoires sous mandat français.

Les Gouvernements britannique et français empêchés, à défaut d'un accord sur le [illegible] sur de directives à donner à la [illegible] des théorique telles [illegible] et équitable d'[illegible] territoires sur lesquels s'exercent [illegible] (1) à examiner toutes les divergences de quelque nature qu'elles soient qui subsistent entre eux au sujet du tracé de la frontière définie par la Convention franco britannique du 23 décembre 1920, (2) à instituer une commission qui, après avoir pris connaissance des observations présentées au Conseil par les deux parties au sujet de cette frontière, entreprenne sur place toutes enquêtes et vérifications nécessaires, les résultats de cette enquête devant être reportés sur une carte établie à cet effet par les deux parties et qui sera j[illegible] rapport de la commission au Conseil ; (3) à indiquer, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 2 de la convention du 23 décembre 1920, sur la base de ladite convention et au vu du rapport de la commission, une solution définitive des questions en litige.

E 4896/1077/89] No. 136

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. R. H. Campbell (Paris).

(No. 83.)
Telegraphic.] R. *Foreign Office, September 11, 1930.*

YOUR despatch No. 1018 of the 10th September: Syria Iraq and Syria-Transjordan frontier.

Formula quoted at end of French draft reference to Council differs materially from that which French and British delegates agreed, on 19th July, to refer to their Governments (see enclosure in my despatch No. 1652 of 7th August). His Majesty's Government had hoped that their readiness to omit final sentence in clause 2 (see penultimate paragraph of Lord Monteagle's letter of 19th August to Mr. Wigram) would enable French Government to accept remainder of formula without further modification.

Modifications now introduced appear to have effect of focussing attention on interpretation issue and of unduly restricting powers of proposed commission.

In order to facilitate early settlement, however, His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept revised French formula, provided clause 2 is amended to conform [illegible] of Paris B (1) 2 of draft formula enclosed in my despatch No. 1652 of 7th August. His Majesty's Government presume that, notwithstanding omission of words "which shall be binding on all parties concerned" at end of clause 3, binding character of Council's eventual decision is adequately assured by reference to article 2 of 1920 convention, and they are prepared to agree to omission of words on this understanding.

As regards general question of joint communication to League, you will see, from [illegible] enclosed in my despatch No. 1745 of 20th August, that joint communication was then regarded as impracticable. In order to facilitate early reference to League, His Majesty's Government are, however, prepared to agree to joint, or identic, communication on lines of draft enclosed in French note of 9th September, subject to amendment of final formula, as indicated above, and subject to omission (as apparently contemplated in certain eventualities by French Government themselves), of enclosures 3 and 4 (i.e., British and French [illegible] line). Reasons for this proposed omission are as follows:—

Section B (1) of Paris formula, enclosed in my despatch No. 1652 of 7th August provided that the two Governments should inform the Council "of the inconveniences to which they consider both that frontier" (i.e., their own interpretation of 1920 line) "and the frontier propounded by the other Government to be subject." There was no intention of providing for detailed discussion of interpretation question at this stage, but merely for presentation of outline of case on merits. Since His Majesty's Government must insist on retention in clause 2 of final formula of provision for presentation of memoranda and counter-memoranda to commission, they are prepared to agree with suggestion of French Government that preliminary argument before Council is unnecessary. They regard it as essential however, that maps should be attached to enclosures 1 and 2, and are glad to note that French Government agree to this being done.

Omission of enclosures 3 and 4 would have further great advantage of simplifying procedure and expediting early reference to Geneva.

His Majesty's Government greatly hope that French Government will agree to adoption of Paris draft of first sentence of clause 2 of final formula as indicated above, and to omission from communication to League of enclosures 3 and 4. On these conditions, they are prepared to arrange for signature of proposed joint communication to Geneva as soon as French Government's note and map showing their interpretation of convention line have been received. They would, however, suggest that in order to obviate further possibilities of delay the two Governments should send to Geneva separate communications in identic terms.

E 5045/1077/89] No. 137

Mr. R. H. Campbell to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 1016.)
Sir, *Paris, September 17, 1930.*

I HAVE [illegible] to transmit to you herewith copy of the reply just received from the Ministry [illegible] instructions contained in your telegram No. 83 of the 11th September on the subject of the Syrian-Iraq and Syrian-Transjordan frontiers.

2. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, you will see, have no special observations to offer on the [illegible] Council should be binding on all parties; (b) that enclosures 3 and 4 to the communication to the Council proposed by the French Government (i.e., the French and British observations on the British and French interpretations respectively of the 1920 line) should be omitted; and (c) that maps should be attached to the enclosures 1 and 2 to the aforesaid communication, provided, however, that the written description of the [illegible] of reference. On the other hand, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are quite unable to accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government to the effect that paragraph 2 of the [illegible] of the 9th September should be amended so as to conform with the first sentence of [illegible] British [illegible]

3. I shall be grateful if I may receive instructions as to the reply which I should make to the French Government [illegible] Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the matter of the formula and the various methods of communication to the Council now suggested.

I have, &c.
R. H. CAMPBELL.

Enclosure in No. 137

Memorandum from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

PAR une note en date du 12 de ce mois, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique à Paris a bien voulu faire part au Ministère des Affaires étrangères des observations qu'avait suggérées au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la lecture de la note du Ministère des Affaires étrangères en date du 9 de ce mois, relative à la question de la frontière entre États sous mandat britannique et États sous mandat français.

Aux termes de cette communication, le Gouvernement britannique, estimant que la rédaction du projet français a pour effet de concentrer l'attention sur la question de [illegible] commission, serait toutefois disposé à adopter la formule française, sous réserve :

1. Que le deuxième paragraphe du projet français de requête au Conseil soit modifié conformément au texte de la première phrase du paragraphe (B) (II) 2) de la formule britannique contenue dans la note de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté du 8 août dernier ;
2. Qu'il soit bien entendu que la décision éventuelle du Conseil serait obligatoire pour les parties en cause ;
3. Que les annexes 3 et 4 de la communication projetée soient supprimées ;
4. Que des cartes soient jointes aux annexes 1 et 2 de cette même communication.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique que les points 2, 3 et 4 ne suggèrent pas d'observations particulières au Gouvernement français, étant entendu toutefois, en ce qui concerne le point 4, que les cartes jointes n'auraient que la valeur d'une simple indication et que la description écrite de la frontière vaudrait seule comme référence.

Le point 1, par contre, apparaît au Gouvernement français comme d'une [illegible] prévue pour l'introduction de la requête au Conseil.

La formule britannique du 8 août dernier tendrait en effet à interdire au Conseil tout examen de l'aspect théorique du problème, à savoir de l'interprétation à donner à la frontière théorique de 1920, avant que la commission d'enquête ait présenté son rapport, à communiquer directement à la commission et non au Conseil les mémoires et réponses des deux Gouvernements, et à charger la commission de proposer une frontière dont le tracé serait arrêté uniquement d'après les données recueillies sur place, en raison de l'impossibilité pour la commission de tenir compte des termes de la convention dont le sens n'aurait pas été préalablement déterminé.

Cette procédure aurait pour effet de traiter le problème de la frontière, sous le couvert d'une simple référence à la convention du 23 décembre 1920, comme une question entièrement nouvelle, et de la résoudre, en raison de l'imprécision du texte régissant la matière, suivant les seules données qu'énumérait la deuxième phrase du paragraphe B (II) (2) de la note de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique en date du 8 août.

Le Gouvernement français, en ce qui le concerne, n'a pas cessé de considérer le [illegible] Dans l'esprit du Gouvernement français, il ne s'agit pas en l'espèce de substituer à cette convention un arrangement pratique destiné à tenir compte de certaines considérations de fait, mais de déterminer d'un commun accord le sens d'une convention dont le premier effet a été d'attribuer aux États sous mandat britannique et aux États sous mandat français des territoires d'une superficie donnée, puis de rechercher, sur la base de cette convention, tels arrangements d'ordre pratique qui, par le moyen de compensations réciproques, tiendraient compte à la fois et des droits et des intérêts des parties en cause.

L'interprétation à donner à la convention de 1920 apparaît donc au Gouvernement français comme d'une importance primordiale, et la divergence de vues constatée au cours des récents entretiens de Paris, divergence sans laquelle le Gouvernement a toute raison de penser qu'un accord aimable eût pu intervenir, comme dominant toute la question et conditionnant la solution à intervenir.

La rédaction proposée par la note du Ministère des Affaires étrangères en date du 9 de ce mois correspondait donc à une intention bien précise. Pressentant la possibilité d'un désaccord sur la procédure à adopter par le Conseil pour instruire l'affaire qui lui serait [illegible] et

dont la note de Sa Majesté britannique en date du 8 août permettait de préciser les termes [illegible] à la décision de cette assemblée. Cette manière de faire était conforme aux termes de la convention de 1920, qui prévoit le recours au Conseil, mais ne fixe aucune règle de procédure.

Dans ce même esprit, le Gouvernement français se proposait d'adresser au Conseil [illegible]

Se conformant, d'autre part, au précédent du règlement relatif à la frontière [illegible] dispositions d'un accord dont le sens resterait incertain, mais de fournir au Conseil tous éléments de fait destinés à le guider dans sa recherche d'une solution tenant compte des droits et des intérêts des parties en cause.

Des correspondances récemment échangées entre l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté [illegible] l'Ambassade en date du 12 septembre, il paraît résulter que les seuls points sur lesquels un accord existe actuellement entre les Gouvernements britannique et français soient le [illegible] manière de voir ci-dessus exposée, il semble que le Conseil ne puisse être pratiquement saisi que sous l'une des trois formes suivantes :

1. Ou requête commune telle que celle qui a fait l'objet de la note du Ministère des Affaires étrangères en date du 9 de ce mois, qui laisse aux deux parties la possibilité de préciser leur position devant le Conseil ;
2. Ou formule plus brève invitant le Conseil à se saisir du différend et à prévoir l'envoi d'une commission sur place, les deux parties se réservant d'exposer [illegible] Conseil par requêtes séparées leur manière de voir en ce qui concerne [illegible]
3. Ou brève déclaration commune des représentants britannique et français au Conseil, annonçant le dépôt devant le Conseil de requêtes séparées exposant le différend dont le Conseil serait saisi.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères croit devoir dès à présent indiquer à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté [illegible] Conseil serait saisi par requête séparée, conformément à l'une des procédures 2 et 3 ci-dessus décrites, insisterait dans les conclusions de sa requête avec toute la netteté désirable sur la référence [illegible] qui est à l'origine du litige, et suggérerait une consultation juridique ou pourrait procéder [illegible]

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 16 septembre 1930.

E 5758 506 65] No. 138

Mr. A. Henderson to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, October 26, 1930*

I HAVE to thank you for your note of the 4th September regarding the [illegible]

2. Your Excellency explains in this note that the French Government, where [illegible] Government to submit the reference of this question to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, are [illegible] of the [illegible] Government have [illegible] propose that the claim put forward by the French group against His Majesty's Government shall be

submitted, not to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, as originally proposed by the French Government and now conditionally agreed to by His Majesty's Government, but to a special arbitral tribunal to be constituted for the purpose—a proposal which, in their view, would render the conditions put forward by His Majesty's Government unnecessary and inapplicable. They further suggest the terms of reference which might suitably be agreed upon if this procedure were to be adopted.

3. His Majesty's Government have now considered the various arguments put forward in your Excellency's note in support of the attitude adopted by the French Government in this matter, and, to my regret, cannot regard them as either valid or well-founded.

4. The first condition put forward by His Majesty's Government was that the French Government should themselves adopt and accept responsibility for the claim put forward by the French group. Your Excellency states that this condition does not correspond to the dispositions ordinarily found in arbitration proceedings, that its object is not clear to the French Government, and that it would necessitate the reference of the dispute to the French Parliament, a proceeding which would involve a regrettable delay. The second condition put forward by His Majesty's Government was that the French Government should agree that the point to be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague was whether any right possessed by the French Government in international law had been infringed by the refusal of His Majesty's Government to recognise the validity of the concession. Your Excellency explains that this condition, which is linked to the preceding one, seems at variance with the procedure usually adopted when two States agree to submit the claims of their nationals to arbitration, and that it does not sufficiently emphasise the particular points at issue, the French Government's conception of which your Excellency then proceeds to define.

5. In replying to these arguments I will begin by requesting your Excellency to draw the attention of the French Government to the following quotations from certain recent judgments of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, which, though immediately concerned with other cases, establish certain general principles which have a direct bearing on the present issue :—

6. Extract from judgment of the Permanent Court in the Mavrommatis case ("Publications of the Court," Series A, No. 2, p. 11) :—

"It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. *By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights—its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.*

"*The question, therefore, whether the present dispute originates in an injury to a private interest, which, in point of fact, is the case in many international disputes, is irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is sole claimant. . . . .*

"*It is true that the State does not substitute itself for its subject; it is asserting its own rights, and, consequently, factors foreign to the previous discussions between the individual and the competent authorities may enter into the diplomatic negotiations. . . . .*"

7. Extract from judgment of the Permanent Court relating to the Chorzow Factory ("Publications of the Court," Series A, No. 17, p. 28) :—

"It is a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the injured State have suffered as a result of the act which is contrary to international law. . . . . *The reparation due by one State to another does not, however, change its character by reason of the fact that it takes the form of an indemnity for the calculation of which the damage suffered by a private person is taken as the measure.* The rules of law governing the reparation are the rules of international law in force between the two States concerned and not the law governing relations between the State which has committed a wrongful act and the individual who has suffered damage. Rights or interests of an individual, the violation of which rights causes damage, are always in a different plane to rights belonging to a State, which rights may also be infringed by the same act. The damage suffered by an individual is never, therefore, identical in kind with that which will be suffered by a State; it can only afford a convenient scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State."

8. Extract from judgment of the Permanent Court in the case of the Serbian loans ("Publications of the Permanent Court," Series A, Nos. 20 and 21, pp. 15, 17 and 18) :—

". . . . It is true, however, that, in the preamble, as also in article 1 above quoted, the Special Agreement defines the dispute by stating, not the respective contentions of the two Governments, but, on the one hand, that of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, and, on the other, that of the French bondholders; the court will revert to this point. . . . .

"Nevertheless, according to the strict terms of the Special Agreement, the controversy submitted to the court does not appear as a dispute between the two Governments, but as one between the Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom and the French bondholders of certain Serbian loans. . . . .

"It follows that if the dispute referred to the court by the Special Agreement between France and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State were to be regarded as a dispute between the Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom and certain bondholders of the loans, one of the essential conditions of procedure before the court, namely, the legal capacity of the parties, would be unfulfilled.

"In this connexion, reference should be made to what the court has said on several occasions, and in particular in Judgments Nos. 2 and 13, namely, that *by taking up a case on behalf of its nationals before an international tribunal, a State is asserting its own right—that is to say, its right to ensure in the person of its subjects respect for the rules of international law. . . . .*

"It is, however, to be noted that the question whether the manner in which the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government is conducting the service of its loans is in accordance with the obligations accepted by it, is no longer merely the subject of a controversy between that Government and its creditors. When the holders of the Serbian loans, considering that their rights were being disregarded, appealed to the French Government, the latter intervened on their behalf with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. Diplomatic negotiations followed; but, whatever took place during these negotiations, it is common ground that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government did not reject the intervention of the French Government, but contended that the service of the loans was being effected by it in full conformity with the obligations resulting from the contracts. This view, however, was not shared by the Government of the French Republic. As from this point, therefore, there exists between the two Governments a difference of opinion, which, though fundamentally identical with the controversy already existing between the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government and its creditors, is distinct therefrom; for it is between the Governments of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom and that of the French Republic, the latter acting in the exercise of its right to protect its nationals. It is this difference of opinion between the two Governments and not the dispute between the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government and the French holders of the loans, which is submitted by the Special Agreement to the court. . . . ."

9. It will be apparent from the above quotations that it is well-established that, when a State makes representations to another State with regard to the treatment of its nationals by that State, and there is a difference of opinion between them, which is referred to arbitration or to judicial settlement, (1) the parties to the difference so referred are the two States, (2) the claimant State claims for an injury done to itself in the person of its national or nationals, and (3) the claimant State must establish, in order to succeed, a breach of international law. Moreover, it is clear that, in the opinion of the Permanent Court, this is, in fact, the case even if the terms of the special agreement refer (incorrectly in the court's opinion), to the claim of the national or nationals of the claimant State on the one hand, and the contentions of the Government of the defendant State on the other.

10. The French Government will thus see that the first and second of the conditions, which His Majesty's Government have put forward, correspond exactly

with the view of the legal position which has been taken by the Permanent Court of International Justice itself. His Majesty's Government, in agreeing to submit the present dispute to the court on these conditions, are, indeed, giving to France everything which, in the opinion of the Permanent Court, France is entitled to demand; namely, the submission, to the highest international jurisdiction, of such claim as the French Government may think fit to put forward, on the basis of an alleged injury to France, in the person of French nationals, caused by action contrary to international law. Such a submission would enable the court, if it should hold the French claim to be justified, to award damages for any such injury of which France is legally entitled to complain. His Majesty's Government accordingly hope that, in view of this explanation, the meaning of their first condition will now be clear to the French Government, and that the French Government will recognise that the terms of their second condition exactly cover the only type of claim which France is entitled to make against His Majesty's Government in international law.

11. As to the argument that the acceptance of these conditions would necessitate a reference of the matter to the French Parliament, His Majesty's Government can only regard this as a purely French internal question, with which they are not concerned.

12. I have already explained that the submission of this claim to the Permanent Court of International Justice under the first two conditions proposed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is in exact accordance with the rulings of the Permanent Court of International Justice as to the legal position when a State puts forward claims in respect of alleged injuries to its nationals against another State and therefore, provides a means of settling, in the correct and regular manner, any claim which the French Government are entitled to make. I have not been able to find in your Excellency's note any good reason justifying in the present case a departure from the regular procedure. With regard, in particular, to your Excellency's observations on the first of His Majesty's Government's conditions, I find it difficult to understand how the French Government, if they are not prepared to assume responsibility for the present claim, can reasonably expect His Majesty's Government to regard the claim as a serious one, suitable for submission to an international tribunal. I may remind your Excellency that, until the autumn of 1927, the only interests in this claim—according to the information of His Majesty's Government—were those of British nationals. The representatives of these British nationals, having repeatedly failed to establish their case or to secure satisfaction for their demands, and seeing no other means by which they could take the matter further, then openly threatened that, if their demands were not satisfied, they would make the question an international matter, and stated that foreign interests had been brought in, admittedly for the sole purpose of enabling the claim to be taken before the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. Very shortly after this your Excellency, on the 21st February, 1928, made your first representations, on behalf of the French group, which the British claimants had now introduced into the matter.

13. I need not recapitulate the various stages of the discussion which followed, beyond reminding your Excellency that, although His Majesty's Government informed the French Government on the 16th April that they could not recognise the concession, and that two successive groups of British nationals, who had preferred claims in respect of it, had been so informed, no further communication was received from the French Government until the 9th February, 1929, when your Excellency left a second note at the Foreign Office, not containing any defence of the claim of the French group, but enclosing a draft statement prepared by the French private interests concerned, but bearing no signature, on which your Excellency refrained from expressing any definite opinion. A full reply to this statement was, nevertheless, sent to your Excellency on the 14th March, 1929, in which the refusal of His Majesty's Government to recognise the concession was supported by detailed legal arguments—arguments which appear to His Majesty's Government to be conclusive, and have never been answered.

14. These facts alone would amply justify His Majesty's Government (were any justification needed) in refusing to deal directly with the private French interests concerned, and in only consenting to consider a claim made by the French Government themselves, or for which the French Government were prepared to assume responsibility. There exists a well-recognised rule of international law, by which a State, in order to be entitled to take up a claim on behalf of its nationals against another State, must be able to show that it possessed—in the persons of its nationals—a national interest in the subject of the claim at the time when the alleged injury

occurred. His Majesty's Government have reason to doubt whether, in the present case, a claim by the French Government is justifiable under this rule; and they are not prepared to agree to any reference of this claim to an international tribunal which does not leave this point open for the appreciation of the tribunal.

15. As regards the third condition put forward by His Majesty's Government—*i.e.*, that the French Government should agree to the insertion in the terms of reference to the Permanent Court of a provision enabling the court to award costs to the successful party—a condition to which equally the French Government appear inclined to object—His Majesty's Government are prepared to admit that, so far as they are aware, no case hitherto submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague has contained a provision of this character. They consider, however, that there are certain cases in which such a provision may appropriately be made, and they are of opinion that in the present instance, and in view of the circumstances as described above which have attended this case, the insertion of such a condition is amply justified. As I have explained in paragraph 14, His Majesty's Government have already given, in reply to representations from your Excellency, reasons which appear to them to prove conclusively that the claim is without foundation, and have received no answer to these arguments. In these circumstances, it is only natural that His Majesty's Government should object to incur the expense which the hearing of such a case must inevitably entail, unless they can be assured that, in the event of their succeeding in establishing their position, they will not still be out of pocket, and that the expenses will be borne by the losing party. The proposal of His Majesty's Government that the court should award costs to the successful party, will, moreover, leave the French Government entirely free to enter, upon their part, into such arrangements as they may think fit, with the private French interests concerned, for the reimbursement to the French Government of any expense which they might thus be condemned to pay to His Majesty's Government in the event of their claim being unsuccessful before the court. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government regret that they must insist upon the maintenance of this condition, no less than of the others they have laid down, if the case is to be referred to any kind of arbitral tribunal.

16. If the French Government were prepared to accept the submission of this case to judicial decision on the conditions proposed by His Majesty's Government, the drafting of a special agreement of reference in accordance with these conditions could then be usefully considered, and His Majesty's Government would be ready to submit a draft agreement for the consideration of the French Government. Until, however, there is an agreement in principle as to these preliminary points, it does not appear that any useful purpose could be served by a discussion of points of drafting. For this reason I will not enter into any discussion in my present note of the formula set forth in paragraph 5 of your Excellency's note. I will merely state that His Majesty's Government could not in any case accept the implication, contained in paragraph 3 of that formula, that, even if His Majesty's Government held the right to "dispossess" the French group of its alleged concession, such a right could only be exercised on the payment of an indemnity by His Majesty's Government. The contention of His Majesty's Government, as your Excellency is aware, is, and has always been, that the original concession was invalid, and that the French group can accordingly have acquired no rights whatever from the British group. The formulation of paragraph 3 seems, therefore, to some extent to contain a *petitio principii*.

17. As regards the fourth condition put forward in my note of the 15th July—*i.e.*, that the French Government should now agree to the reference to arbitration of the British claims arising out of the disturbances in Syria in 1925 and 1926—I would request your Excellency to remind the French Government, in some detail, of the course of the lengthy negotiations which have taken place on this question.

18. During the Syrian rebellion of 1925–26, a number of British subjects, British protected persons, and natives of British mandated territories suffered serious loss or damage as a direct result of the action of the French military authorities, in respect of which they subsequently submitted claims against the French Government. On the 4th December, 1925, His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, under instructions from my predecessor, drew the attention of the French Government to these claims, and expressed the hope that they would be prepared to make arrangements under which British claimants would receive reasonable compensation. The French Government having replied to this communication by repudiating all responsibility for the events out of which the claims arose, and all

liability towards the claimants, the matter was discussed informally between the Legal Advisers of the Foreign Office and of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and it was explained that, if the French Government could not meet His Majesty's Government over this question in a more accommodating spirit, some kind of friendly arbitration must be pressed for. His Majesty's Government were fully conscious of the difficulties of the French Government in Syria, and did not wish to increase them. They could not, however, believe that the French Government really wished to escape liability for any mistakes committed on the French side which might justify claims. Some form of arbitration, therefore, seemed equally advantageous to both sides. These conversations having led to no result, the matter was again discussed informally between His Majesty's Embassy in Paris and the Quai d'Orsay in May 1926. In the course of these conversations His Majesty's Embassy were informed that the French Government, no less than His Majesty's Government, were anxious to settle any well-founded claims in a quiet and friendly manner. It was therefore suggested that as small a list as possible of the claims, including only those which His Majesty's Government regarded as really well-founded and were ready definitely to support, should be prepared and communicated to the Quai d'Orsay, in order that they might be examined, and, if possible, met in an amicable spirit.

19. On the receipt of this communication the claims were subjected by His Majesty's Government to a careful scrutiny, in consultation with His Majesty's consular officers in Syria. Such claims as to the soundness of which, either on legal grounds or for other reasons, there appeared to be any room for doubt were abandoned, and a carefully selected list of the strongest claims was handed to the Quai d'Orsay on the 5th November, 1926, the hope being expressed that the matter might now be disposed of without delay. No satisfactory reply was, however, received from the French Government. A supplementary list of claims, the investigation of which had not been completed when the previous list was sent in, was presented to the French Government on the 1st April, 1927. A few further claims were held up pending further enquiries by His Majesty's Government, but these have now also been communicated to the French Government.

20. On the 3rd June, 1927, the French Government sent an official reply regarding the claims presented in November 1926 and April 1927. This reply, so far from indicating any readiness on the part of the French Government to meet the claims in a friendly spirit, began by reasserting the original French denial of all responsibility for the events out of which the claims arose, and explained that the only satisfaction which the French Government could offer was a promise to allow the British claimants a share in the exiguous funds which had been collected from the rebels by way of fines—a sum entirely inadequate to meet even a small proportion of the claims.

21. During the next two years His Majesty's Government made repeated efforts to obtain a settlement of this question, indicating their readiness to accept any form of settlement which would enable them to obtain reasonable satisfaction for such claims as they regarded as well-founded and for which they were prepared to take responsibility, but emphasising the fact that it would be impossible for them to abandon the claims, and making it clear that, unless some satisfaction could be obtained, it would be necessary for them to demand arbitration. The attitude of the French Government, however, became less and less accommodating, and every fresh appeal made by His Majesty's Embassy in Paris was met either by protracted delays or by the statement that the matter must be referred to Beirut for a further report. Eventually, on the 4th May, 1929, His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, under instructions from Sir Austen Chamberlain, addressed a note to the French Government, recapitulating the history of the recent negotiations and formally demanding arbitration in this matter. No reply has been received to this communication.

22. While, therefore, His Majesty's Government do not dispute the statement contained in your Excellency's note that the question of the Syrian claims has no direct connexion with that of the present French claim in respect of the alleged Dead Sea salts concession, they cannot but feel the utmost surprise that the French Government should consider it natural and proper for His Majesty's Government to agree to the unconditional reference to arbitration of the claim of a private French group, while the French Government themselves continue to refuse to agree to any form of tribunal to decide upon British claims, which have been pressed for so long, and in respect of which His Majesty's Government have adopted so patient and conciliatory an attitude. I would further remind your Excellency that His

Majesty's Government have put forward no claim in respect of British losses arising out of the Syrian disturbances without assuring themselves that there is a *prima facie* case in international law against the French authorities, and without themselves assuming full responsibility for that claim. In these circumstances, they consider that they are entitled to demand at least reciprocity of treatment, and to insist on the French Government agreeing to arbitration in the case of the British claims as an essential condition of their own agreement to refer the present French claim to any form of international arbitration.

23. Finally, I would remind your Excellency of the recent consent of His Majesty's Government to accept arbitration in the case of the claim of Mme. Chevreau. His Majesty's Government can only regret that their unconditional compliance in this matter has not led the French Government to adopt a more conciliatory and reciprocal attitude in regard to the British claims.

24. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot consider the proposal of the French Government that the French group's claim in respect of the alleged concession for the extraction of salts from the Dead Sea should be referred to a tribunal other than the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and that it is impossible for them to abandon any of the four conditions set forth in my note of the 15th July.

I have, &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 6455/598/65] No. 139.

Consul Monck-Mason to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 81.)
Sir, *Aleppo, November* 20, 1930.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 78 of the 22nd October on the subject of communications with Iraq and North Persia, I have the honour to report that progress on the Bozanti-Afep-Nisibin and Prolongements railway line is being made in the direction of Tell Ziwan, which should be reached by February next. A modest building will be put up there to serve temporarily as a station house, and, later on, for the accommodation of staff. The aim is, of course, to make of Tell Ziwan the Syrian rail-head, but this may not happen until April or May next, pending the decision of the High Commission at Beirut.

2. M. Audoin, the manager of the railway here, tells me that at the present rate of progress trains should be able to get as far as Kubur-el-Bid (about 20 kilom. east-south-east of Tell Ziwan, and see paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 16 of the 23rd January, 1930) before the end of 1931. At Kubur-el-Bid, which, by reason of its central position in the rich agricultural district of the Duck's Bill, is destined to increase in importance, probably more or less at the expense of Kameshlié, more ambitious buildings will be erected. The High Commissioner at Beirut has promised to put up a rest house here. It is worth noting that the proposal to build a hotel at Nisibin has fallen through, while nothing has been done at Kameshlié. At the latter place, however, accommodation of some sort fit for Europeans is needed.

3. In the same way that the additional 50 kilom. of railway covered between Derbessieh and Nisibin were sufficient to start motor cars conveying passengers to Mosul, the extra 33 or 34 kilom. of railway beyond Nisibin, to Kubur-el-Bid, combined, of course, with the improvement of the roads between rail-head and Mosul, will make it possible for Kirkuk to be reached on the evening of the day that the passenger alights at Kubur-el-Bid. The weak spot on the road is the bridge at Demir-Kapu. I am assured that this work is being taken in hand by the Syrian Public Works and the bridge should be ready by the winter. This is, indeed, part of the settled programme of the Wagons-Lits Company, and its eventual execution will save nearly a day of the eight now taken to reach Bagdad. To make it possible, it will, of course, be necessary to speed up the train service in such a way that Kubur-el-Bid may be reached at the same hour of the morning as Nisibin is now reached: this can be done.

4. Other decisions tending to improve the passenger train service towards Mosul were arrived at during the conference of the Wagons-Lits Company held at Copenhagen this summer. One affects the restaurant-car service from Istanbul; in future the restaurant-car is to go on to Nisibin and not to Rayak, replacing the

present "fourgon-restaurant." The sleeping-car service is to function on the Nisibin line three times a week instead of twice, as now.

5. The Wagons-Lits Company have also decided to inaugurate during the coming year a motor-car service between Khanakin and Tehran, viâ Kermanshah and Hamadan, taking three days on the journey. The exact dates for the execution of this programme and the improvements indicated above cannot as yet be fixed.

6. The passenger service between Nisibin and Aleppo has been much appreciated by travellers during the last year, and the figures are encouraging. They should be even better when the actual rail-head is in Syrian territory. Freight figures have been disappointing, mainly on account of the dilatoriness on the part of the Syrian and Iraq authorities to ratify the agreement come to on customs matters between officials of the two countries at Aleppo in June last. It may be said that freight traffic between Iraq and Syria by the Bozanti-Alep-Nisibin and Prolongements railway line is almost at a standstill pending the decision of the two parties concerned. If the freight service of the line is to be properly tested, it is also necessary that the suggested meeting between the Syrian, Iraqi and Persian customs delegates should take place as soon as possible.

I have, &c.
A. MONCK-MASON.
